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Abstract
Building Automation Systems (BAS) are a collection of devices and software which manage the
operation of building services. The BAS market is expected to be a $19.25 billion USD industry
by 2023, as a core feature of both the Internet of Things and Smart City technologies. However,
securing these systems from cyber security threats is an emerging research area. Since initial
deployment, BAS have evolved from isolated standalone networks to heterogeneous, interconnected
networks allowing external connectivity through the Internet. The most prominent BAS protocol is
BACnet/IP, which is estimated to hold 54.6% of world market share. BACnet/IP security features
are often not implemented in BAS deployments, leaving systems unprotected against known network
threats. This research investigated methods of detecting anomalous network traffic in BACnet/IP
managed BAS in an effort to combat threats posed to these systems.
This research explored the threats facing BACnet/IP devices, through analysis of Internet
accessible BACnet devices, vendor-defined device specifications, investigation of the BACnet spe-
cification, and known network attacks identified in the surrounding literature. The collected data
were used to construct a threat matrix, which was applied to models of BACnet devices to evaluate
potential exposure. Further, two potential unknown vulnerabilities were identified and explored
using state modelling and device simulation.
A simulation environment and attack framework were constructed to generate both normal and
malicious network traffic to explore the application of machine learning algorithms to identify both
known and unknown network anomalies. To identify network patterns between the generated nor-
mal and malicious network traffic, unsupervised clustering, graph analysis with an unsupervised
community detection algorithm, and time series analysis were used. The explored methods identi-
fied distinguishable network patterns for frequency-based known network attacks when compared
to normal network traffic. However, as stand-alone methods for anomaly detection, these methods
were found insufficient. Subsequently, Artificial Neural Networks and Hidden Markov Models were
explored and found capable of detecting known network attacks. Further, Hidden Markov Models
were also capable of detecting unknown network attacks in the generated datasets.
The classification accuracy of the Hidden Markov Models was evaluated using the Matthews
Correlation Coefficient which accounts for imbalanced class sizes and assess both positive and
negative classification ability for deriving its metric. The Hidden Markov Models were found
capable of repeatedly detecting both known and unknown BACnet/IP attacks with True Positive
Rates greater than 0.99 and Matthews Correlation Coefficients greater than 0.8 for five of six
evaluated hosts.
This research identified and evaluated a range of methods capable of identifying anomalies in
simulated BACnet/IP network traffic. Further, this research found that Hidden Markov Models
were accurate at classifying both known and unknown attacks in the evaluated BACnet/IP managed
BAS network.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The total cost of reported cyber crime in Australia during 2016 was $4.3 million USD per year,
with an average of two cyber attacks per week per business (Ponemon Institute, 2016). While these
are direct costs, indirect or second order costs can manifest when the systems under attack manage
cyber-physical devices; such as buildings. Building Automation Systems (BASs), also referred to as
Building Management Systems (BMSs), are a collection of devices and software used to automate
the control of various services which comprise a building. Automation control was originally used
for heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) services, but has steadily evolved to encompass
other building services with the improvement of electronic circuitry and microprocessors. BASs are
now used to control energy management, water/waste systems, lighting, security and life-safety
systems in addition to HVAC, a typical BAS is shown as Figure 1.1. The purpose of a BAS is
essentially to optimise the operational costs and processes of a building in relation to the comfort,
safety and security of the buildings occupants, goods, and services provided within. Given that 40%
of the worlds energy costs are generated from commercial buildings, BAS can provide a significant
reduction in operational costs, through the optimisation of building services using sensing devices
and efficient load algorithms (IEA, 2015). Further, the BAS market is expected to grow from $6.65
billion USD in 2016 to $19.25 billion USD by 2023 (Wood, 2017).
Connections between BASs and other networks, such as enterprise networks and the Internet are
increasing. The core motivations for increased connectivity are reduced costs and optimised auto-
mation through remote management, outsourced cloud analytic platforms, and the future use in
smart cities and the Internet of Things (IoT) (Khaund, 2015; Baig et al., 2017). However, with in-
creased connectivity and automation, network complexity can increase (Kastner, Neugschwandtner,
Soucek & Newman, 2005; O’Neill, Bailey, Dong, Shashanka & Luo, 2013), and a need exists for
increased device and network level monitoring. While system monitoring is often undertaken for
operational means at a device level, network level monitoring is often ignored, which is of principal
interest for network security and digital forensic purposes. The lack of network monitoring can be
attributed to a historical remnant of the closed system topology, whereby access was physically re-
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stricted and thus monitoring for network security was not of concern. When externally connected,
there exists a detrimental level of network monitoring in BAS, with Kovach (2016) stating that
on average a successful adversary is connected and operating on a BAS without detection for 243
days. Coupled with tens of thousands of misconfigured BAS networks directly connected over the
Internet (Peacock & Johnstone, 2014; Johnstone et al., 2015; Praus, Kastner & Palensky, 2016;
Gasser et al., 2017), BASs are accessible to adversaries.
Figure 1.1: The Integrated Building Automation System, replicated from Kast-
ner, Neugschwandtner, Soucek and Newman (2005, p1180)
With increased accessibility comes increased cyber security threat vectors. These vectors are
a cumulative effect of the original design of BAS, namely, high trust devices, isolated topology
and extensive lifecycle. Previously, adversaries required a physical presence within, or near the
BAS for malicious action, which significantly reduced the actionable threats against BASs. With
interconnected systems the physical barrier has been removed, exposing BASs to domain specific
threats, in addition to inheriting traditionally IT based threats with the adoption of protocols
such as IP. BASs face both first and second order threats. As BASs are cyber-physical devices,
malicious action against a BAS can cause physical damage to buildings, termed cyber-kinetic attacks
(Applegate, 2013). This class of attack can be devastating economically as directly, the damage to
the building is sustained, and indirectly, the occupants, goods and services provided by the building
are reduced, causing lost opportunity costs. A range of identifiable outcomes for launching a cyber
attack against a BAS exist. There are tangible benefits, such as corporate espionage, terrorism
or data exfiltration. There are also hidden, second order benefits, such as increasing operational
costs and a businesses bottom line, or reputation damage from discomfort caused from the air-
conditioning being off in commercial complexes. In both cases, tangible and hidden, there is an
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associated direct, or underlying cost to cyber attack.
There is an increasing understanding that securing cyber-physical systems is of high import-
ance, highlighted by a number of IoT based Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, most
prominently the Mirai Botnet. The Mirai Botnet used a large number of physical devices with
low compute power to create a 600Gbps DDoS against a range of services (Herzberg, Bekerman &
Zeifman, 2016). It is not inconceivable that a similar event could occur in a BAS, due to the shared
design philosophy and characteristics between BAS and other, cyber-physical systems. A high pro-
file example of a BAS attack was conducted in 2014 against the US retail chain Target. The BAS
of a Target store was breached using a third party contractors credentials to the HVAC system.
The BAS was used as a pivot point into the corporate network, where the point of sale systems
in most US Target stores were infected with malware, resulting in 40 million credit card details
being stolen, and personal data relating to 70 million customers exposed (Vijayan, 2014; Krebs,
2014). In 2015 after the Target breach, a single credit card detail was reportedly worth between
$5 and $30 USD, dependent on the issuing bank, credit card information and geographical loca-
tion (Mcfarland, Paget & Samani, 2015). Thus, the initial cost of the Target breach was between
$200,000,000 and $1,200,000,000 USD. In addition, the second order costs included banks in the
U.S spending $200,000,000 USD on bank card replacements, the CEO and CIO of Target losing
their positions, and the sales in Target dropping 46% in the quarter after the attack, representing
reputation damage. The attack was not detected by Target, but rather Target were notified by the
U.S Department of Justice. The success of the attack was due to a combination of lack of network
segregation between the BAS, enterprise network and point of sales systems, lack of BAS network
monitoring, and the remote access credential theft from a third-party managing the HVAC system.
A focused attack against a BAS occurred in November 2016, when reports emerged of a BAS
being attacked in two apartment blocks in Finland (Roberts, 2016). The attack was originally
claimed as a DDoS against the building controller, which effectively shutdown the ability to heat
the buildings during winter. However, the attack was detected by the BAS management after the
BAS “began issuing strange alarms and could not be remotely accessed” Roberts (2016), inferring
the adversary had control of the BAS, rather than just DDoSing the BAS. The attack lasted for
one day; with resolution achieved via shutting down the BAS and reconfiguring at a hardware level
(Roberts, 2016). Envisage this sort of attack against a major apartment block in a global city
such as New York, London or Sydney, reputation damage alone would be significant. The response
time to the Finland incident was extensive in terms of a control system, whose core purpose is
availability. A requirement in any digital system is knowing what your system entails, and having
oversight to ensure operation is running accordingly. The Finland example reveals a core issue in a
security context for network oversight in a BAS. The attack was detected due to the out-of-bounds
nature of the communications being sent, which was identified in the normal monitoring of the
system for performance and general operation. Without actively monitoring for security, a stuxnet
type attack, where normal inbounds commands are acting maliciously could be envisaged to exist
on a BAS.
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Table 1.1: Survey results, adapted from Facilities.net (2015)
Question Yes No
Not
Sure
N/A
Total
Respondents
Are any of the building automation
systems in your buildings connected to
the Internet?
84% 16% - - 224
If the building automation system(s) is
(are) on a dedicated building
automation network, is it bridged to
the corporate/enterprise network?
35% 29% 27% 9% 173
Has a budget been established for
security countermeasures for building
automation systems
41% 59% - - 172
Have you conducted a threat
assessment of your network and
physical security measures for
cyberattacks on your building
automation systems?
42% 58% - - 157
Has your building automation system
monitored for cyberattacks?
54% 46% - - 155
Have you developed a plan for
responding in the event of a
cyberattack on your building
automation system?
37% 63% - - 156
While there are known cyber security issues, awareness in the BAS domain has been increasing.
A 2015 survey conducted by Facilities.net recorded 224 building operation managers as respondents
on cyber security and BAS trends, selected results are detailed in Table 1.1. Of note, 75% of
respondents stated their organisation did not have a formal cyber security incident response plan
for their BAS. 66% of respondents were not confident in their organisations ability to effectively
recover from an attack, and 84% of respondents stated their BAS was connected to the Internet.
An understanding of the protocols and components operating in the BAS domain is required
to detect attacks against the system. A shift to open-source protocols over the past 30 years has
changed the landscape from primarily vendor-specific proprietary protocols, to three major open-
source protocols and a range of proprietary protocols which encompass the market, namely, BACnet,
KNX and LONWorks. The Building Services Research and Information Association (BSRIA) states
that BACnet is the dominant communications protocol with a 54.6% world market share as of 2015
(Towler, 2015). Following this trend, BACnet is widely deployed in government, industry and
businesses around Australia. As such, the research presented focuses on the BACnet/IP protocol,
which uses IP as its communication media.
The SANS 2016 state of ICS security survey, which includes BAS, states that 54% of respondents
are reliant on their trained staff to search and detect threats manually, while 30% state they use
anomaly detection tools (Harp & Gregory-Brown, 2016). Given the time taken to detect attacks
on BAS, there exists the need to improve detection methods beyond manual means, and account
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for the potential of stuxnet type zero day attacks.
Classification of the ability to detect threats faced by BASs can be represented using a Johari
window (Luft & Ingham, 1955). Kim (2017) adapts the Johari window model to present certainty
and identification in terms of risk, shown as Table 1.2. Kim (2017) elaborates on “unknown
unknowns”, through a further classification of unknown-unknown types, namely, unidentified due
to knowledge gap, or unidentified due to an assumption. These include time space or condition,
between parts or the whole system. Identifying hidden or temporal interactions in a system can
Table 1.2: Johari window of certainty and knowledge, replicated from Kim
(2017, p155)
Certainty
Known Unknown
Identification
Identified (Known)
Known-Known
(Identified Knowledge)
Known-Unknown
(Identified Risk)
Unidentified (Unknown)
Unknown-Known
(Untapped Knowledge)
Unknown-Unknown
(Unidentified Risk)
be achieved through learning how a system operates in relation to its defined rules and semantic
meaning. Methods which can account for temporal features, such as time series analysis, state
space modelling and some machine learning algorithms could be appropriate.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for computer networks have been an active research field
since the initial works of Anderson (1980) and Denning (1987). The purpose of an IDS is to identify
potential attempts of unauthorised access or actions being undertaken on a system (Denning, 1987;
Yu & Tsai, 2011). Typically, classification of IDS approaches fall into two categories, misuse-
based (often called Signature) and anomaly-based (Axelsson, 2000). Misuse-based rely on accurate
signatures of malicious actions, to which normal traffic is compared. Comparatively, anomaly-based
approaches define a baseline of normal actions on the network through a learning phase, and report
deviations from normality as potential intrusions.
Application of Intrusion Detection Systems to BACnet managed BAS is a growing area in cyber
security literature, with many authors focusing on anomaly detection (Kaur, Tonejc, Wendzel &
Meier, 2015; Tonejc, Gu¨ttes, Kobekova & Kaur, 2016; Caselli, Zambon, Amann, Sommer & Kargl,
2016; Esquivel-Vargas, Caselli & Peter, 2017). The application of machine learning to enhance
intrusion detection is a more recent occurrence. Tonejc et al. (2016) explores unsupervised machine
learning methods to identify anomalous traffic in BACnet/IP networks. Application of supervised
learning, which can account for temporal data has not been explored.
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1.2 Purpose
“There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But
there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” Rumsfield
(2002)
This research identifies a gap in knowledge in regards to anomaly detection in BACnet/IP
managed Building Automation Systems (BASs). The literature review reveals limited applications
of intrusion detection methods against BACnet/IP managed BASs. A similar problem faced by
generic IDS researchers is suffered in BAS anomaly detection, the lack of datasets. Datasets in BAS
anomaly detection can be classed as a real network dataset, requiring synthetic malicious traffic,
and small-scale simulated network datasets with limited attack variance. More recent studies utilise
both types of dataset to improve the efficacy of the presented detection method (Tonejc et al., 2016;
Esquivel-Vargas et al., 2017). Further, the application of machine learning use in IDS for BAS is
limited, with investigations focused on unsupervised methods. Results from the literature show
the ability to detect “known known’s” with varying success rates, but rarely address “unknown
unknowns”.
This study aimed to investigate methods of identifying both known and unknown BACnet/IP
specific attacks in a BACnetwork. Given the temporal nature of BAS, models which can utilise
time based features, such as Markov Models, time series analysis and Artificial Neural Networks
were explored and compared. As with previous studies, a range of real and simulated datasets
were obtained to evaluate the methods. The purpose of the research is thus to improve anomaly
detection in BACnet/IP managed building automation systems to improve the protection of critical
infrastructure. A range of research questions were derived to further define the research, detailed
in §1.3
1.3 Research questions
RQ1 How can known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP based Building Automation Systems
be detected?
SQ1 Are BACnet devices exposed to known threats?
SQ2 Do known BACnet attacks have distinguishable network patterns compared to normal
BACnetwork traffic?
SQ3 Is machine learning applicable to identify known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP
networks?
SQ4 How accurate are machine learning approaches in detecting known and unknown attacks
against BACnet/IP networks and devices?
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1.4 Thesis terminology
While the writing convention of this thesis is Australian English, many BACnet components are
referred to throughout the thesis in American English spelling in line with the SSPC-135 (2012)
standard. Further, BACnet networks will be referred to as BACnetworks.
1.5 Thesis structure
The remainder of the thesis is structured into a number of distinct parts. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature in the domain of Building Automation Systems and approaches undertaken in Building
Automation cyber security. Further, approaches for state modelling and machine learning applied to
cyber security problems, and the applications to building automation systems security is discussed.
Chapter 3 details the research design and methodology used throughout the research. A discussion
of the dominant research paradigms is undertaken, culminating with the paradigm selected for
this research. Further, a review of approaches resolves the specific methods used throughout the
research, forming the research design. Chapter 4 outlines the exploratory results of the research,
including a survey of Internet connected devices, threat modelling of devices and simulation design.
Chapter 5 continues, presenting the results of a range of algorithms applied to the generated
simulation data. Chapter 6 discusses the results in respect to the existing literature, followed by
a critical review of the research process. Finally, Chapter 7 presents conclusions drawn from the
research, and suggests potential future work in the domain.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The literature review chapter frames the research project undertaken in the context of previous
works in the respective areas. The chapter begins with a discussion of Critical Infrastructure (CI),
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and where Building Automation Sys-
tems (BASs) sit in relation to CI and SCADA. Followed by a discussion of the open-source protocol
landscape; accompanied by a comparison and justification of research towards BACnet. The review
then traverses to BACnet security, outlining the current state of the BACnet protocol in regards
to security features. Following, a critical review of previous and current works in BACnet security,
with particular focus on intrusion detection research is presented. Machine learning techniques
for anomaly detection, and system behaviour are discussed, with specific applications applied to
BACnet identified. Finally, three machine learning algorithms are presented as potential approaches
to identify anomalies in BACnet/IP managed BAS.
2.1 Critical Infrastructure
Critical Infrastructure (CI) is defined by the Australian Federal, State and Territory governments
as
“...those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communic-
ation networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended
period, would significantly impact on the social or economic wellbeing of the nation
or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security”
Attorney Generals Office (2010, p. 8).
The direct mention of “physical facilities” should be evidence enough that buildings are a core part
of CI. However, it was not until 2015 that in the United States, The National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology (NIST) updated the “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security”,
to mention Building Automation Systems (BASs) as an “other type” of control system classed as
CI (Stouffer, Pillitteri, Lightman, Abrams & Hahn, 2015). Further, the SANS 2016 State of ICS
Security Survey encompassed BAS as a core focus for the survey, alongside SCADA, Distributed
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Control Systems (DCS) and Process Control Systems (PCS) (Harp & Gregory-Brown, 2016). The
classification, and inclusion as a core focus underpins the importance of securing Building Auto-
mation and Control systems, which have been used extensively for over 30 years. There has been
a gradual convergence between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT)
(Murray, Johnstone & Valli, 2017). The convergence between building controllers and IT based
protocols has created a larger threat surface, not previously faced by building controllers. Differing
control structures however have left traditional cyber security approaches in the IT sector incapable
of direct application securing building controllers. These issues faced are similar in nature, and
general operation to Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), systems; another CI,
which has been the focus of security researchers for some time.
2.1.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCADA systems are used to monitor and control industrial automation processes which are geo-
graphically dispersed. In Australia, the distance between stations can be thousands of kilometres.
SCADA systems are deployed to manage utilities and CI, including gas, water, electricity and
traffic systems. SCADA systems provide a real-time centralised monitoring and control system
for large numbers of process inputs and outputs (Stouffer, Falco & Kent, 2007). SCADA systems
were originally implemented with proprietary protocols for communication; however over the past
two decades, standardised network communications using TCP/IP has increased (Zhu, Joseph &
Sastry, 2011). Standardisation to IP protocols and connecting SCADA systems to the Internet for
remote management and control can leave SCADA systems exposed to vulnerabilities. The barrier
to entry for attackers is reduced due to external facing connections, rather than needing line of sight
or physical access to systems. Traditional IT security measures, such as patching directly clash with
the high availability requirement of SCADA, further exacerbating security concerns with patchable
vulnerabilities existent on these systems (Dussel et al., 2010; Murray et al., 2017).
2.1.2 SCADA security
Due to the cyber-physical nature of SCADA systems, cyber security is of high importance (Zhu
et al., 2011). Previously, threats to availability were a hardware reliability issue, with protection
tied to fault prevention and detection (Ca´rdenas, Amin & Sastry, 2008). However, with increased
network connections in SCADA systems and increased use of commercial off the shelf (CoTS)
IT systems, protection against cyber threats is now also required to prevent availability issues
(Ca´rdenas et al., 2008; Dussel et al., 2010). Unlike CoTS devices, the application of CoTS based
cyber security practices are limited by the SCADA environment. Noted by Granzer and Kast-
ner (2010), limitations include power requirements, security scalability, communication medium
support, the use of non-IP protocols and quality of service differences. The potential impact on
availability that security practices create is often the limiting factor upon direct integration of se-
curity systems to SCADA. Patching often requires system downtime which is not acceptable in life
safety or CI systems particularly (Zhu et al., 2011; Murray et al., 2017). The culmination of these
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issues has resulted in a high number of legacy devices in SCADA systems, which are unpatched
(Ca´rdenas et al., 2008; Cheminod, Durante & Valenzano, 2013; Murray et al., 2017). In addi-
tion, protocol design can contribute to system vulnerabilities in SCADA. For example, ModBus,
a widely used SCADA protocol contains no confidentiality, integrity or authentication checking
processes (Benbenishti, 2017), allowing attackers to use the normal commands of the protocol to
undertake malicious actions. Building Automation suffers from many of the same security issues as
SCADA systems (Fisk, 2012). Particularly protocol based vulnerabilities, caused by initial design
choices stemming from a segregated local network with low access and highly trusting devices.
2.2 Building Automation Systems
Building Automation Systems (BASs), historically called Building Management Systems, are the
result of the centralisation of control and management of services operating in a building. Originally,
BASs encompassed heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, but now can be used
to centralise control of lighting, water systems, power management and security features, such as
CCTV cameras and access control (Kastner et al., 2005; H. Merz, 2009). Typically, a BAS consists
of management devices, controllers and field devices, such as sensors and actuators. The services
in buildings operate using schedules and control loops, defined for the specific facility based on the
features of the building, and surrounding environment. The primary goal of BASs is to reduce the
cost of a building, through the application of smarter control loops and schedules to reduce energy
consumption, while maintaining comfort for building occupants (H. Merz, 2009). For this purpose,
data collection is required from field level devices to make short term decisions in controllers, and
long term decisions based on trend data. Trend data is compared to the control schema, when the
trend does not follow the control schema, it is a point of interest to investigate, showing either the
system is incorrectly programmed, or an extreme weather event caused the controls to activate out
of bounds. However, there is the potential that trend data could also indicate a network attack
event against a device. Typically, the network data associated with a BAS is not monitored, with
the interest from owners and operators of the system coming from data values, rather than network
traffic (Caselli, 2015; Jabado, 2017; Humphries, 2017). Correlation between network traffic and
trend data could be used to identify issues from a security perspective.
Emerging from a proprietary locked industry, three open source network protocols with similar
aims have become dominant in BASs, namely, BACnet, KNX and LONWorks. The largest protocol
is BACnet, with a world market share of 54.6% in 2015 (Towler, 2015), thus BACnet is the object
of interest for this research, due to its proliferation in Australia and abroad. Byres, Franz and
Miller (2004) note that SCADA protocol adoption and use is highly coupled to industry preference,
vendor operating requirements and design history of systems. These attributes are applicable to
BAS protocols, which followed a similar history of proprietary communication protocols in closed
internal networks.
There are a number of challenges facing BASs, particularly the IT/OT convergence also faced
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by SCADA systems. The long life-cycle of buildings, compared to IT devices is of note. Typic-
ally, BASs are expected to operate for 10-20 years, this time frame requires designs to be flexible
for future advancement and integration, while also supporting legacy devices and maintaining a
limited amount of interaction for security purposes (Kastner et al., 2005) BAS design is thus in a
challenging position, given the advancement of the Internet of Things (IoT), Smart Cities, Cloud
based analytics and Wearable technologies, which can be used to improve BASs core purpose (Baig
et al., 2017; Ahmad, Mourshed, Mundow, Sisinni & Rezgui, 2016). From a security standpoint,
the incorporation of these devices, which were designed to be interconnected, into the BAS domain
which was typically locationally isolated increases the threats faced exponentially. Fisk (2012)
noted that external connection is required for systems to maintain longevity to allow for future
patching cycles. Counter to this, Ca´rdenas et al. (2008) state that “Patching and frequent updates,
are not well suited for control systems” (Ca´rdenas et al., 2008, p3), citing a nuclear power plant
which accidentally shut down after a diagnostic computer rebooted for a software update. Given the
range of vendors, devices and protocols in use, every BAS is a unique implementation. Each system
now requires knowledge and management of IT domain systems and issues, while maintaining a
coexistent relationship with the safety and operational constraints of an OT system.
2.2.1 System requirements
Apart from the functionality of controlling building services, BAS also have a number of require-
ments with regards to safety and operation. The requirements from OT do not always overlap
with IT and more specifically, security. Novak and Treytl (2008) discuss the common require-
ments between safety and security systems, summarised in Table 2.1. Novak, Treytl and Palensky
(2007) describe the comparative goals between safety and security, which can allow for crossover
life-cycles to be developed, as undertaken in Novak and Treytl (2008) and Novak and Gerstinger
(2010), with further discussion in Cheminod et al. (2013). Novak and Treytl (2008) elaborate that
safety and security systems have a common goal in reducing risk; but state that confidentiality
and non-repudiation are not relevant for automation systems. While confidentiality may be an
added burden to low-power systems, the data transmitted is important and should be protected.
Additionally, non-repudiation of commands sent on a BAS is an important feature which would
be required for a secure system. For a safety system, it would be required to know with great
certainty that a device had acted according to its specification and cannot deny its involvement
in an action. Further, Cheminod et al. (2013) highlight the key disparity between requirements in
BAS and IT are the real world ramifications of system failure. Downtime in IT systems is generally
acceptable, and often to be expected in relation to the patching cycles of software. Exemplified by
service level agreements for Internet service providers stating a 99.999% uptime on their service
(Amazon, 2017). Additionally if an IT device fails, the device is generally survivable when proper
contingency planning was implemented. However, if safety or security critical systems fail, the risks
are significant, with the potential for loss of life, asset damage and environmental impact. These
issues cause BAS to follow the paradigm that failure is unacceptable, similar to SCADA systems
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(Kirsch, Goose, Amir, Wei & Skare, 2014). The difficulty arises when implementing this paradigm
using failure tolerant IT systems.
Table 2.1: Summary of security and safety common requirements defined in
Novak and Treytl (2008, p312)
Requirements of
Security Systems
Requirements of Safety Systems
Integrity Authentication Availability Authorisation
Confidentiality
Integrity 3
Availability 3
Authentication 3
Authorisation 3
Non-Repudiation
2.2.2 Protocols
BAS specific protocols are typically open source, examples include BACnet, KNX, LONWorks and
ModBus. In addition, a number of proprietary frameworks interlinking the open source protocols
together exist, such as Tridium-Fox and Schneider’s Continuuum. The benefit of the three major
BAS specific open source protocols, apart from being device independent, is the ability to com-
municate with multiple protocols, on existing cabling infrastructure (Granzer, Kastner & Reinisch,
2008), reducing costs significantly. While originally serial-based, other data media such as Ethernet
are increasingly being used for BAS, with IP encapsulation and more recently native IP stacks al-
lowing BAS to be connected to enterprise networks and allow direct remote access over the Internet
(Kastner et al., 2005; ASHRAE, 2018).
2.2.2.1 BACnet
Building Automation Control Networking (BACnet) is an object-oriented peer-based protocol for
managing BASs, which began development in 1987. The aim of BACnet was to create a protocol
which would work with management, field and automation devices, and provide interoperability
between other protocols. BACnet was released in 1995 as an ASHRAE/ANSI standard, in 2003,
BACnet gained ISO standardisation (ISO 16 484-5). BACnet is actively maintained, with reviews
of the protocol occurring every four years until 2008, thence changing to biennial reviews (SSPC-
135, 2017). The most recent BACnet standard is BACnet-2012, Version 1, Revision 19 (SSPC-135,
2017). In December 2016, Addendum 135-2016bj was released for initial public advisory, as of June
2018, Addendum 135-2016bj is in its second round of public advisory. To provide interoperability,
BACnet focusses on the Network layer and above, allowing for multiple physical and data link layer
technologies to be used (Hersent, Boswarthick & Elloumi, 2012). While there are defined protocols
in the standard for interoperability depicted in Table 2.2, further undocumented mapping can occur
due to the flexibility of the protocol (Granzer et al., 2008; Hersent et al., 2012). BACnet utilises
UDP for transmission over IP networks, using a virtual IP network stack. UDP is used to reduce
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the overhead which occurs from using connection orientated protocols, such as TCP (Zachary,
Brooks & Thompson, 2002), along with providing the ability to map protocols to interpret the
UDP data (Newman, 2013). However, Addendum 135-2016bj aims to implement a native IP
option as opposed to Virtual IP, to allow for greater interconnection between traditionally BAS
devices, and IT services such as cloud analytic platforms.
Table 2.2: BACnet architecture mapping to the OSI model as of revision 19,
replicated from SSPC-135 (2012, p11)
OSI BACnet Layers
Application BACnet Application Layer (APDU) Application
Network BACnet Network Layer (APDU) Network
Data Link ISO 8802-2 MS/TP PTP BVLC
LonTalk
ZigBee
Data
Link
Physical Ethernet ARCNET EIA-485 EIA-232 UDP/IP
802.15.4
Physical
2.2.2.2 KNX
Konnex (KNX) Association began in 1999, as a merger between the European Installation Bus
(EIB), Batibus and European Home System (EHS) protocols. The aim of KNX was to define and
offer certification services for the KNX open standard (Hersent et al., 2012); which was defined in
2002 (Granzer et al., 2008). KNX became a European Standard in 2004, and defined as ISO/IEC
14543-3 in 2006 (ISO, 2006). KNX follows the OSI model for packet construction, see Table 2.3.
Further, KNX is based on the older protocol EIB; allowing EIB to coexist and be compatible with
KNX. Similar to BACnet, KNX is flexible in physical media usage, with twisted-pair, power line
and wireless radio available. Additionally, KNX can use tunnelling to operate over IP, with unicast
for configuration and maintenance, and multicast for process data exchange (Granzer et al., 2008).
KNX has a small network stack, making it suitable for field devices with low processing power,
while also providing collision avoidance via CSMA/CA (Granzer et al., 2008).
Table 2.3: KNX/EIB architecture mapping to the OSI model, adapted from
Ko¨hler (2008, p12)
OSI KNX/EIB Layers
Application KNX/EIB Application Layer
Transport
KNX/EIB Transport Layer
Connection Orientated Connectionless Orientated
Network KNX/EIB Network Layer
Data Link MAC through CSMA/CA
Physical
Twisted Pair Power Line
Radio
Frequency
Ethernet
TP-0 TP-1 110Khz 132Khz 868Mhz UDP/IP
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2.2.2.3 LONWorks
Local Operating Networks (LONWorks) is a network platform developed by Echelon Corp., and
was accepted as an ANSI standard for control networking in 1999 (Hersent et al., 2012). In
2008, LONworks was approved as ISO standard ISO/IEC 14 908-1, -2, -3 and -4 (Hersent et al.,
2012). LONWorks aim was to move away from proprietary centralised control models, by using
connection devices to exchange data directly, eliminating the need for a central controller, and thus
the single point of failure (Hersent et al., 2012). LONWorks is the combination of the LONTalk
communication standard, defined as ISO/IEC 14908 (‘ISO/IEC 14908 Information Technology
- Control network protocol’, 2012) with Neuron chips developed by Echelon Corp. Originally
dominant in the transportation and utilities industries, the LONWorks platform was adapted to
BASs (Snoonian, 2003). Similar to BACnet and KNX, LONWorks is physical media independent,
allowing the use of twisted pair, power lines, wireless and optical fibre (Hersent et al., 2012).
LONworks is not an IP native protocol, and makes use of ANSI/CEA-852 IP tunnelling to connect
LONwork networks to IP networks (Hersent et al., 2012). A mapping of LONworks to the OSI
model is shown as Table 2.4
Table 2.4: LONWorks architecture mapping to OSI layers, adapted from
Hersent, Boswarthick and Elloumi (2012, p. 63)
OSI LONWorks Layers
Application LONWorks Application Layer
Presentation LONWorks Presentation Layer
Transport LONWorks Transport Layer OR LONworks Session Layer
Network LONWorks Network Layer
Data Link MAC through CSMA/p-persistent
Physical
Twisted Pair Power Line Fibre
Optic
LON-
Works
over
IP
Free
Topo-
logy
RS-485
Transformer
Isolated
75kHz 86kHz 115kHz 132kHz
2.2.2.4 Protocol comparisons
The objective of all three major open-source protocols is identical, to increase interoperability over
multiple physical media and vendor devices, and thus reduce the cost of implementation while
also providing robust building automation operation. A shortcoming in all three protocols is that
they are based on BASs initial design, being a local, trusted network. With the increased use
of the Internet, remote administration and more recently cloud-based analytics and smart city
initiatives, BASs have become interconnected to enterprise networks and the Internet (Baig et al.,
2017). Security, was not an original function of BASs, nor needed given the previous closed network
topology (Newman, 2013). However, with increased connectivity exists an increased attack surface,
where a lack of inherent security processes expose BASs to adversaries (Khaund, 2015). Security
through obscurity no longer exists in BASs (Kastner et al., 2005), the cyber-physical nature of
BASs, and the integration of security and safety services makes the system a potential target to
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a range of adversaries (Khaund, 2015). Overall, the cyber security practices in BASs are lacking.
A range of factors contribute, including but not limited to, a lack of awareness and a limited
consolidated effort for implementing network security features.
2.3 BACnet structure
This research focuses on ASHRAE Standard 135-2012 BACnet, as this was the latest version
implemented upon undertaking the research. Additionally, the BACnet 2012 is the version to which
BACnet compliant devices are measured (BTL, 2017). BACnet is an object-oriented protocol in
which associated sets of values are represented by an object, a complete listing is shown as Table 2.5.
These objects are held in collections representing a single device, referred to in the object model
as a BACnet Device. There are 54 standard objects that communicate using 38 standard services
as of the 2012 version of the BACnet Standard (SSPC-135, 2012). When transported on UDP/IP
as default, BACnet uses UDP Port 47808 for communications to the server running the service.
However, it should be noted that the UDP port in use is arbitrary, with proprietary middleware
implementations of BACnet communicating on additional UDP ports (Schneider Electric, 2015;
Gasser et al., 2017).
Each object contains a set of properties to describe the object. For each of these properties
a definition of type is included, the type could be analogue, binary, text or a number of other
possible types. Additionally, each attribute includes a flag indicating optionality, essentially if the
property can be omitted and still operate in accordance with the protocol standard. The majority
of properties present in each object is optional. To facilitate object handling and communication,
each object contains a mandatory property of an object identifier field, which identifies what type of
object is being examined. Every BACnet device requires a mandatory device object, which provides
addressing details for communication on the BACnet network (SSPC-135, 2012). All other objects
are implemented based on the requirement of the device (SSPC-135, 2012). Each BACnet device
supports a number of services. These services provide the means of communication between devices
on the network. The services make use of a client-server model for connectivity similar to that in use
on TCP/IP networks, however the classification is reversed. The clients are controller devices, while
servers are sensors, actuators and point controllers which generate the data to provide to the client
devices. Thus, server devices have much lower hardware capabilities compared to client devices.
As stated, there are 38 services defined in the 2012 version of the protocol, outlined in Table 2.6.
The BACnet services themselves are not dependent on any particular network infrastructure, with
the protocol specification stating that BACnet is to be agnostic to the transport of data (SSPC-
135, 2012). Addendums to the protocol have formally added virtual IP and ZigBee to the list of
supported underlying protocols, however in theory any underlying protocol could be utilised for
this purpose (Granzer et al., 2008; Hersent et al., 2012).
A minimum set of services required for operation is defined as a BACnet Interoperability Build-
ing Block (BIBB) in the BACnet standard. Each BIBB represents a service function, or network
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Table 2.5: BACnet standard objects sorted by type, adapted from SSPC-135
(2012), bolded objects represent the most common objects used defined by
Distech (2010, p23)
Basic Device SimpleValue
Device Bit String Value
Analog Input Character String Value
Analog Output Date Pattern Value
Analog Value Date Value
Binary Input Date Time Pattern Value
Binary Output Date Time Value
Binary Value Integer Value
Multi-state Input Large Analog Value
Multi-state Output Octet String Value
Multi-state Value Positive Integer Value
File Time Pattern Value
Time Value
Physical Access Control Notification
Access Credential Event Enrolment
Access Door Notification Class
Access Point Notification Forwarder
Access Rights Alert Enrolment
Access User
Access Zone
Credential Data Input
Presentation Process
Group Averaging
Global Group Loop
Structured-View Program
Life safety and security Logging
Life Safety Point Event Log
Life Safety Zone Trend Log
Network Security Trend Log Multiple
Schedule Control
Calendar Command
Schedule Load Control
Meter Lighting control
Accumulator Channel
Pulse Converter Lighting Output
message which can occur in the device, specifying which device is to act as a client or server for
each individual service. Thus there are two types of BIBB, Client BIBBs which represent supervis-
ory/control devices requesting data and actions to occur (classed A), and Server BIBBs representing
sensors which respond to requests with data (classed B). The BACnet standard defines six device
profiles which couple a set of BIBBs with the minimum working set of objects with which to classify
a device. See Addendum A for a complete listing of device profiles. Each device may implement
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Table 2.6: BACnet standard services sorted by type, adapted from
ANSI/ASHRAE standard 135, BACnet 2012. (SSPC-135, 2012)
Alarm and Event Remote Device Access Object Access
AcknowledgeAlarm DeviceCommunicationControl AddListElement
ConfirmedCOVNotification DeviceCommunicationControl RemoveListElement
UnconfirmedCOVNotification ConfirmedPrivateTransfer CreateObject
ConfirmedEventNotification UnconfirmedPrivateTransfer DeleteObject
UnconfirmedEventNotification ReinitializeDevice ReadProperty
GetAlarmSummary ConfirmedTextMessage ReadPropertyMultiple
GetEnrollmentSummary UnconfirmedTextMessage ReadRange
GetEventInformation TimeSynchronization WriteProperty
LifeSafetyOperation UTCTimeSynchronization WritePropertyMultiple
SubscribeCOV Who-Has WriteGroup
SubscribeCOVProperty I-Have
Who-Is
I-Am
File access Virtual Terminal
AtomicReadFile VT-Open
AtomicWriteFile VT-Close
VT-Data
additional services other than the minimum required in the standard, thus comparable devices from
different vendors can have differing functionality. Thus, each device of the same profile type may
have different objects and services but undertake the same functions, due to a minimum operating
specification and optionality of most objects, object properties, and services which can vary by
vendor. Compliance with the BACnet standard is based on a minimum set of features required,
with devices currently tested against the ASHRAE 135-2012 BACnet version (BTL, 2017). Com-
pliance holds for one specific hardware version of the device, with future versions requiring a new
round of compliance testing. To determine the objects and services a specific device supports,
BACnet employs a Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS), which each vendor
is required to generate for each device a vendor produces. Each device is therefore capable of
generating a PICS, from which core information can be retrieved. Compliance holds for multiple
software versions for a device, according to the listing of PICS retrieved from BTL (2018). Thus
many devices for sale use older BACnet protocol revisions for operation. Typically, the BACnet
protocol version a device operates with is between five and ten years old. The flexibility of the
protocol implementation has allowed BACnet to become widely used and interoperable, over a
range of devices and use cases, but also makes it difficult to baseline devices for security purposes
(Caselli et al., 2016).
2.3.1 Typical network topology
Historically, BACnet operated on a three tiered network topology (Kastner et al., 2005), see Fig-
ure 2.1. With the advancement of microprocessors, the typical three tier topology has been reduced
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Figure 2.1: BACnet three tiered network topology, replicated from Kastner,
Neugschwandtner, Soucek and Newman (2005, p1183)
to two tiers (Kastner et al., 2005), management and field, with the automation tasks undertaken
on point controllers in the field tier and network controllers operating in the management tier, see
Figure 2.2. The management tier contains networking controllers, operator workstations, human
machine interfaces and facility management networks, which provides the ability to retrieve data
and interact with field tier devices to make high level decisions. For interconnected BACnet sys-
tems, the management level also holds connections to the enterprise network, and externally to the
Internet through a firewall. The field tier represents physical devices in the network which gener-
ate data about the environment, or interact with humans, such as sensors, actuators, valves, light
switches. The field tier also holds point controllers, such as variable air valve controllers, thermo-
stats and zone controllers, which control subsections of a network allowing for local control decisions
(Kastner et al., 2005). Serial connections between field devices are often daisy chained together
operating with master/slave token passing, with the network controller acting as a bridge between
the serial and digital management network (Cisco, 2008). There has been a shift to BACnet using
exclusively IP networks, culminating with the public review release of BACnet Addendum 135-
2016bj (ASHRAE, 2018). Currently, BACnetworks operate over IP using a virtual IP stack, which
encapsulates idioms of the BACnet application layers to transport over IP medium. BACnet/IP
networks do not use token passing, but rather operate as a traditional peer based network. As such,
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Figure 2.2: Example of BACnet two tiered network topology, described in Kast-
ner, Neugschwandtner, Soucek and Newman (2005)
BACnet/IP networks follow a more traditional IP based network topology, where related devices
are in a joint subnet. Typically, this only consists of controllers and management devices such as
workstations due to their higher feature set.
2.3.2 BACnet networking devices
In contrast to the conventional definition of a router (separation of networks) a BACnet router
translates between two different protocols in a network. When using BACnet/IP, connections
to other protocols in the hierarchy, such as BACnet MS/TP or ModBus are connected using a
BACnet router (Thomas, 2008). BACnet routers are not necessarily standalone devices, and are
often incorporated as part of a BACnet device, typically the network controller.
Given the reliance on broadcasting, a BACnet Broadcast Management Device (BBMD) can
be used as a gateway device for BACnet devices that are on different sub-networks. The purpose
of a BBMD is to broadcast, direct or relay packets between subnetworks, as BACnet routers
simply translate messages between protocols (Thomas, 2008; Distech, 2010). In the same way that
Ethernet bridges store Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, the BBMD stores locally known or
registered devices in their BACnet Device Table (BDT). Further, devices which operate under a
separate networking controller in the shared backbone network are classified as “Foreign Devices”,
and are stored in a Foreign Device Table (FDT) in the BBMD. BBMD management traffic is
undertaken using UDP/IP.
The BACnet standard defines 19 Network layer messages, which are used for device management
and network security processes when implemented. In addition, vendors may implement proprietary
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messages, outlined in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: BACnet network layer messages defined by SSPC-135 (2012)
Hex Octet Message
X00 Who-Is-Router-To-Network
X01 I-Am-Router-To-Network
X02 I-Could-Be-Router-To-Network
X03 Reject-Message-To-Network
X04 Router-Busy-To-Network
X05 Router-Available-To-Network
X06 Initialize-Routing-Table
X07 Initialize-Routing-Table-Ack
X08 Establish-Connection-To-Network
X09 Disconnect-Connection-To-Network
X0A Challenge-Request
X0B Security-Payload
X0C Security-Response
X0D Request-Key-Update
X0E Update-Key-Set
X0F Update-Distribution-Key
X10 Request-Master-Key
X11 Set-Master-Key
X12 What-Is-Network-Number
X13 Network-Number-Is
X14 - X7F ASHRAE Reserved
X80 - XFF Vendor Proprietary
2.4 BACnet security issues
“ We didn’t really think that the threat would come from someone tapping into the
network in some dark mechanical room and sending legitimate, but malicious, mes-
sages.” Newman (2013, p. 43)
BACnet was not designed with security as a primary requirement, as the original intention and
implementation of BAS was isolated from external connection. With the advancement of network-
ing technology, the change from serial-based networks to Ethernet, and the rise of the IoT, BAS
networks now have external facing connections to internal enterprise networks, and the Internet for
remote management and cloud-based data analytics (Ahmad et al., 2016; Baig et al., 2017; IBM,
2017). As such, the attack surface against BAS networks, including BACnet managed networks
has increased.
Before publishing the first edition of the BACnet standard in 1995, public review comments
highlighted a concern about security in BAS (Newman, 2013). As noted by Newman (2013),
peoples view of the “main threat” to BACnet was different. The main threat proposed by the
BACnet working group was that of a disgruntled employee, who would use an existing operator
workstation to attack the BACnetwork. The realisation of the threat provided by public comments
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however was an external physical intruder who would tap into the network and send “legitimate,
but malicious messages” (Newman, 2013, p43). With the way BACnet is structured, and the now
ubiquitous connection to the Internet, the physical requirement of the intruder to send legitimate
commands which cause malicious actions has been eliminated. While BACnet has the most robust
security features of the three major open source protocols, the lack of implementation equates the
robustness to naught.
With the increased connectivity of BAS to other networks, such as enterprise and the Inter-
net, BAS are exposed to the same threats faced by traditional IT based networks and protocols
However, BAS are also exposed to their own set of threats, due to a hierarchal topology, broadcast
based communications and extensive trust placed in communications from devices connected to the
network. The consequence of this design leaves BAS networks with no third party verification for
source authentication, exposing BAS protocols to message interception, replay and message inser-
tion attacks (Holmberg, 2003; Granzer, Praus & Kastner, 2010). In addition, BAS are vulnerable
to a range of denial of service attacks through normal operation of BAS protocols against specific
building services (Antonini, Barenghi, Pelosi & Zonouz, 2014; Mundt & Wickboldt, 2016).
Many researchers have identified and classified vulnerabilities in the BACnet protocol. Holmberg
(2003) in their 2003 threat assessment identified a range of vulnerabilities against BACnet, with
classification split into two distinct parts, IT based, which represent generic Internet Protocol
based vulnerabilities, and BACnet protocol specific vulnerabilities. Within the BACnet vulner-
ability class, there are five categories, snooping, application service attack, network layer attack,
network layer Denial of Service and application layer Denial of Service. Similarly, Kaur et al. (2015)
identified three classes of vulnerability against BACnet, adapted from IT (equivalent to Holmberg’s
IT based), non-conformance and protocol vulnerability. Further, Caselli (2016) defined snooping,
Denial of Service and process control subversion. At the time of writing, no research was found to
have been undertaken to consolidate a classification scheme, or address the impact of each BACnet
vulnerability against a system. The range of vulnerabilities defined have had limited known usage
in real networks. Reported attacks against BACnet specifically are limited, and those that exist are
not at a level where specific vulnerabilities are discussed. Typically, reported attacks are disclosed
by researchers, rather than reported by advisories after an attack has occurred.
Researchers have implemented a range of attacks against BACnet using the detailed specific
vulnerabilities in a number of simulated environments (Johnstone et al., 2015; Tonejc et al., 2016;
Esquivel-Vargas et al., 2017). Bowers (2013) outlined a range of attacks implemented as part of an
automated attack framework implemented in Python. The Framework contained three categories,
Discovery, Enumeration and Fuzzing, which utilised legitimate BACnet commands. However, often
researchers forgo directly implementing an attack, rather using synthetic data manipulation for
out-of-bounds data set generation and testing purposes (Kaur et al., 2015; Tonejc et al., 2016).
There are various reports of the number of BACnet devices which are directly accessible to the
Internet. Praus et al. (2016) details results from 2014, where 13,964 BACnet devices are openly
accessible. More recently Gasser et al. (2017) undertook active Internet-Wide traffic measurements
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searching for BACnet devices, between 2016 and 2017, revealing 16,485 internet accessible devices.
Further, Gasser et al. (2017) scanned 16 ports, as opposed to only the default port 47808, which they
identify as 53% of their responses. Identifying an exposed BACnet device is relatively simple given
the protocol has high trust, and is verbose. In addition, fingerprinted device search engines such
as Shodan, can be used to search directly for BACnet devices. The devices detailed from a Shodan
scan is not a complete listing of all devices, given the results displayed are a subset of total results
due to caching. At any one point around 3,000 readily accessible BACnet devices exist through
the Shodan Engine, with Australia being consistently in the top five exposed countries (Peacock
& Johnstone, 2014; Peacock et al., 2017). Figure 2.3 details three Shodan searches undertaken
at various points during the research duration. In 2017, Positive Technologies undertook data
collation of scans from Shodan, CenSys and Google to outline the number of Internet accessible
ICS components. 175,632 devices were found, with BACnet devices accounting for 13,717, and the
Tridium Fox framework accounting for 39,168, placed 4th and 2nd respectively out of all protocols
detailed (PositiveTechnologies, 2018). With an increased level of exposure, detection of incidents
is of importance to reduce associated costs and risks.
2015 2016 2017
Figure 2.3: Shodan search engine results outlining directly accessible Internet
connected BACnet/IP devices at the time of query in 2015, 2016, and 2017.
The darker the colour the more devices identified.
Second order threats are those which have an emergent effect against a system. In BAS, these
can include damage to physical goods/data inside a building, such as perishables or data servers
through temperature manipulation. Since BAS networks are connected to enterprise networks,
attacks such as data theft and extortion on enterprise networks can also occur via the BAS network
(Ca´rdenas et al., 2008; Vijayan, 2014).
Direct and second order threats are tightly coupled. One vulnerability could exploit each of
these threats, for example an attack against a fan in a HVAC, which uses legitimate commands
sent from a trusted by default device on the network would impact both the physical device (i.e
burn out the fan) but also impact the goods inside the building (Johnstone et al., 2015).
Compared to other connected devices, such as desktop computers and smart phones, BAS
devices undertake relatively simple computing tasks, and as such have reduced compute power by
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design. With the added long life-cycles of BAS networks compared to IT devices, most IT devices
have an order of magnitude more processing power and memory size than a building controller.
The connection of BASs to external networks provides a means for contextually powerful devices
to interact with BAS devices, which through normal interaction can overwhelm BAS devices and
cause physical damage to building components and the surrounding environment (Holmberg, 2003;
Johnstone et al., 2015).
2.4.1 Summary of core issues
Many of the underlying issues facing BACnet controlled BAS originate from historical design choices
based on the then locally connected topology. BACnet devices are peers, meaning there is a high
degree of trust placed in the network communications originating from a device. Due to previously
being closed topology, source authentication was not required and thus is lacking from base protocol
implementations of BACnet. Given there is no third-party source authentication, any device on the
network which utilised the BACnet protocol can communicate with other BACnet devices. BACnet
has limited knowledge of network scope and segregation, thus if an external device can interact with
a BACnet device, it will act on its command. As BASs often run over office network architecture,
and provides remote access to internal systems, securing the BAS is important for enterprise network
security (Ca´rdenas et al., 2008; Fisk, 2012), in addition to the security of the BAS. More recently,
BASs using BACnet have been integrated into cloud analytic platforms and the IoT (GO-IoT,
2018). Discussion has also begun on the use of integrating wearable technologies to further optimise
control procedures in BAS for future smart cities (Baig et al., 2017), opening another avenue into
the network which must be secured. Additionally, as BASs are more commonly being connected
to enterprise networks, the possibility of pivoting into the secured internal enterprise network can
exist (Ca´rdenas et al., 2008).
Oversight on the network level is also an issue. Typically, BACnetworks have sensor monitoring
and data aggregation via trending for operational purposes, but not network level oversight. Gener-
ally, the owners and operators of the BAS do not have control over the network, with IT personnel
controlling the network (Jabado, 2017; Humphries, 2017). Often BAS operators have a network
to operate the BAS, but outsource monitoring of the network connection to the IT department,
who do not deploy network monitoring to a segregated part of the network, allowing for malicious
network transactions to occur undetected.
2.5 Approaches to securing BACnet
“no company has yet implemented it[BACnet security services] in a commercially
available product”Newman (2013, p. 44)
The 2003 threat assessment undertaken by Holmberg (2003) formed the basis of the construction
of an improved security addendum for BACnet. Prior to this, Clause 24 of the BACnet Standard
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outlined minor network security features discussed in Zachary et al. (2002) and Holmberg (2003)
as in-secure. The BACnet Security Services (BSS) is the improved security addendum, defined as
Clause 24 of the BACnet standard 2012, with the intent to “...provide peer entity, data origin,
and operator authentication, as well as data confidentiality and integrity” SSPC-135 (2012, p720).
Clause 24 specifically mentions it is not defined to provide “... authorization policies, access control
lists and non-repudiation” SSPC-135 (2012, p720). Security features are implemented as a set of
network layer messages, but is typically described as a separate stack layer. Clause 24 provides the
ability for devices to authenticate, data hiding and user authentication through the use of shared
keys used to sign messages, of which there are six types outlined below (SSPC-135, 2012).
1. General-Network-Access
2. User-Authenticated
3. Application-Specific
4. Installation
5. Distribution
6. Device-Master
The General Network Access Key is provided to all devices, and is used to sign Broadcast net-
work layer messages, enable encryption tunnels and used by user interface devices which cannot
authenticate normally (SSPC-135, 2012). The standard notes that messages sent with a general
network access key should not have their user ID and user role fields trusted (SSPC-135, 2012).
The User Authenticated Key are provided to trusted client and server devices which implement
identity management, allowing for trust of the user ID and user role fields. Application-Specific
keys provide security boundaries between specific building services, such as HVAC and lighting
(SSPC-135, 2012). An Application-Specific Key is thus only provided to devices sharing a building
service, with Clause 24 stating these keys can be for highly secure communication, allowing re-
striction of services initiated by devices with lower privileged keys (SSPC-135, 2012). Installation
keys are temporary keys which are aimed to be used by technicians to configure controllers using
tools that would not normally access the network (SSPC-135, 2012). Distribution keys are used to
distribute all keys bar the device-master over the network, as per local security policy (SSPC-135,
2012). The device master key is used for the distribution key, and can be either a unique pre-
fixed key, or requested from a key distribution server using the Set-Master-Key service (SSPC-135,
2012). Key distribution is intended to occur via a BACnet key server (SSPC-135, 2012). All keys
are bundled into a set and distributed with a single key revision number, each device receives a
specific set of keys appropriate for the device use (SSPC-135, 2012).
The BSS defines SHA256 or MD5 for key Hashed Message Authentication Codes (HMAC),
however, given that MD5 is widely identified as an insecure hashing technique (Turner & Chen,
2011), the integrity of signing messages using BSS is questionable.
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Table 2.8: BACnet security policies, adapted from SSPC-135 (2017)
BACnet Security Policies
Plain-Non-Trusted Not physically nor digitally secure
Plain-Trusted Physical security is required, without protocol secur-
ity
Signed-Trusted Physical security is not required, digital security is
provided by signatures
Encrypted-Trusted Physical security is not required, digital security is
provided by encryption
Encryption is often not implemented on control networks due to the processing capability of
devices (Cheminod et al., 2013), and to provide the ability to maintain oversight for safety features.
Additionally, encryption does not prevent legitimate messages causing malicious actions if a trusted
device is taken over by an adversary. Clause 24 defines four network policies for devices, defined in
Table 2.8.
The caveat of BACnet security is that BSS defined in Clause 24 is optional. Noted by Newman
the original BACnet working groups director, “no company has yet implemented it[bacnet secure
services] in a commercially available product” Newman (2013, p. 44). Additional limitations are
identified in Clause 24, of note, for secure communications Clause 24 states that not only the
signature, but also the Device ID is required. Thus, the secure features of the protocol are reliant on
knowledge of the Device ID field of other devices, which is generally requested before communication
via a broadcast. Additionally, advice given in Clause 24 is to disable a range of error conditions
to prevent potential denial of service attacks, the equivalent of disabling ICMP in IP networks for
diagnostics, which is generally a discredited idea (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009). To implement Clause
24, the standard defines a minimum device requirement, consisting of the details listed below.
1. Have an application layer
2. Support execution of WriteProperty
3. Ability to track time
4. Have non-volatile re-writable storage
5. Not be an MS/TP Slave device
These limitations discount legacy, and current field devices specifically, which generally cannot track
time and are MS/TP slaves. From a security standpoint, the development of BACnet seems to
have a reduced focus since the inclusion of the BSS as Clause 24 in 2009. Little additional security
analysis was performed via the BACnet working groups until 2017, with an updated release of
Addendum 135-2016bj discussing security. As noted, there is a push for BACnet to be part of the
IoT. Given the lack of implemented security features, the introduction of BACnet into the IoT area
is concerning, and requires further investigation. Currently, the security features of the protocol are
assumed to be handled by the IP suite (Newman, 2013). From a security standpoint, there are many
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questionable functions in the protocol base, which seem fundamentally at odds with traditional IT
based security theory and practice, yet are required for BACnet to operate in accordance with the
standard; for example, the reliance on broadcast communications (Newman, 2010). The BACnet
protocol is intended to provide a base level of functionality, with the flexibility to implement security
features on a per-use basis, given the optional criterion of the BSS. The implementation of the BSS
is reliant on the vendor of the device installed, however this is seen as an extra feature, rather than a
required behaviour. Unfortunately for BACnet, and subsequently the associated people, goods and
buildings, BAS vendors have historically been poor at securing their hardware devices and software
stack implementations. Additionally, many modern BACnet certified devices operating with the
base features defined in previous versions of the protocol standard, further outlined in §4.6.7.1 .
Proprietary security measures are being developed, and seems the way forward for securing BACnet
managed buildings. Given the market share of BACnet, continuing topology trends, and aim to be
integrated into the IoT, additional security features are required to improve the robustness of the
protocol.
2.5.1 Device hardening
Not only the BACnet protocol has security issues. As noted, BAS devices have a fraction of the
compute power compared to modern day desktops, laptops and smart phones. A number of reported
attacks against BACnet managed BASs have used hardware flaws in devices to gain access to the
system. One such attack was revealed via the July 2012 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Newark divisions unclassified situational information report cyber alert, discussing vulnerabilities
in the Tridium Niagara ICS system (FBI, 2012). The report detailed that the Niagara system
is used extensively in BACnet managed BAS, with at the time, over 300,000 instances operating
worldwide (FBI, 2012). The trigger for the investigation was the infiltration of an adversary into
a New Jersey air conditioning company, who used Tridium hardware to manage its HVAC system,
and supplied the same hardware to other businesses buildings, including financial institutions (FBI,
2012). The Tridium hardware was connected directly to the Internet, with no interposing firewall;
a similar situation many businesses face with modern IP connected BAS hardware. Similarly, a
hardware flaw in a Tridium controller exposed to the Internet was used by independent researchers
to access the BAS in Googles Sydney Wharf building in 2012 (Grubb, 2013). The access was
responsibly disclosed, with Google reporting that the system accessed was segregated from other
devices on the network. Given the typical topology of BAS, and the topology retrieved in the
exposure, the statement is questionable. Analysis outlined in §4.2 found over 5000 unique Tridium
devices directly accessible to the Internet over a three year period.
An approach to improving the security of BACnet devices is firmware patching. Similarly,
software patching can be used to reduce software vulnerabilities running on each device. However,
patching is an area where IT and OT have opposing goals. Patching is a part of the system life-cycle
in IT systems, where upon detection of a flaw, a fix is designed, tested and applied to the system.
To deploy the patch, often the system must be restarted, or taken offline for a period of time. While
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appropriate for IT systems, downtime is not acceptable in BASs without forward planning; similar
to other control systems which have a safety to security relationship (Dussel et al., 2010; Fisk, 2012;
Cheminod et al., 2013). Additionally, patching a vendor installed device often leads to voiding the
maintenance warranty of the device, which is a prohibitive associated cost and justification to not
patch devices. Much like other control systems, the importance of availability has resulted in a lack
of patching, which in turn results in flawed systems in operation for often the entire lifecycle of the
device, typically 10-20 years. However noted by Fisk (2012) for longevity of a system, patching
must be a part of the system. Fisk (2012) elaborates, stating that patching only becomes effective
when an equilibrium is reached where more or equal vulnerabilities are fixed compared to those
introduced by the patch. The possibility of introducing unknown error provides further reasoning
for BAS to have infrequent to non-existent patching cycles.
While all BACnet devices are tested by a BACnet testing laboratory before being standardised
and receiving accreditation, the hardware level security of the device is not a component of ac-
creditation. Rather, the focus is on ensuring a minimum working set of communication and device
representation based on specific versions of the standard (BTL, 2017).
2.5.2 Network level security
Khaund (2015) identifies the requirement of a defence in depth, or layered approach to BAS security,
including identity validation, firewalls and encryption. BACnet specific network security methods,
such as firewalls have been investigated previously in Holmberg, Bender and Galler (2006). Pan,
Hariri and Al-Nashif (2014) investigated a means of preventing intrusions automatically through
dropping specific packets, akin to a firewall. However in life-safety critical systems, as elaborated by
Kaur et al. (2015), dropping packets is not an appropriate action. Comparatively, Fovino, Coletta,
Carcano and Masera (2012) implemented a ModBus firewall, which sits between the master and
slave devices on a network to monitor the critical state of the system. Alerts are generated based
on legitimate commands which could change the state of the system to a defined critical state.
Fovino et al. (2012) note that a great deal of knowledge is required of the system to define the
critical states, with future work proposed as a means of automatically searching the system space
and generating critical state definitions. A similar approach could be used in BACnet/IP, however,
it would suffer from similar issues due to the scope of BAS networks, and the multiple interactions
between devices. A potential means of enumerating the network protocol could be the use of
fuzzing (Takanen, Demott & Miller, 2008). Kaur et al. (2015) undertake fuzzing using a Python
Scapy based fuzzer to test their network normalisation rules. Further, fuzzing can also be used for
improving the security of the protocol, rather than testing a security tool, as noted by (Turner,
2016). Turner (2016) applied a customised fuzzer against the BACnet open stack v 0.8.4 (Karg,
2016), revealing a buffer overflow in the NPDU implementation. Fuzzing however would be highly
time consuming, and have a high degree of risk if running against a real system.
Most BACnet implementations do not have network level visibility of device communication
(Caselli, 2015; Jabado, 2017; Humphries, 2017). Rather, a Human Machine Interface (HMI) work-
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station provides a graphical interface for viewing and controlling specific devices in the network.
Further, in Khaund (2015), network visibility of the BAS network is not mentioned as a security
countermeasure. The convergence of OT and IT systems has led to data visibility being investigated
to further optimise the efficiency of BAS systems, typically for retrieving further knowledge from
data, such as occupancy trends from sensor data. With multiple motivations, and limited impact
on existing infrastructures, intrusion detection systems are an appropriate avenue to explore.
2.5.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are an area of interest in control system network research,
and it is no different in BACnet managed BAS. Over the past decade, a range of novel detection
approaches have been undertaken to address security issues in BACnet. A Flow based intrusion
detection approach was investigated by Cˇeleda, Krejcˇ´ı and Krmı´cˇek (2012), based on their previous
work in Krejcˇ´ı, Cˇeleda and Dobrovolny´ (2012). The flow method, described in Krejcˇ´ı et al. (2012)
was implemented in Cˇeleda et al. (2012) for IDS purposes on the Masarysk University BAS network,
with three security use cases discussed. One use case investigated three BACnet specific attacks,
namely a BACnet router spoofing attack, a BACnet DoS and a BACnet write attack. The flow
based approach was deemed sufficient by the authors to identify attacks where a combination of
packets causes a malicious action, as is the case with the router spoof attack and the DoS. The flow
patterns revealed by the write packets however, could not be used to reveal a specific attack taking
place, as one packet could cause a malicious write, and thus the pattern is much more difficult to
find with the flow based method. A significant limitation of the research is the lack of real attack
data, the flows did not reveal any BACnet specific network attacks, in addition, as the monitored
network was a real network, attacks could not be crafted and sent across the network to identify
what a malicious flow would encompass. The study by Krejcˇ´ı et al. (2012) identified diurnal and
weekly patterns in the traffic of a university BAS. Explained by the purpose of a BAS to control
the temperature of an environment based on internal and external temperature differences, which
are diurnal. Of note is the diurnal pattern of Read property, Write property, I-am and Who-is
packets, which form the basis of BACnet communications between devices. These features could
be used for deriving normal network behaviour.
Pan et al. (2014) expanded the flow based method of Cˇeleda et al. (2012) by applying a capture
method to a simulated BACnetwork, with a range of BACnet specific network attacks used to gen-
erate a dataset for anomaly detection. The methods presented by Pan et al. (2014) assume that the
attacker will cause abnormal network transactions to occur, and thus defined normal value ranges
for write values. A tuning phase would be required for this method to work, as application to a
real network would require additional training to define the normal value ranges of specific devices,
as these ranges will be application specific, rather than a global standard. Of the commands clas-
sified, the authors classified I-am and Who-is network transactions as anomalous, however these
transactions are normal traffic interactions which occur in a BACnetwork when a device wishes to
find another device in the network, and write or read data to said device. Given the conditions
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set by the authors, the abnormal method is quite successful, however a limitation of the work is
the ability to correctly classify attacks which occur in the bounds of the specification of BACnet.
For example, in regards to the classification of I-am and who-is transactions as malicious, they can
be deemed as dual-purpose commands which can cause legitimate-yet-malicious commands to be
executed. Similarly, Write property commands which send values that are in-bound but with an
additional feature, such as frequency or multitude can also cause malicious action.
An alternative method for detection of out-of-bounds attacks is presented by Caselli et al. (2016),
using BACnet Protocol Implementation Compliance Statements (PICS) to derive device conform-
ance rules to form IDS rules. The approach provides a semantic-based method to detect abnormal
BACnet properties, services and objects operating in a BACnetwork with high detection rates and
low false positives. However, similar to Pan et al. (2014), the semantic based approach offered in
Caselli et al. (2016) also fails to detect legitimate-yet-malicious commands.
Esquivel-Vargas et al. (2017) continues the work discussed in Caselli et al. (2016), providing
rigorous testing to the specification mining approach. A parsing method is developed for BACnet
protocol implementation compliance statements for the specific devices operating in the network
of interest, which are used to form intrusion detection rulesets. The rulesets are tested using a real
BACnetwork, consisting of 646 devices. 10 PICS files describe 640 of these devices, with network
fingerprints generated for which services and properties each device has. When traffic deviates from
these generated fingerprints, an alert is triggered. The implementation is tested against a long
term capture of the real-network, which identified a number of implementation specific anomalous
behaviour, and a small testbed used to generate malicious BACnet specific attacks for testing. The
results are promising, but as noted by the authors, highly dependent on extraction of device PICS,
and observations of normal traffic interactions. Further, as noted, the drawback of this approach
is the inability to detect attacks which follow the correct syntax of the protocol and interact with
the defined objects and properties (Esquivel-Vargas et al., 2017).
A group of researchers have focused on anomaly based detection approaches to BACnet IDS,
carrying on from previous works with the KNX protocol. Kaur et al. (2015) discuss a snort based
traffic normalisation method for improving application reliability and security, with future work
slated for detection and prevention of attacks. Kaur et al. (2015) first derives a range of attacks
from Holmberg (2003), and defines that normal traffic, through real device testing is capable of
processing only 180 messages per second. The purpose of traffic normalisation is to improve the
robustness of the protocol implementation, through preventing malformed or, out-of-bounds traffic
from entering the network. Evaluation of the derived normalisation method is undertaken using
a simulated BACnetwork implemented as three virtual machines. The testbed consisted of an
attacker which uses the aforementioned fuzzer, the protocol normaliser and one BACnet device
operating the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2015) and wireshark to monitor the network traffic. A
range of scenarios were undertaken to generate normal and abnormal traffic sets. Of note, a DoS
attack consisting of upwards of 800,000 malformed packets per second was simulated, and used as
attack traffic for testing. When the normaliser is deployed, the DoS fails as all out-of-bounds traffic
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is dropped by the normaliser, and thus does not reach the device. The traffic normaliser defined in
Kaur et al. (2015) achieves the same purpose as Pan et al. (2014) and Caselli et al. (2016), albeit in
a different way. Implementation of the traffic normaliser in a real network would be difficult, given
the peer-to-peer topology of BACnetworks, as such a number of normalisers would be required.
Further work defined by Kaur et al. (2015) is the implementation of a state based classification,
similar to work outlined in Peacock and Johnstone (2014) and Johnstone et al. (2015).
Tonejc, Kaur, Karsten and Wendzel (2015) introduced a visualisation method for identifying
application layer anomalies in BACnet based on network messages flows. The authors test their
method with the premise of hardware malfunctions. Later, in Tonejc et al. (2016), the authors
expand and compare a range of unsupervised machine learning methods to the flow visualisation
method defined in Tonejc et al. (2015) for identifying malicious anomalies. A limitation of the
flow visualisation technique, as represented in Tonejc et al. (2016) is that only previously unseen
nodes would be classed as malicious nodes. There is no discussion on how existing trusted nodes
who sporadically exhibit malicious action would be identified. Community detection may be an
appropriate avenue to pursue, for dormant malicious actors on the network.
While work has been undertaken for intrusion detection in BACnet, current works can be
improved. Further work can be directed to identifying contextual anomalies, those which have
the characteristics and obey the rules of the protocol, but can still cause malicious outcomes.
Detection of contextual anomalies requires learning and understanding the structure of the devices
and interactions on the network, baselining behaviour, and identifying where behaviour deviations
occur. A common way to find patterns in networks is the application of machine learning algorithms.
A typical use case for machine learning in cyber security is in the area of intrusion detection systems.
The application of machine learning to BAS’s, particularly BACnet, is a recent research direction.
As such, a discussion of machine learning applied to cyber security generally is appropriate, to
outline areas in which machine learning can be applied to BAS intrusion detection.
2.6 Machine learning
Bhattacharyya and Kalita (2014) define machine learning as the application of algorithms to extract
meaningful patterns from datasets, with the intention of applying these learnt patterns to classify
future data. There are thus two sides to machine learning, developing learning algorithms, and
the application of said algorithms to specific problems. The application of a machine learning
algorithm essentially defines a learnt model of behaviour for the system of interest, from which
future data is compared, and classified based on the model. There are many learning algorithms, and
the classification of machine learning algorithms into specific methods/classes vary between texts,
with many crossovers, reclassifications and sub-classifications. Additionally, due to the quantity
of algorithms and derivatives, any listing would inevitably be incomplete (Goldstein & Uchida,
2016). There are generally however, two simplified classifications, supervised and unsupervised.
The core classifier for placement in these two defined groups is that supervised methods require
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labeled data, whereas unsupervised methods do not require labeled data. Supervised methods
model the relationships between inputs and outputs through analysis of the mapping between
inputs and outputs. While unsupervised learning is focused on finding patterns in data sets, and
forming clusters from which classification of future data can be undertaken through comparing
the distance between new data, and defined clusters. Examples of supervised machine learning
methods include Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), Support Vector Machines (SVMs), decision
trees, bayesian networks, and Markov models (Dua & Du, 2011; Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2014;
Goldstein & Uchida, 2016). Unsupervised methods include clustering and statistical methods such
as expectation-maximisation algorithms (Dua & Du, 2011; Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2014; Goldstein
& Uchida, 2016).
2.6.1 Application of machine learning to cyber security
A range of machine learning algorithms have been applied to cyber security problems, most com-
monly for intrusion detection systems (Dua & Du, 2011; Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2014). Bhat-
tacharyya and Kalita (2014) note the different potential uses for the two generic divisions of machine
learning, supervised and unsupervised in network analysis. Supervised machine learning are useful
for finding known instances, however they require a labelled dataset which often requires human
intervention. Comparatively, unsupervised methods are useful for identifying unknown instances,
as they do not require labelled datasets, rather, using the statistical properties of instances to
group them by similarity. However, identification of unknown instances is dependent on three core
assumptions outlined by Bhattacharyya and Kalita (2014) .
1. Normal traffic has a higher occurrence than Anomalous traffic
2. Anomalous traffic is qualitatively different to Normal traffic
3. Similarity between Anomalous traffic is stronger than between Normal traffic
The features which distinguish between normal and anomalous may cause significant overhead.
A core premise of machine learning in cyber security is optimising feature selection to identify
the least number of features which can classify the traffic between normal and anomalous with
the highest accuracy levels (Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2014). Through optimisation of features,
the subsequent dimensionality of the data is reduced which increases the processing speed of the
method (Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2014).
A major problem with anomaly detection is the ability to detect threats in real-time, to increase
the speed in presenting an alarm. Chandola, Banerjee and Kumar (2012) highlight that Markovian
based techniques are very effective at undertaking real-time detection (termed online-detection
in Chandola et al. (2012)) through slight adaptation, with less than n-order Markovian models
applying thresholding, and Hidden Markov Models modifying the forward backward algorithm to
compute the optimal state sequence for an observation sequence in real time.
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2.6.2 Machine learning in BAS
Tonejc et al. (2016) undertakes a range of unsupervised machine learning methods, including clus-
tering, random forest, one class SVM and support vector classifier. The authors use a test set of
known attacks, and pre-process the packet captures into a vector representation, which then has
principal component analysis (PCA) applied for feature reduction. PCA can be used to classify
network traffic, whereby the lowest number of components are selected which describe the largest
amount of network traffic (Dua & Du, 2011). With the assumption that normal traffic outnumbers
malicious traffic, at a certain selected number of components, the traffic which is not explained by
the components are stated as anomalous. Tonejc et al. (2016) analysis is undertaken at a global
level, analysing all traffic on a testbed network. Any cluster smaller than 2% of total traffic is
classed as anomalous. Similar to other works in the area, many of the attacks discussed are out of
bounds based, e.g incorrect bit combinations, longer than normal addresses. These types of attacks
work well for methods such as clustering for outlier detection. The clustering and random forest
approaches undertaken were reported as successful, results for the one class SVM were deemed not
useful and thus not presented (Tonejc et al., 2016).
As reported by Tonejc et al. (2016), unsupervised methods seem appropriate for detecting an-
omalies in BAS where the malicious traffic is distinctly different from the normal traffic. However,
when detecting anomalous traffic which is close to normal, it is unclear how well unsupervised
methods will operate. The requirement of labelled data may be necessary, where supervised meth-
ods can be utilised. Typical machine learning methods which operate with labelled data include
Markov models and ANNs, which will be discussed in the forthcoming sections.
2.7 Markov Models
A Markov model is a class of probability model which exhibits the Markov property, namely, the
determination of the next value is only dependent directly on the current value, and not on historical
events or values (Van Mieghem, 2009). Markov models which evaluate based on the current state
are called first order Markovian models. N order models, use additional states to assess the next
state to transition to, for example, a second order Markovian model would evaluate a pair of states
for the next subsequent state. The class of Markov model is dependent on if the state variable
is observable, and if the system changes based on the observations from the model. When the
state variable is observable, and does not alter a system, the model is classed as a Markov Chain.
Alternatively, when the state variable is only partially observable, and the system is not altered,
the model is classed Hidden Markov Model. When the system is directly acted upon by the Markov
model, it is classed Markov Decision Process; which can be fully observed, or partially observed.
Given the domain of this research, only models which do not interact with a system are evaluated,
namely, Markov chains and hidden Markov models.
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2.7.1 Markov Chains
The state space and time parameter of a Markov chain can differ, and provides a number of further
classified Markov chains. When the state space is restricted, a model which exhibits the Markov
property is called a Markov chain. There is little consensus in the literature about the naming
convention for specific types of Markov chains, with Markov chain or Markov process being used
generically to refer to different time parameter models. For this research, if using discrete time,
a Markov model is referred to as a discrete-time Markov chain. When using continuous time, a
Markov model is referred to as a continuous-time Markov chain.
A Markov chain consists of a set of states, a transition matrix between the set of states and an
initial distribution of transition matrix values. A discrete-time Markov chain can be described by
Equation 2.1 - Equation 2.4, adapted from Haykin (2009, p583). Equation 2.1 defines the Markov
property, while a transition matrix where transitions occur at the same period is defined in Equation
2.2. When Equation 2.3 is met, the transition matrix is called a stochastic matrix. Additionally,
Equation 2.4 states that at a discrete time, there occurs a transition in the Markov chain.
Markov chains have a number of properties, including reducibility, periodicity, transience and
recurrence. From these properties, the ergodicity, and steady-state analysis of the Markov model
can be determined. Reducibility describes the ability of the chain to traverse between states. A
Markov chain is classified as irreducible so the chain can get to any state from any state. The
periodicity describes the number of periods required to return to the current state from future
states. If the period is 1, the state is classed aperiodic, if all states are aperiodic, the chain is
classed as aperiodic. If the period is 1<, the chain is classed periodic with a stated period value
corresponding to the greatest common divisor of periods between states. Transience and recurrence
are properties of states in the Markov chain. A transient state describes a state which may never be
transitioned back to, while recurrent states will always, eventually return to the state. Additionally,
if a state can never be exited, the state is classed an absorbing state. A state is called ergodic if
the state is both aperiodic and positive recurrent. Classification of states, and Markov chains
can be determined through analysis of the state properties, and consultation of Figure 2.4. The
steady state distribution, sometimes called a stationary distribution, is reached when the probability
distribution remains unchanged in the Markov chain as time progresses, stated as a vector pi. The
steady state is determined by raising the transition matrix to the power k, a future time step, until
the transition probabilities converge.
P (Xk+1 = xk+1|X0 = x0, ..., Xk = xk) = P (Xk+1 = xk+1|Xk = xk) (Equation 2.1)
pij = P (Xk+1 = j|Xk = i) (Equation 2.2)
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pij ≥ 0 for all i, j (Equation 2.3)
N∑
j=1
pij = 1 (Equation 2.4)
Figure 2.4: Markov state classification represented as a decision tree, replicated
from Haykin (2009, p590)
Conversely, a continuous-time Markov chain, holds the Markov property, see Equation 2.5,
and also holds the concept of time spent in a state, i.e the ∆t between transitions are not equal,
see Equation 2.6 taken from Van Mieghem (2009). Continuous time Markov chains thus have an
exponentially distributed transition time between states, which is independent of changing state;
the time spent in the state is not determinant on transitioning to the next state. Both discrete-
time, and continuous-time Markov chains can additionally hold the concept of homogeneous and
inhomogeneous time, whereby the transition probabilities between states are independent on time,
or are dependent on time, respectively. For a continuous time Markov chain, Equation 2.5 describes
the Markov property and Equation 2.6 describes the transition matrix. Equation 2.7 is called the
Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, which is the fundamental equation determining that states in
the set are connected to each other. The same relation as discrete time Markov chains holds for
continuous time Markov chains, namely Equation 2.8 stating that at any point in time, the chain
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will be in a defined state. Further, the initial condition of the transition matrix is Equation 2.9.
P (X(t+ τ) = j|X(τ) = i,X(u) = x(u), 0 ≤ u < τ) = P (X(t+ τ) = j|X(τ) = i) (Equation 2.5)
pij(t) = P (X(t+ τ) = j|X(τ) = i) = P (X(t) = j|X(0) = i)
where
X(t), t ≥ 0
(Equation 2.6)
P (t+ u) = P (u)P (t) = P (t)P (u) (Equation 2.7)
N∑
j=1
Pij(t) = 1 (Equation 2.8)
P (0) = I
where
P (0) = lim t ↓ 0P (t)
(Equation 2.9)
2.7.1.1 Markov Chain applications to cyber security
Markov chain models have been used in a range of disciplines including cyber security, typically for
network anomaly detection. Markov models can be used for simulation, testing approaches, and
classification of new data based on previously seen data. In Caselli, Zambon and Kargl (2015), a
discrete time Markov chain is defined for network communication in the ModBus protocol. The
model uses a sequence of event process, which allows for state classification based on the sequence
of commands being sent on the network, in addition to the data sent on the network. Of note
is the generation of the model being independent of the protocol of interest, where each sequence
event is automatically classified for state learning. After learning, test data is provided whereby
new states and transition patterns are flagged as anomalous, and investigated for further analysis.
The concept of weights are applied to commands based on domain knowledge and an adversary
model, where not all events are of equal importance.
In Abraham and Nair (2015), Markov models are applied to threat intelligence analytics,
through the generation of automated attack graphs from CVSS data. The inputs for this model
are the network topology, services running on devices, and CVSS scores of identified devices and
software. Markov chains are used to simulate progress of an adversary progressing through the
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network by chaining vulnerabilities in each device together to reach an end goal. The aim of the
research is to define the shortest path an adversary must take to reach their goal, and provide
insight into the current security structure of a given system. The model is generic, and could be
expanded with the combination of an adversary model, and additional goal states for the adversary.
In Kostakos, Ferreira, Goncalves and Hosio (2016), a Markov chain is developed for prediction
of smart phone screen usage, based on statistical properties of usage. The aim of the modelling
was to reveal emergent system behaviour, based on the assumption that observable state features
are mutually exclusive, and have a probabilistic transition between states. From the data used in
this research, the time between sequential events can be determined, defining how long each state
is visited for, a continuous time Markov chain. Analysis performed in Kostakos et al. (2016) details
that the data exhibits time inhomogeneous features, in certain states the transition probability
increases based on the amount of time spent in the current state. Time data analysis of the
relationships between state transitions and the time of day and day of week was undertaken.
Kostakos et al. (2016) also investigate individual device profiling, applying the analysis to individual
devices to identify device specific behaviour patterns for time between states, and time of day state
change. A difficulty with time inhomogeneous and continuous Markov models are the increased
complexity of the model requiring additional processing capability.
Abaid, Sarkar, Kaafar and Jha (2016) apply a limited state discrete time Markov chain model
for detection of botnet infections, and prediction of a botnet attack executing. The model presented
defines four states: exploit, binary download, CNC communication and attack. Of note, the
authors discuss self loops in their states, where for attack and CNC communication, the transition
probabilities are very high (90%<), which significantly impacts the prediction of state change in
their model. The authors argue that given their interest in entering an attack state, and not the
duration held within the attack state, the self loop can be discounted. From this point, the authors
investigate the potential of eliminating all self loops, and conclude that from their dataset, the
variance in temporal patterns on self loops is low enough to eliminate self loops completely. The
authors describe a high prediction rate for the attack state, and CNC communication state, but
detail a limitation of their research is the small sample size and high variance in some state data,
with two orders of magnitude more data for attack and CNC states compared to exploit and binary
download states. The research proposes a future improved state model, which holds more states,
and an improved classifier for classifying data into states.
Bockholt (2017) apply a Markov chain model to identify sequence attacks on network flows from
the DARPA98 dataset. The Sequential Probability ratio test and log likelihood ratio algorithms
are applied against the Markov chain transition matrix and graphed, with the premise of visually
identifying different classes. A linear threshold is implemented which distinguishes the classes
of traffic, future work suggests a non-linear threshold. A number of restrictions are placed on
the implementation, such as the aim to use low level information, and minimise the processing
requirements.
An underlying theme stated in the analysed literature is the requirement of ground truth data
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representing the normal network behaviours of the system of interest. This is particularly difficult
in real networks, where the certainty of having no adversary traffic in the network is unknown.
Further, the requirement of labelled data is a time-consuming, often manual process (Bhattacharyya
& Kalita, 2014), which must be overcome. An alternative, when the states are not directly observed,
and thus not labelled is the Hidden Markov Model.
2.7.2 Hidden Markov Models
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a model which explains a set of unobservable states through
a probability distribution function of observations generated by the underlying states (Rabiner,
1990). The observations infer the underlying state of the system, and can be discrete or continuous
values. In a network context, the observations could be features of network packets or flows such as
packet size, and the hidden state is a discrete value, such as a command, or protocol type (Dainotti,
Pescape´, Rossi, Palmieri & Ventre, 2008). The HMM is described by a finite set of hidden states (S),
and a finite set of observations (O), generated by those states. The transition matrix (A) represents
the probability of moving from one state to another, while the emission matrix (B) describes the
probability of the observation when the system is in a specific state. The model is initialised by
a starting probability distribution function (pi), which defines the probability of starting in each
hidden state. As the state is not observed, the joint distribution of the observation and state is
taken over the full set of states. Each observation is independent and identically distributed over
the state sequence. Each state is dependent on the previous state at the last time slice.
Formally a HMM (λ) is a set of model parameters (pi,A,B), defined by Equation 2.10, Equa-
tion 2.11, Equation 2.12, Equation 2.13 and Equation 2.14. The joint distribution probability is
described in Equation 2.15.
S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} (Equation 2.10)
O = {o1, o2, ..., om} (Equation 2.11)
A = {aij , 1 ≤ i, j ≥ N}
where
aij = P (st = j|st−1 = i)
aij ≤ 0
(Equation 2.12)
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B = {bj(k)}
where
k ∈ O
bj(k) = P (ot = k|st = j)
(Equation 2.13)
pi = {pii}
where
pii = P (q1 = si), 1 ≤ i ≥ N
(Equation 2.14)
P (O|λ) = pis1P (o1|s1)
∑ T∏
t=2
aijP (ot|st) (Equation 2.15)
Applying a HMM to real data requires solving three problems.
1. The Evaluation Problem: Determine the probability that the model generated the observation
sequence
2. The Decoding Problem: Determine the optimal state sequence which best explains the ob-
servation sequence
3. The Learning Problem: Determine the probability of the model producing an observation
sequence through tuning the model parameters.
The evaluation problem can be solved using the forwards algorithm. The forwards algorithm is
a recursive algorithm for calculating the probability of each observation sequence which ends in
a specific state, for all states in the model (Shokhirev, 2010; Rabiner, 1990). Using the forwards
algorithm, improves the calculation from order 2T ·NT to N2T . The decoding problem can have
multiple solutions, as there can be various definitions of optimal (Rabiner, 1990). When the state
space is ergodic, meaning transitions between all states can exist, the forwards-backwards algorithm
can be used. However, if the state space is not ergodic, the Viterbi algorithm can be used, which is
a form of likelihood maximisation algorithm which finds the single best state sequence for the given
observation sequences. The learning problem is the most difficult, as there are multiple model
parameters to optimise simultaneously. The Baum-Welch algorithm can be used to select a set
of locally maximised model parameters for the observation sequence given the model, using an
iterative approach which eventually converges (Rabiner, 1990). It should be noted that there may
be multiple locally maximised model parameters existing in the explored space, which may require
optimisation (Rabiner, 1990).
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2.7.2.1 Hidden Markov Model applications to cyber security
HMMs have traditionally been used in speech recognition processes (Rabiner, 1990). HMMs have
also been used for general network traffic analysis in Salamatian and Vaton (2001) and later, Dain-
otti et al. (2008). In Warrender, Forrest and Pearlmutter (1999), the use of HMM in identifying
malicious system call sequences was explored, with high true positive (0.8 to 0.99) and low false
positive readings (0.0000 to 0.0005). Warrender et al. (1999) note the overhead of HMMs with
intermediate data structures, and conclude that HMMs are dependent on the dataset for useful-
ness. Jain and Abouzakhar (2012) use HMM for network anomaly detection against the KDDcup
1999 dataset (Hettich & Bay, 1999). Two models are derived, a normal HMM and a malicious
HMM, where the observations provided are fed into each model and classified normal or malicious
based on the observations fit to the model. The overall detection rate values are calculated by
summing the F measure of each model for each TCP service investigated. Nine different classes
of service are presented, with overall detection ranging from 0.76 to 0.99. An alternative method
to having multiple models is assuming that low probability transitions lead to anomalous states
(Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2014), which may be appropriate in certain situations. Ariu, Giacinto
and Perdisci (2007), apply a HMM for application level network traffic analysis to identify anomal-
ous sequences of commands travelling over a network. Ariu et al. (2007) explore the use of varying
size symbol dictionaries, splitting the training data, and using 10, 20 and 30 hidden states for their
model. Similar to results found in Warrender et al. (1999) for system call analysis, the application
of HMM to network sequences has a high true positive and low false positive rate. The high classi-
fication rates of HMM in both system call and network traffic warrant investigation for application
to BAS network data. Further, the periodic nature of diurnal traffic generation lends itself to the
use of a state classification method. HMM will be investigated given the lack of application to BAS
traffic in the explored literature.
2.8 Artificial Neural Networks
An alternative machine learning method is the Artificial Neural Network (ANN). As defined by
Haykin (2009), an ANN is a parallel distributed processor, which consists of simple processing
units (called neurons) that can store experimental knowledge and make it available for future use.
Knowledge is acquired through the application of multiple input signals to a neuron. Each input
signal has a synaptic weight, which provides distinction of importance between inputs in numerical
form. The inputs have a summation and bias function applied taking into account the synaptic
weights. The value is then passed to an activation function, which limits the output value to be
generated based on the type of activation. There are various learning methods, of which batch and
online are prominent (Haykin, 2009). The key distinction between the two learning methods are
when the change in synaptic weight occurs in the model. For batch learning, synaptic weights can
be changed after all training batches have been iterated, called an epoch. Comparatively, online
learning provides the ability to change weights at an example by example level inside each epoch.
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Additionally, learning algorithms are used to manipulate various parts of the base ANN model,
such as the synaptic weights, and the structure of the neurons in the network.
A commonly used learning algorithm is the back propagation algorithm, which provides feed-
back to prior nodes in the network, improving learning and classification. The back propagation
algorithm will be the focus of this section. Back propagation consists of two additional phases.
The forward phase where the synaptic weights of the network are fixed, and the input signal is
propagated iteratively through the layers until reaching the output layer. Changes in the network
only occur in the activation potentials and output neurons during the forward phase. The second
phase is called the backwards phase, whereby an error signal is produced through the comparison
of the output and desired result. The resultant error signal is then propagated through the network
backwards, to affect the synaptic weightings applied to the network.
Formally, there are five steps involved in back propagation ANNs, summarised below from
Haykin (2009).
1. Initialisation: Where, assuming no prior information is available, use a uniform distribution
with 0 mean and a variance which caused the standard deviation of the neurons to fall between
the linear and standard of the Sigma activation function, to derive the weights and thresholds.
2. Presentation: Present the constructed network an epoch of ordered training examples, for
each example, perform the sequence of forwards and backwards algorithms.
3. Forward Computation: The input vector is presented to the input layer node, similarly, the
desired response vector is presented to the output layer nodes. Computation of the induced
local fields and function signals of the network by proceeding forward through each layer of
the network, shown as Equation 2.16. Assuming a sigmoid bias function, the output signal of
neuron j in layer l is given as Equation 2.17 If neuron j is in a hidden layer, then Equation
2.18 is used, similarly, if neuron j is in the output layer, then Equation 2.19 is used. The
error signal is calculated using Equation 2.20.
4. Backwards computation: The aim of the backwards computation is to find the local gradients
shown as Equation 2.21, and then adjust the synaptic weights of the network, shown as
Equation 2.22.
5. Iteration: The iteration step involves repeating steps three and four while presenting new
epochs of training examples until a stopping criteria is met. The order of presentation of the
training examples should be randomised between epochs. As training iteration is increased,
the momentum and learning parameters are adjusted, often decreased.
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(l)
j (n) =
∑
i
w
(l)
ji (n)y
(l−1)
i (n)
where
v
(l)
j (n) is the induced local field
y
(l−1)
i (n) is the output signal of neuron i at the previous layer (l − 1) at iteration n
w
(l)
ji (n) is the weight of neuron j in layer l which is fed from neuron i in layer (l − 1)
(Equation 2.16)
y
(l)
j = φj(vj(n)) (Equation 2.17)
y
(0)
j (n) = xj(n)
where
xj(n) is the j
′th element of input vector x(n)
(Equation 2.18)
y
(L)
j = oj(n) (Equation 2.19)
ej(n) = dj(n)− oj(n)
where
dj(n is the j
′th element of the desired response vector d(x)
(Equation 2.20)
δ
(l)
j =
eLj (n)φij(vLj (n)) for neuron j in output layer Lφ′j(v(l)j (n))∑k δ(l+1)k (n)w(l+1)kj (n) for neuron j in hidden layer l
where
φ′ denotes differentiation with respect to the argument
(Equation 2.21)
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(l)
ji (n− 1)] + ηδ(l)j (n)y(l−1)i (n)
where
η is the learning rate parameter
α is the momentum cost
(Equation 2.22)
2.8.1 Artificial Neural Network applications to cyber security
ANNs have been used in a range of cyber security areas, most prominently for clustering, feature
extraction and anomaly detection in network traffic (Bhattacharyya & Kalita, 2014). Ryan, Lin
and Miikkulainen (1998) examined the application of an artificial neural network to Unix command
detection in one computer with multiple unique users. A classification task was undertaken for nor-
mal traffic to identify which user used what commands. In addition, random data was generated
to represent anomalous behaviour on the system. The implemented method reported a 0.96 detec-
tion rate of anomalous behaviour, with a 0.93 true positive rate. The 0.07 false positive data was
explained due to a lack of data for a specific user of the system whose only interactions were the
reported false positive data. Ghosh and Schwartzbard (1999) evaluated the DARPA 98 intrusion
detection dataset, using an ANN for misuse and anomaly based detection. 139 normal and 22 an-
omaly sessions were used for testing both approaches. Increasing the accuracy of detection results
in a higher false positive rate, with a 0.773 true positive and 0.036 false positive accepted as the
optimal outcome for the anomaly detection approach. In regards to network anomaly detection,
ANN’s have been applied to detect a range of network based attacks (Bhattacharyya & Kalita,
2014). Often, this type of research explores frequency based attacks, such as denial of service
and port scanning, whereby the normal network traffic has synthetic attacks embedded into the
dataset, such as in Andropov, Guirik, Budko and Budko (2017). Callegari, Giordano and Pagano
(2014) evaluated a range of ANNs for prediction of future network traffic for finding anomalous
traffic. The results are promising, with false positives ranging from 0.002 to 0.049. With increasing
applications of ANNs to anomaly detection in cyber security, application to a BAS network is of
interest.
2.9 Summary of literature
With the presented review of the literature, it has been determined that intrusion detection ap-
proaches with regards to BACnet/IP managed BASs should be further explored. The majority of
research has focused on incorrect traffic identification as anomalous behaviour, such as increased
frequencies or illegal byte values. Further, two distinct types of dataset are used. Either, a real-
dataset with synthetic attack traffic implemented, or a small simulated test-bed network with a
limited range of attack types. Additionally, implemented test-beds are often not analysed in the
context of real-world network implementations.
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Few articles investigate the application of machine learning to anomaly detection in BACnet-
works. Methods, such as Markov based models and ANNs have seen high accuracy rates in anomaly
detection in similar network structures such as SCADA networks. As such, improvements can be
made in both the datasets used to test anomaly detection approaches for BACnetworks, and the ap-
plication of existing machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection in BACnetworks. The study
aims to address these issues, through generation of a simulation testbed for anomalous BACnet
command generation, and the application of machine learning methods, such as HMMs and ANNs
for evaluating the detection capabilities for BACnetworks.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology and Design
This chapter details the methodology and design selected for the research. In some circumstances
it is straightforward to identify known-known anomalies in networked computer systems where the
variables are well understood and controlled, allowing for the experimental method to be directly
applied. However, identifying other types of anomalies, such as those defined in Table 1.2 are not
as straightforward to evaluate. To explore this problem, a number of frameworks are evaluated to
identify the appropriate research approach that could address the posed research questions.
The dominant research paradigms in information systems and cyber security research are ex-
plored, and an appropriate paradigm is identified and justified. The approach taken for the research
is discussed, with a range of candidate methods identified, analysed and ultimately selected. Next,
the research questions and derived hypotheses are stated. Following, the research design is presen-
ted, detailing the phases of research, core variables and materials used. The limitations and threats
to research are identified, and subsequently mitigations to said threats are stated. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of validity testing within the study.
3.1 Methodology
A methodology, as defined by Williamson (2013) is the “overall logic of inquiry involving the philo-
sophical assumptions behind an inquiry, the strategy of conducting research such as research design
and selection, and adoption of research methods and techniques as well as arguments for knowledge
construction and justification”(Williamson, 2013, p. 116). From this definition, there are two dis-
tinct features when undertaking research. First, the methodology, which defines the philosophical
assumptions underpinning the research used to inform the overall strategy and form a foundation
for selecting a research design. Second, the research design, which details the methods and tech-
niques, defining specific processes and procedures used for conducting the research, as well as the
collection and processing of data. Crotty (1998) states another feature, the justification of using
a specific methodology and design, rooted in the research question, and the assumptions of reality
the researcher brings to the research. Thus, through exploration of the philosophical assumptions
of a research domain, a critical selection process was undertaken for the use of specific methods
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and techniques which constitute a design. Coupled with analysis of the research questions, justific-
ation can be provided for a specific selection. Given the research undertaken involves technology,
systems and information, the domain of information systems research is explored for paradigms,
and associated meta-theoretical assumptions.
3.1.1 Research paradigms
As noted, the combination of meta-theoretical assumptions can be collectively used to inform a
research paradigm. For information systems research, Williamson (2013) defines three dominant
paradigms, positivist, interpretivist and critical. Similarly, Galliers (1990), describes the paradigms
of research in information systems as a continuum between empirical (positivist) and interpretative
(interpretivist) views. While the term positivist and quantitative, and likewise interpretivist and
qualitative are often used interchangeably, Williamson (2013), notes they are not synonyms. The
terms do not exclusively match with the aforementioned paradigms. Discussed by Crotty (1998),
the qualitative and quantitative classifications for research should be applied at the method level,
as they classify types of methods, rather than at the methodology level (separated as theoret-
ical perspective and epistemology by Crotty (1998)). This view is also informed through Galliers
(1990) classification schema of empirical and interpretative. As each methodology can utilise meth-
ods from both classes, quantitative and qualitative. The research paradigms will be discussed in
Galliers (1990) and Crotty (1998) terms. Namely, the paradigms are classed in terms of empir-
ical (positivist) and interpretative (interpretivist), while methods are classified as quantitative to
qualitative, detailed in Figure 3.1.
Paradigm
Quantitative
Qualitative
Method
Positivist Interpretivist
Critical
Empirical Interpretive
Figure 3.1: The continuum of dominant research paradigms in information
systems, and method classifications.
Positivists aim to apply scientific methods to a problem domain, with close association to de-
ductive reasoning and quantitative data. The aim of the positivist is to discover general laws
which can be applied, termed nomeothic. Interpretivists are concerned with meanings constructed
through individuals and groups, principally using inductive reasoning and collecting qualitative
data, termed idiographic. Critical theory focuses on changing the structures of society to empower
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disadvantaged or minority groups, through quantitative and qualitative data and subsequent meth-
ods.
3.1.2 Meta-Theoretical assumptions
When distinguishing between the various paradigms, classification is undertaken through the use
of differing meta-theoretical assumptions. In information systems research, there are a number of
implied meta-theoretical assumptions which guide the choice of research methodology. Four core
meta-theoretical assumptions, derived from Williamson (2013) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) are
ontological, epistemological, logic of inquiry and axiological. Crotty (1998) posits that ontological
and epistemological issues arise together, whereby a certain way of understanding “what is” (the
ontology) is tightly coupled with the way of understanding “what it means to know” (the epistem-
ology). Crotty (1998) argues that it is difficult to separate epistemology and ontology as concepts,
as they inform one another, and thus selection of a methodology (termed theoretical perspective)
is often complicated through stating the epistemological and ontological assumption. Rather, for
the sake of completeness, the methodology discussion presented will follow the specification derived
from Williamson (2013) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) stating both the epistemological and ontolo-
gical assumptions, with knowledge that the two assumptions inform one another. The definitions
of each meta-theoretical assumption can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary of meta-theoretical assumptions, adapted from Williamson
(2013), Guba and Lincoln (1994)
Assumption Description
Ontological The nature and existence of social reality
Epistemological The nature of knowledge and the ways of
knowing
Logic of Inquiry The logic of scientific explanation
Axiological Ethics and claims about values and their im-
pact on research
3.1.2.1 Ontological assumptions
The ontological assumption or question, relates to the form and nature of reality (Williamson, 2013).
Through defining the ontological assumption, research questions are grounded in what is perceived
to be “real”, and thus knowledge can be acquired which describes “how things really are” (Guba
& Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). The three dominant paradigms have competing views of the ontological
assumption. The positivist view accepts that there is one ordered and stable reality, which exists
regardless of interaction, called realism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Williamson, 2013). Interpretivists
view reality as a social construct, where reality is fluid and exists for the individual or group when
experienced, called relativism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Williamson, 2013). A middle ground is the
critical paradigms view, which accepts that reality objectively exists without interaction, but was
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shaped through the individual or groups construction over time, and now confines what is real,
called historical realism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
3.1.2.2 Epistemological assumptions
Epistemology, as stated by Crotty (1998) is “how we know what we know”. Epistemology is used to
ground research and allow for decisions of what can be classified as knowledge, and how knowledge
can be described as adequate and legitimate. A core epistemology is objectivism, which states that
meaning exists apart from the operation of consciousness. As an object, of a certain type, there
exists an intrinsic meaning defining the object. Thus, when an object is identified as a specific type
of object, the meaning of said object is revealed. Objectivity aligns with the positivist paradigm,
and, as noted, is clearly aligned with the ontological assumption of realism. Another, competing
epistemology is constructionism, which rejects the objectivist view, stating that there is no objective
truth waiting to be discovered, meaning exists due to the interaction with the world. Thus, meaning
is not discovered, but rather constructed by the individual, who may have competing meanings for
the same object of interest. Constructionism aligns with the interpretivist paradigm, and is closely
formed by the relativism ontological assumption. A third epistemology called subjectivism aligns
with both the interpretivist and critical paradigms, thus being influenced by historical realism.
Subjectivism states that knowledge is value mediated, and thus meaning is value dependant and
can change (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
3.1.2.3 Logics of inquiry
There are two dominant logics of inquiry also called logical reasoning, namely, deductive and
inductive. Deductive reasoning begins with a general theory about an object of interest, testable
hypotheses are formed, and observation is undertaken. The end result of deductive reasoning is
an acceptance or rejection of the stated hypothesis, providing suggestion of a theory. Conversely,
inductive reasoning begins with a specific observation, which is then explored to find patterns and
thus form temporary hypotheses. The hypotheses are then explored and a general conclusion or
theory is then suggested. Typically, deductive reasoning aligns with a positivist paradigm, while
inductive reasoning aligns with interpretivist paradigms.
3.1.2.4 Axiological assumptions
Axiology is the study of the nature of values, when making an axiological assumption, one is
assessing the impact of individuals or a group of people’s values which influence the research
(Williamson, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Positivist paradigm research defines that research is
undertaken in a value-free way, with the researcher being independent from the data, allowing
an objective stance. Interpretivist paradigm research defines all research as value laden, as the
researcher is part of the study, and cannot be separated, thus research is subjective. A summary
of the dominant meta-theoretical assumptions in information systems is presented as Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Summary of meta-theoretical assumptions for the three dominant
paradigms in information systems research, adapted from Guba and Lincoln
(1994), Crotty (1998), Williamson (2013)
Paradigms
Positivist Interpretivist Critical
Reason for
Research
Discovery of regularities
and causal laws for explana-
tion, prediction and control
of events and processes.
Description and under-
standing of phenomena in
the social world and their
subsequent meanings in
context
Empower people to change
their conditions through
unmasking and exposing
hidden forms of oppression,
false belief and commonly
held myths.
Ontology Realism: Ordered and
stable reality exists irre-
spective of an observer
Relativism: Reality is
socially constructed, as
people experience and
assign meaning, making
reality fluid and fragile.
Historical Realism: Real-
ity is socially constructed
but also perceived as ob-
jectively existing.
Epistemology Objectivism: Instrumental
approach to knowledge.
Knowledge enables control
of events, and represents
reality being stable and
additive.
Constructionism: Practical
approach to knowledge. In-
clusion of evidence about a
subject, and context is used
to empower understanding
of other realities, and how
the researcher came to un-
derstand them.
Subjectivism: Dialectical
approach to knowledge.
Knowledge reveals hidden
forms of control, domina-
tion and oppression, which
empowers individuals to
seek social change and
reform.
Logic of In-
quiry
Deductive: hypothesised
relations among variables,
logically derived from laws
or theories are empirically
tested in a repeatable way.
Inductive: development
of idiographic descriptions
and explanations based
on studies of people, and
actions in context. Explan-
ations need to make sense
to the individual or group
being studied as well as the
researchers and subsequent
research community.
Deductive, Inductive or
Abductive: seeking creative
leaps and revealing hidden
forces or structures which
help people understand
their circumstances and
ways of changing them.
Axiological Value-Free: Assumes both
natural and social sciences
are objective and value free,
operating separately from
social and power structures.
Ideally, positivist research-
ers are detached from the
topic of interest, and collect
value-free facts
Value-Laden: Questions
the possibility of value-
neutral science and value
free research. Values
are seen as embedded in
all human action, and
hence are inevitably part of
everything studied, without
judging one set of values as
better than another.
Value-Reasoned: Describes
any research as a moral-
political and value-based
activity. Critical research-
ers explicitly declare and
reflect on their value po-
sitions and provide argu-
ments for their normative
reasoning.
3.1.3 Selection of methodology
According to Williamson (2013), selection of a research paradigm is closely related to the form of
the research question, which infers the values of the core meta-theoretical assumptions. Questions
which aim to use measurements which can reliability provide an objective answer, and can be
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generalised to the population on which the study is based, can derive its assumptions from the
positivist paradigm. Questions which do not lend themselves to measurement and objective results
can instead derive their assumptions from the interpretivist paradigm.
From analysis of the stated major research question RQ1: How can known and unknown attacks
against BACnet/IP based Building Automation Systems be detected?. An objective, empirically
proven answer would be appropriate, and thus the research paradigm leans towards a positivist
approach. A similar method is described by Crotty (1998), whereby a research question or problem
informs the method to answer the question, and thus is the foundation of the strategy to undertake
subsequently leading to a discussion of assumptions about knowledge and reality; the methodology.
A complementary approach to identifying the meta-theoretical assumptions and subsequent
paradigm of research is through the analysis of the object of interest, and associated methods
described by Galliers (1990). Analysis of the objects of interest from Galliers’ taxonomy, shown as
Table 3.3, and the research questions posed suggests that both technology and theory testing are
potential subject matters for this research. From the identified objects of interest, the approaches
which align with both objects are highlighted, where the classification of “yes” is stated in one of the
objects of interest, it is explored. The “possibly” ranked approaches omitted from exploration are
Case Study, Survey, Subjective and Descriptive, given the research questions do not lend themselves
towards these approaches. The approaches explored are Theorem Proof, Laboratory Experiment,
Field Experiment, Forecasting and Futures Research, and simulation and game/role play.
Theorem Proof is described in Galliers (1990) as the development and testing of theorems,
closely tied to the strengths of the scientific method, namely, repeatability, reductionism and re-
futability, in addition to the precision of results. In essence, Theorem Proof is primarily concerned
with mathematical theorems, and thus will be discounted as an approach for this research.
Laboratory Experiments are described as the identification of precise relationships between vari-
ables in a designed controlled environment, with analysis undertaking using quantitative techniques.
With the aim to derive generalist laws to be applied to real world situations, the embodiment of the
positivist paradigm. Given the empirical nature of the research questions,laboratory experiments
is an appropriate approach.
Field Experiments are an extension of Laboratory Experiments, with the aim of improving the
real-world applications of research through some external object of interest, which the researcher
has limited control over to experiment on. The lack of control, and repeatability that this ap-
proach would incorporate, and potential of damaging real networks with attack traffic discounts
this approach.
Forecasting and Futures Research, defined by Galliers (1990) are scientific (positivist) and in-
terpretivist terms for determining future behaviour or action based on past historical data. In
a positivist tense, Forecasting involves the use of statistical models, such as regression and time
series analysis on numeric data. From an interpretivist perspective, in terms of technology, Futures
Research is the interpretation of behaviour over time related to a specific technology. Given the
research questions, Forecasting aligns with the operation of intrusion detection systems, and the
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purpose of the research, namely, to detect future known and unknown threats based on histor-
ical threats and an understanding of the system of interest. As such, the positivist approach of
Forecasting could be an appropriate approach for this research.
Similarly, Simulation and Game/Role Playing represent the positivist and interpretivist aspects
of the approach, being, the extrapolation of a model to solve problems which are difficult to solve
analytically from observable behaviour. In terms of Simulation, this is a mathematical, or com-
puter based construct which represents a system of interest. Whereas, for Game/Role Playing, a
hypothetical situation is devised and prepared for testing in a real-world scenario. Through the use
of Simulation, complex problems can be reduced, explored and extrapolated based on controllable
factors. Given that a BAS is a complex system, the ability to simulate parts of the system to answer
controllable, repeatable questions is justifiably appropriate for the research. As such, Simulation
can also be classed as an appropriate approach.
Through the exploration of the objects of interest, and approaches combined, there exists three
potential approaches to undertaking the research, Laboratory Experiments (Experimental), Fore-
casting, and Simulation. The shared paradigm of these approaches are positivist. Derived from the
approaches of Galliers (1990) and Williamson (2013), and reflection upon the research questions, a
positivist paradigm has been accepted for the research.
3.1.4 Summary of accepted meta-theoretical assumptions
A realist ontological view is taken for this research, given that the research is based on empirical
comparisons of measures, the belief that reality is stable and existent irrespective of observation.
An objective epistemology is taken, based upon the acceptance of reality existing irrespective of
observation, knowledge is derived through the control of events, to be determined through the
analysis of appropriate identified methods. The logic employed for the research follows deductive
reasoning, the classical positivist logic, as the research naturally forms from a general theory about
anomaly detection in BAS, with room for testable hypotheses to be developed. The role of values in
the research follows from the objective epistemology, the researchers values are of no consequence
for the exploration, testing, observation and analysis of the research problem posed. A summary
of the selected meta-theoretical assumptions are presented in Table 3.4. With the paradigm now
apparent, the associated quantitative methods and techniques, relating to the identified approaches,
Experimental, Forecasting and Simulation shall be explored to derive a research design.
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Table 3.3: Galliers’ taxonomy of research approaches and objects of interest,
adapted from Galliers (1990)
Traditionally Empirical approaches Overlapping approaches Traditionally Interpretive approaches
Object of
interest
Theorem
Proof
Laboratory
Experiment
Field
Experiment
Case
Study
Survey
Forecasting
and Futures
Research
Simulation
and Game
/Role
playing
Subjective
/Argument-
ative
Descriptive
/Interpretive
(Reviews)
Action
Research
Society No No Possibly Possibly Yes Yes Possibly Yes Yes Possibly
Organisation
/Group
No Possibly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual No Yes Yes Possibly Possibly Possibly Yes Yes Yes Possibly
Technology Yes Yes Yes No Possibly Yes Yes Possibly Possibly No
Methodology No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Theory
Building
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Theory
Testing
Yes Yes Yes Possibly Possibly No Possibly No Possibly Possibly
Theory
Extension
Possibly Possibly Possibly Possibly Possibly No No No Possibly Possibly
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Table 3.4: Accepted meta-theoretical assumptions of the research
Assumption Description
Ontology Realism
Epistemology Objectivism
Logic of Inquiry Deductive
Axiomatic Value free and separate from power struggles
3.2 Research approach
As identified through the exploration of the methodology, there were three potential approaches ap-
propriate for the research. The forthcoming section describes the methods of the three approaches,
Experimental, Simulation and Forecasting.
3.2.1 Experimental approach
The core concepts of experimental methods are the construction of hypotheses, identification of
statistical tests, definition of variables, and a discussion of the reliability and validity of the design
(Williamson, 2013). Further, experimental methods involve undertaking the experiment according
to the design, performing the appropriate statistical analysis and drawing conclusions to suggest
recommendations. The experimental method process is visually represented as Figure 3.2, with the
concepts discussed in the forthcoming sections.
3.2.1.1 Hypotheses
There are a number of reasons for using an experiment, discussed by Montgomery (2013) and
detailed in Table 3.5. The overall objective of an experiment is to.
1. Determine the influential variables against the response variable.
2. Optimise the control variables to ascertain a desired response.
3. Optimise the control variables to reduce the variability of the response.
4. Reduce the effects of uncontrollable variables.
Recognition of an experimental reason is paramount to form appropriate questions, and thus derive
hypotheses to form experiments from. A hypotheses, as defined by Williamson (2013), is a statement
or proposition about a predicted relationship between two or more variables which is empirically
testable. Noted by Montgomery (2013), generally, a single experiment is not adequate to answer
a question, thus a set of smaller experiments, of multiple types are used to suggest answers to
posed questions. The notion of hypotheses thus allows exploration of “smaller questions”, which
can be used to inform of a larger overarching question. Once a hypotheses is formed, classification
of variables in the object of interest can commence.
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Identify Measures of 
Validity
Identify Measures of 
Reliability
Select Experimental 
Design
Perform 
Experiments
Derive 
Hypotheses
Define 
Variables
Build 
Experiments
Statistical Analysis of 
Data
Draw Conclusions
Figure 3.2: Summary of experimental method processes, adapted from Willi-
amson (2013), Montgomery (2013)
3.2.1.2 Variables
Independent variables are the factor which is manipulated to observe what impact change has on
other variables. The independent variable is the presumed cause of the phenomena in the object
of interest. The dependent variable is the factor which is measured to determine response to a
particular change in the independent variable. The control variable is the factor which is not of
interest, but is held constant to ensure the control variable does not impact the independent or
dependent variables. The confounding variable is an unknown element, which is not the focus of the
study, but is assumed to affect some of the observations, and must be accounted for. The extraneous
variable is a competing independent variable which may explain outcomes in the dependent variable.
The final type of variable is the moderating variable, which moderates the impact, or describes the
relationship between other variables in the study.
53
Table 3.5: Reasons to undertake experiments, adapted from Montgomery (2013)
Experimental
Reason
Description
Characterisation Learning which variables influence the re-
sponse of interest. Generally used when there
is a lack of knowledge about the object of in-
terest.
Optimisation When the variables have been identified, op-
timisation experiments are used to tune vari-
ables to form a desireable output.
Confirmation Used to verify behaviour of an object of in-
terest, consistent with a theory or experience.
Discovery Determine what happens when new variables
are explored in an object of interest.
Robustness Determining in what condition the response
variables degrade, to better control variab-
ility in the response from poorly controlled
cofounding variables
Through identification of the variables and analysis of the hypotheses, an experimental design
can be selected.
3.2.1.3 Reliability, validity, and threats
Reliability in terms of an experimental method is the consistency of results produced by a measuring
instrument, when repeated in a similar situation. Validity, subsequently, is the capacity of a
measurement instrument to measure what is purports to measure, or the accuracy of observations
taken by the instrument. Reliability and validity have a co-existent relationship, validity infers
reliability, however, reliability does not infer validity, rather, reliability is a determinant of how
valid a measure can be. The purpose of ensuring reliability is to reduce the rate of random error in
measurements. Mitchell and Jolley (2010) detail three sources of random error, namely, observers,
participants and test situation. Determining the extent of random error can be achieved using a
test-retest process, whereby multiple runs of an experiment are taken and compared, to determine
any change. If change due to random error is determined, additional methods, such as measures
of reliability and measures of internal consistency can be used to identify the source of reliability
degradation.
It is important to establish the validity in addition to the reliability, as an invalid variable can
be reliably measured. There are two types of threats to the validity of an experiment. The internal
validity, which is the confidence that observed results are attributable to the independent variable,
and not caused by other, unknown factors. External validity is the generalisability of the research
findings, or, the extent of application to other populations, settings or treatments. The strength
of each type of validity is a distinction between laboratory and field experiments. Laboratory
experiments are high in internal validity due to the control provided from the surroundings. Al-
lowing manipulation of the independent variable, accuracy of effect measurement on the dependent
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variable, and ensuring that the effect of cofounding variables are controlled or mitigated. The gen-
eralisation of results, or external validity, is often questioned due to the results being drawn from
an environment which may not resemble the “real world”. Conversely, the lack of external control
in field experiments questions the internal validity of an experiment, whereas the external validity
is generally higher. Elaborated upon by Mitchell and Jolley (2010) and detailed in Table 3.6, there
are common threats to validity and reliability faced by laboratory and field experiments, however
there are also precautions which can be applied to eliminate these potential threats.
Table 3.6: General threats and precautions to experiments, adapted from
Mitchell and Jolley (2010)
Threat Description Precaution
History External events that are mis-
taken as treatment effects
Isolate participants from ex-
ternal events
Maturation Biological changes that are mis-
taken as treatment effects
Conduct study in a short period
Testing Treatment effects are due to par-
ticipants having learnt from the
pretest
Only test once, use different ver-
sions of the test to decrease the
testing effect
Instrumentation Changes in measuring instru-
ment causes treatment effects
Be consistent with materials and
measurements
Mortality Apparent effects are due to par-
ticipants leaving the study
Use incentives and reduce num-
ber of treatments to prevent par-
ticipants stopping
Regression Treatment effects are due to
extreme scoring results in the
pretest being less extreme in the
post test
Do not choose participants based
on the basis of extreme scores
Selection Effects are based upon the con-
trol groups being different before
the study started
Don’t use designs that involve
comparing groups of participants
with each other.
Selection Inter-
actions
Effects are due to groups that
scored similarly in the pretest
naturally growing apart and
scoring differently in the post
test
Match on all relevant variables,
not just on pretest scores.
3.2.2 Experimental designs
There are a range of experimental designs, the selection of which is dependent on the hypotheses,
the variables, and the object of interest. Additionally, in computer science research, difficulties can
arise with the control of non-treatment variables due to the volatile state of computer memory.
To control non-treatment variables, the use of quasi-experiments can be undertaken, which limits
the effects of non-treatment variables by identifying, and proving that the change in the dependent
variable was not caused by changes to the non-treatment variable.
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3.2.2.1 Randomised two group design
The basic experiment, or Randomised two-group design involves two identical groups which are
treated differently throughout the experimental process. One group termed the treatment group
receives a treatment, while the second group receives no treatment, termed the non-treatment or
control group. Analysis of these two groups is undertaken, where the treatment or independent
variable is the only systematic difference between the groups. To ensure that the treatment is
the only systematic difference applied, independent random assignment is used where assignment
of participants or objects to each group is randomised. The groups are then measured based
on the dependent variable, from which two hypotheses can be defined, namely the experimental
hypothesis: the treatment has an effect, and the null hypothesis: the treatment does not have an
effect. Additionally, temporal precedence must be established and spuriousness must be identified.
Temporal precedence proves that the changes in a group occurs after the treatment variable has
been applied. While spuriousness shows that the variation observed between both groups could only
be due to the treatment applied. Without temporal precedence, the variable which causes change
cannot be determined, similarly without measuring spuriousness causality cannot be determined.
Statistical analysis is undertaken on the dependent variable, and conclusions drawn. The basic
model can be varied to include alternative treatments, rather than a control group, with comparison
between each alternative treatment, and no treatment.
3.2.2.2 Pre-test/Post-test control group design
A pre-test, post-test control group design, often called a covariance design is similar in premise
to the randomised two group experimental design. The difference being that both groups are
initially tested before a treatment is applied. After initial testing, the treatment group undertakes
a treatment and is then measured. The control group is isolated from the treatment group, and
tested at the same time as the treatment groups post-test. Observations are then derived from,
and attributed to the change, or lack of change between the treatment and control group.
3.2.2.3 Factorial design
When there exists multiple independent variables in a study, both the independent effects, and
the interactive effects between the variables on the dependent variable is studied, termed Factorial
design. Unlike experiments which evaluate independent variables individually, factorial designs
allow for combinations of independent variables to be explored jointly, revealing potential effects
on the dependent variable caused via interactions between independent variables. Confounding
variables can also be built into the design, providing a level of control not offered in some other
experimental designs. Factorial designs can also reduce the number of observations required when
compared to other experimental designs; the number of observations required for a factorial design
is determined through power analysis. A drawback of Factorial design is the increased complexity
as the number of independent variables increases.
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3.2.3 Quasi-Experimental Designs
Quasi-experiments have a similar aim as true experiments, where a treatment is administered.
However, when using a quasi-experiment design, treatment and control group participants are not
randomly assigned. In addition, non-treatment factors are identified and taken into account, rather
than eliminated. Quasi-experiments aim to establish temporal precedence in the same manner as
true experiments, covariation is also assessed through comparison of treatment and non treatment
conditions. However, spuriousness through randomising the group values cannot be eliminated,
nor are non-treatment factors kept constant to account for spuriousness. Rather, non-treatment
factors are identified, and explored to justify that the observed change is not due to a non-treatment
factor. The eight general threats to validity, defined in Table 3.6 can be used to eliminate specific
threats and infer the causality in the dependent variable. Each quasi-experimental design eliminates
different threats, with remaining threats requiring additional controls to eliminate, or explain the
impact of the threat, explained in §3.2.3.1, §3.2.3.2, §3.2.3.3, and summarised in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Threats to internal validity mitigated by stated quasi-experimental
designs, adapted from Trochim (2006), Mitchell and Jolley (2010), Williamson
(2013), Edgar and Manz (2017)
Potential Threats NEGD ITSD RD-D
History 3 3 7
Maturation 3 7* 7
Testing 3 7* 7
Instrumentation 3 7* 7
Mortality 3 7* 7
Regression 3 3 7
Selection 7 7 7
Selection Interaction 7 7 7
* Requires additional controls to mitigate
3.2.3.1 Non-Equivalent group design
The non-equivalent group design (NEGD) is a direct comparison to the simple experiment, as
noted by Trochim (2006), Mitchell and Jolley (2010). The NEGD is structured as as pre-test/post-
test randomised experiment, with the randomised assignment removed. Groups of subjects are
formed on the notion of similarity, however, true certainty of the groups comparisons cannot be
stated, given the threats to internal validity faced. The selection threat is not accounted for in
the design due to the deliberate group separation. The interaction between threats and selection,
termed selection interaction in Mitchell and Jolley (2010) is dependent on the data analysed, and
thus can be explained given the pre and post bivariate data. Mitchell and Jolley (2010) states
that the NEGD has all the strengths of a simple experiment, with the design eliminating the
threats of maturation, testing and instrumentation. While the use of a control group allows for
the explanation of history, maturation and mortality threats. Further controls, such as variable
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matching or statistical techniques can assist in reducing the impact of selection interaction threats
(Christensen, Johnson & Turner, 2011)
3.2.3.2 Interrupted time series design
An interrupted time series design (ITSD) uses a series of observations and/or measurements over an
extended period of time, before and after the treatment condition, rather than two distinct pre and
post tests. When the point at which a treatment occurs, the “interruption” treatment can be iden-
tified through the change in the slope when plotting the observations (Shadish, Cook & Campbell,
2002). The design allows for trends to be examined before, during and after a treatment, test-
ing and re-testing is also performed on the same subjects, thus, selection and selection-interaction
threats to internal validity are eliminated by design. Conclusions drawn in ITSD are only valid if
the effects of history, maturation, mortality, testing and instrumentation during the study’s time
is estimated correctly. The greatest threat to internal validity is that of history, as the precaution
is at odds to the design. An alternative measure for ITSD could be the collection of baseline data
to account for historical effects, which could reveal cyclical patterns, which, without a historical
evaluation, may be mistaken for treatment effects. In addition, any inconsistent effect could be a
threat to internal validity, specifically for history and regression, however, inconsistency in matur-
ation, testing, mortality and instrumentation are possible, but can often be estimated, thus being
accounted for in the design (Mitchell & Jolley, 2010). Where estimation is inaccurate, ITSD should
attempt to eliminate the threat, rather than account for it, through similar measures in randomised
experimental designs.
3.2.3.3 Regression-discontinuity design
The regression discontinuity design (RD-D), is similar to NEGD, with a pre and post test, however,
there are two (or more) groups, whose selection is based on a continuous numeric criterion derived
from the pre-test. In this way, groups of interest within specific value ranges determined by the
pre-test, are given treatments, while other classed groups are set as control groups. A regression
line is fit between both the treatment and control groups, at the point of the cutoff, a discontinuity
is present, which can show the effect of the treatment, as opposed to the control group. The RD-D
counters many threats to internal validity faced by other quasi-experimental designs, and thus can
be comparable to the validity of fully random experimental designs Trochim (2006).
Rather than attempting to match variables or prove the equality of groups pre-test to infer post-
test results, the RD-D assumes that without a treatment, the pre-post relationship between the two
groups would be identical. The strength of the RD-D is thus dependent on two further assumptions,
that there is no spurious discontinuity in pre-post relationship which occurs at the cutoff point,
and the degree of validity in the pre-post relationship model, which is the focus of the statistical
analysis of RD-D Trochim (2006). Thus, in principle the RD-D has comparable internal validity
to randomised experiments, however, in practice, the internal validity measures are dependent on
the accuracy of the modelling of the pre-post relationship of the data. In addition, RD-D requires
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a larger data set for statistical analysis comparable to randomised experimental design, Trochim
(2006) states, as much as 2.75 times as many observations.
If the relationship between variables in a RD-D is not linear, the regression line will not represent
the true relationship, resulting in an incorrectly fitted model. Common reasons in which this
situation can arise is when the relationship is not linear between variables, but rather squared or
cubic, or if the dataset is not normally distributed. Data transformation can be used to reduce bias,
resulting from non-linear variables, allowing the correct modelling of the regression line. Another
threat is the effect of the confounding variable which may interact at the classification cutoff point,
and cause the treatment to be misinterpreted.
3.2.4 Statistical analysis
The purpose of analysing a hypothesis with statistical techniques is to determine if observed results
are due to chance, termed the Null hypothesis. Alternatively, if the Null hypothesis can be rejected,
it can be stated the treatment has some effect.
The statistical analysis undertaken is dependent on the experimental design, the aim of the
hypothesis and the scale of the data explored. Descriptive statistics are used to describe the data
presented, while inferential statistics are used to extrapolate the differences between groups of data
into a generalisable condition. A range of statistical tests are summarised in Table 3.8 according
to the analysis model, and experimental design.
Many statistical analysis techniques are reliant on the assumption of independence between
variables, which is often not guaranteed in quasi experimental designs, due to the lack of random
assignment of observations to control and treatment groups. Thus, quasi experimental analysis is
more complex, and borrows from statistical tests commonly found in forecasting, such as Autore-
gressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) .
Table 3.8: Appropriate statistical analysis models for identified experimental
designs adapted from Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002), Trochim (2006),
Christensen, Johnson and Turner (2011), Montgomery (2013)
Experimental Design
Statistical Analysis model
T-Test ANOVA ANCOVA Regression ARIMA Frequency
Randomised Two Group 3 3 3
Pre-test/Post-Test Control Group 3 3 3
Factorial Design 3 3
Non-Equivalent Control Group 3 3
Interrupted Time Series 3 3 3 3
Regression-Discontinuity 3 3
3.2.5 Forecasting approach
Forecasting as an approach is traditionally used in economics and management disciplines to plan
actions for future potential events, “predicted” from a historical based data model. Essentially,
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forecasting is the application of statistical methods on historical data with the aim of predict-
ing future values with accompanying confidence levels. There are various methods employed in
forecasting, which, similar to other scientific methods can be classified on a quantiative and qual-
itative continuum, where the polars are empirical experience (qualitative) and formal statistical
based methods (quantitative), upon which specific methods are aligned. As determined from Sec-
tion 3.1.4, the research is interested in quantitative methods, which can be further specified in the
context of forecasting as either an Explanatory model or a Time series analysis model. All quant-
itative forecasting methods share three core assumptions, defined by Makridakis, Wheelwright and
Hyndman (1998)
1. Data about the past is available
2. The Data can be quantified as numerical
3. Some aspect(s) of the past pattern will continue into the future (The assumption of continuity)
Additionally, Makridakis et al. (1998) notes that all forecasting methods follow a similar process,
shown as Figure 3.3.
3.2.5.1 Exploratory analysis
The exploratory analysis of the data informs the class of forecasting methods which are appropriate,
either explanatory or time series. Exploratory analysis involves the use of visual inspection of the
data through the use of various types of plots, including time, seasonal and scatter, in addition
to the application of descriptive statistics. The application of descriptive statistic techniques is
dependent on the historical data type, however, no single test can definitively determine which
forecasting technique to employ. Typically, the outcome of exploratory analysis is a shortlisted
selection of models. As noted by Makridakis et al. (1998), forecasting models cannot account for
all variations, or randomness in a model, meaning each forecasting model has an associated degree
of error. The output of a system can thus be described as the functional relationship governing
a system, and randomness, or data = pattern + error. Thus, at a high level, forecasting involves
separating the pattern from the error, so that the pattern features can be used to define a model.
The general process for estimating a pattern is the application, or fitting of a functional form
(model) to minimise the error component of the equation, or, to eliminate randomness. Choosing
and fitting a model involves enumerating through the shortlisted model selection, and fitting the
dataset to each model, with the aim to minimise the error component of the pattern for accurate
pattern development. Evaluation of each model is clearly dependent on the method selected, and
the results of which can inform the acceptance of the model, further exploration or tuning of the
model, or selection of a different model.
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Figure 3.3: Summary of forecasting method processes, adapted from Makrida-
kis, Wheelwright and Hyndman (1998)
3.2.6 Forecasting methods
3.2.6.1 Explanatory methods
Explanatory methods aim to describe and correlate the underlying relationships between variables
in a data set, commonly, regression models are used to this effect. Explanatory methods can suffer
in accuracy when used to forecast too far past the real dataset, with generalisability often an issue
as explanatory methods describe correlation, and not necessarily causation.
3.2.6.2 Time series methods
Time series analysis is the statistical investigation of a temporally ordered series of observations
from one or many cases. The purpose of the analysis can be to identify self correlated patterns
offset in time, determine the impact of an intervention or experiment on an object of interest
over time, or, in the case of forecasting, project the historically identified patterns forward for
future predictions (Makridakis et al., 1998; Hyndman & Athanasopoulos, 2018). There can be
multiple overlaid patterns in a data stream, which are identified as seasonality, trends and random
error. Time series models are often an approach used when the independence of errors cannot be
guaranteed, which counteracts a core assumption of regression models.
Time series methods take a black box approach to data analysis, where seasonal and trend
patterns in temporally ordered data are identified, and then removed or transformed to forecast
future data points. A class of commonly used time series models are ARIMA models, which use
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various combinations of auto regression, differentiation and moving average models.
3.2.6.3 Other methods
Additional methods exist which uphold the forecasting approaches core premise to predict future
results on historical data, these are state-space models and artificial neural networks. Both the Kal-
man filter, a series of regression algorithms used for prediction (Welch & Bishop, 2006), and neural
networks which rely on regression have been used previously as forecasting techniques (Makridakis
et al., 1998).
3.2.7 Analysis of forecasting models
Measuring the accuracy of a forecasting method often means measuring the goodness of fit, or
how well the model can reproduce known data. It is thus difficult to compare models directly as
fitting measures vary between models, a comparison from a single criteria is of limited value. The
comparison between models can be misconstrued, as many accuracy measures are reliant on the
scale of the data, however relative error calculations can be used for comparison between models.
In addition, the goodness of fit describes the models ability to identify historical data, but not the
accuracy of the future forecasting result. However, the notion of accuracy can also be applied to
the future forecast.
Comparison between different models is difficult, given the lack of a common measuring tool.
Using a Na¨ıve forecasting method provides a comparison tool for evaluating different models.
Makridakis et al. (1998) details two na¨ıve forecasts, named Na¨ıve Forecast 1 (NF1), and Na¨ıve
Forecast 2 (NF2). NF1 takes the most recent observation as a forecast, which acts as a baseline
for comparison. Any difference in the Mean absolute error and Mean absolute percentage error
between the NF1 and other, more complex models can be discussed. NF2 considers the poten-
tial for seasonality in the data series, and thus removes seasonality from the dataset to create a
seasonally adjusted data, which then follows the same forecasting method as NF1.
The accuracy measures presented however, treats each error as an equal, which is not the case
given the potential scale differences between errors. A more robust method of comparison is Theil’s
U statistic defined in Equation 3.1 from Makridakis et al. (1998), which gives large error margins
a larger weight than smaller error margins.
U =
√∑n−1
t=1 (FPEt+1 −APEt+1)2∑n−1
t=1 (APEt+1)
2
where
FPEt+1 =
Ft+1 − Yt
Yt
APEt+1 =
Yt+1 − Yt
Yt
(Equation 3.1)
The Absolute Percentage Error (APE) defined in Equation 3.1 is the actual relative change,
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which is equivalent to the NF1, making the U statistic the comparison of the Mean Absolute
Percentage Error (MAPE) of a given forecasting to the MAPE of NF1. Therefore, the accuracy of
the forecasting method can be classified based on the following three points.
1. if U = 1 the forecasting model is as good as the na¨ıve method
2. if U < 1 the forecasting model is better than the na¨ıve method
3. if U > 1 the forecasting model is worse than the na¨ıve method
Alternatively, using a similar approach to that of machine learning algorithms and experimental
design, a test set and initialisation set can be used, whereby the initialisation set is used for
estimating parameters and stating the method, while the accuracy of the measure is computed for
errors in the test set only.
3.2.8 Simulation approach
Simulation can be a powerful tool in research which can improve the understanding of a phenomena
of interest relating to an object or system (Dooley & Dooley, 2001; Rose, Spinks & Canhoto,
2015; Edgar & Manz, 2017). Complex models can be built at various levels of abstraction, which
provides the ability to examine system interactions, component performance and test theories that
are often not possible on real systems. Using a simulation model can be appropriate when the
object of interest cannot be directly interacted with, due to a range of circumstances, such as cost
of operation, criticality of the object of interest or associated risk of interacting with the system.
This is particularly true for critical infrastructure (CI) systems, such as BAS and SCADA where
building a real device test bed can be prohibitively expensive, and the risk posed by running tests
on a CI is difficult to accept. Simulation methods are rooted in experimental design, whereby the
aim of simulation is often to undertake specific experiments against a defined model, to optimise
processes and provide alternative paths for future operation of a system. Simulations provide strong
control over data generation and experimentation, however, results derived from a simulator are
only as good as the underlying models used (Edgar & Manz, 2017).
For cyber security, Edgar and Manz (2017) defines simulation use as a computer process or
application which imitates a cyber or physical process through generating similar responses and
outputs. An abstract model of the actual process or object is built, instantiated into a program,
and used to generate data which mimics the behaviour of the real system of interest.
Simulations can either be a black-box process, where the aim is to achieve realistic output from
a system, or a white-box implementation, where the inner workings of the process are integral to
the research questions. White-box implementations (termed emulation in Edgar and Manz (2017))
provide a higher fidelity simulation, using more complex models to provide high fidelity output
compared with that of black-box simulations (Edgar & Manz, 2017).
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Figure 3.4: Summary of simulation method processes, adapted from Rose,
Spinks and Canhoto (2015)
3.2.9 Simulation methods
Edgar and Manz (2017) state there are both general and cyber security specific methods for sim-
ulation. General simulation can be classified as agent-based, process-based (continuous), discrete,
and Monte-Carlo methods (Dooley & Dooley, 2001; Edgar & Manz, 2017). Cyber security spe-
cific methods include network simulation, target simulation and threat simulation (Edgar & Manz,
2017). The purpose and potential use-cases for each stated simulation method are outlined in
Table 3.9. Each simulation method follows a number of generic steps in order to undertake a sim-
ulation. A Flow Chart representation, adapted from Rose et al. (2015) for simulation methods is
shown as Figure 3.4.
3.2.10 Simulation validation
Simulations are a specific implementation of reality based on an underlying model. To ascertain the
validity of the simulation, the underlying models should be scrutinised. Typically, observational
methods are used to test the validity of a simulation, by collecting like data of a system, and either
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Table 3.9: Comparison of simulation methods, adapted from Dooley and Dooley
(2001), Edgar and Manz (2017)
Class Method Purpose Use-Case
General Agent-Based Define parts of a sys-
tem as individual agents
which operate independ-
ently from each other,
data from interactions
between agents and the
defined environment are
monitored
1. Discover emergent beha-
viour of the system
2. Represent distributed con-
trol of systems
General Discrete-
Event
A predefined, stochastic
implementation which
defines how and when
variables change in the
system
1. Event-based analysis
2. Interactions between vari-
ables not of interest
General Process-
Based
Generates behaviour
based on a mathematical
definition of the system
1. Simulate physical pro-
cesses
General Monte-Carlo Execute a range of tests
to determine likelihood of
outcomes
1. Decision support based on
likelihoods
2. Account for uncertainty
from input parameters
Cyber Network Simulate network proto-
cols to generate both nor-
mal and malicious net-
work transactions
1. Protocol behaviour ana-
lysis
2. Traffic generation
3. Attack analysis
Cyber Target Controllable method of
studying specific cyber in-
cidents and vulnerabilities
1. Honeypots
2. Adversary profiling
3. Attack classification
Cyber Threat Analysis of user and sys-
tem action when faced
with a threat or hazard
1. Validation of experiments
2. Fault Analysis
3. Fuzzing
4. Attack classification
5. Exploit testing
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comparing the data statistically to the simulation outputs, or using the real data as a baseline
to generate models via machine learning methods. Using statistical methods, the distributions of
behaviour can be derived, if the data fits distributions well, the distribution can be used to model
and recreate similar behaviour in the simulation model (Edgar & Manz, 2017).
An alternative approach to validation is using experimentation, through defining tests cases
which can be executed in the simulation, and the real system. A comparison between the test cases
and real system responses can then be used to determine the validity of the simulation (Edgar
& Manz, 2017). A downside of this approach is the requirement of direct interaction with the
observed real process. Such as in the case of critical infrastructure and cyber-physical research,
direct interaction to run test cases is not suitable.
3.3 Comparison of identified approaches
3.3.1 Candidate experimental designs
An experimental approach clearly fits to this research, determination of the specific design to use
however, is dependent on the objective of the research, which is to identify known and unknown
threats against BACnet/IP managed Building Automation Systems (BASs). The randomised two
group design is not appropriate for this research, as a true experiment cannot be performed on the
datasets generated. Specifically, samples provided to the algorithms cannot be randomly assigned,
as an object of interest is the sequence and timing of network frames. Factorial designs can be
used to compare combinations of independent variables. The independent variables defined in
this research are the various algorithms used to test for anomalous network transactions. Given
that differing data pre-processes are required for the application of each algorithm, an exhaustive
comparison of multiple algorithms would not achieve a usable result, compared to direct comparison
between specific algorithms using appropriate pre-processing techniques. Thus, factorial design is
discounted. The research makes use of time series data, particularly data readings over time
recorded from sensors, and network data with a key element of time, an interrupted time series
design seems an appropriate fit for conducting experiments. However, the key use of ITSD is to
identify if a treatment has had an effect, when the time of the effect is known. The stated assumption
cannot be held when the aim of the research is to detect when a known or unknown attack occurs,
rather than measure the effect of an attack on a system or network, thus ITSD is discounted. A
regression discontinuity design would not be appropriate for this research, given the control set must
be the real data for validity of the synthetic data, and the relationship between variables in the
dataset cannot be claimed to be a linear relation, thus it is discounted. While the Non-Equivalent
Group design can suffer from selection bias, additional controls discussed in Section 3.2.3.1, such
as variable matching and statistical techniques can be used to account for selection bias. The Non-
Equivalent Group design provides the strengths of a laboratory experiment, minus the random
assignment, which fits the requirements of this research, thus is an appropriate design.
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3.3.2 Candidate forecasting methods
A forecasting method can be used to answer a specific question about a future result, based on
historical data and the assumption of continuity. Given the normal network interactions of a BAS
are generally deterministic, there is the potential for a forecasting model to be used to define
normality on the network, and identify relationships between features in the network. Subsequent
models could be used to identify anomalous behaviour, based on the analysis of the forecasting
method. Additionally, as time series models can account for seasonal changes, it is appropriate in
a system where temperature variations and user interaction are based on seasons, to have a model
which can take seasonality into account for identifying contextually normal and abnormal variable
values. A range of other models are classified as forecasting methods by Makridakis et al. (1998),
including state models and neural networks. Given the prevalence of state models in engineering
and computer science research for learning, in addition to neural networks use in data analysis and
cyber security, both methods are of interest. Specifically, Markov, Hidden Markov, and Artificial
Neural Network methods.
The forecasting approach, by itself is not a complete answer for this research, as the use of
forecasting based models is only a subset of tasks, rather than the overall objective of the research.
Forecasting methods, however, fit well into an overarching experimental design, where specific
methods are tested against a dataset as an experiment.
3.3.3 Candidate simulation methods
From analysis of the research goals there exists two distinct requirements for the simulation in this
research. First, to provide a means of generating representative BACnet/IP network traffic in a
controllable method based on a defined scenario. Second, to generate synthetic data values from
physical phenomena, such as temperature, to proliferate over the simulated network. The outlined
purposes in Table 3.9 informs the selection of a simulation method for both requirements. When
discussing general simulation methods, Dooley and Dooley (2001) note that any simulation method
can be applied to a problem with varying levels of success. In the context of this research, at a
network level the system of interest closely resembles a discrete event system definition, whereby
predetermined events (commands) occur in the system, changing variables and subsequently the
state of the system in a stochastic manner. However, a discrete event simulation may be an
oversimplification of an entire BAS, given there are also a number of non-constant variables which
occur at the data generation level, specifically fluctuating internal sensor readings which cause
commands to execute; therefore Discrete event is eliminated. An agent based simulation fits the
requirements, given each device can have an associated agent model representing the distributed
nature of a BAS, and generate data within each agent. Emergent behaviour between devices based
on implemented communication rules would be appropriate for examining normal actions, and
those of simulated attack traffic, and thus is selected. Additionally, a Process based simulation
method could be used to generate the environmental data readings to be transmitted over the
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network, given they are continuous variables, many of which can be created using mathematical
functions. There also exists uncertainty in the input parameters for some identified physical process
to model, as such Monte-Carlo methods are also appropriate. The requirements of the research
do not align with the Target method, as examining adversary interactions with BACnet systems
is beyond the scope of this research, thus the Target method is eliminated. Similarly, the Threat
simulation method is discounted, as the aim of the research is not to determine how devices and
users act when a network attack is or has occurred, rather to perform analysis on the generated
traffic. Naturally, the requirement to generate simulated network traffic of a specific protocol is
within the brief of a Network Simulation, and thus is selected.
3.3.4 Selected design
The approaches identified through the use of Galliers’ Taxonomy presented in Table 3.3 identified
three possible comparative approaches for this research. Given the overlap between the derived
approaches, due to a shared positivist paradigm, a range of methods and techniques are appropriate,
and complementary for the research design. In consideration of the scope of the research, and the
specificity of the forecasting and simulation approaches, it is not justifiable to select either as the
research design of this research project. However, the usefulness of the methods which fall under
these classifications cannot be dismissed. Both forecasting and simulation methods are rooted in
experimental design, and as such can be used for specific experiments which output tangible results
for the research. Of the examined experimental designs, the non-equivalent control group design
was deemed most appropriate for this research, given the strengths of a laboratory experiment,
with the flexibility of selecting specific groups for testing.
As such, a non equivalent group design is selected for use in this research, with the acknowledge-
ment that some methods used can also be classified as methods used in forecasting and simulation
approaches.
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3.4 Research questions
Given the identified gap in knowledge, and the exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of
the research, the following questions have been derived.
RQ1 How can known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP based Building Automation Systems
be detected?
SQ1 Are BACnet devices exposed to known threats?
SQ2 Do known BACnet attacks have distinguishable network patterns compared to normal
BACnetwork traffic?
SQ3 Is machine learning applicable to identify known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP
networks?
SQ4 How accurate are machine learning approaches in detecting known and unknown attacks
against BACnet/IP networks and devices?
3.4.1 Hypotheses
The hypotheses derived from the research questions are defined as H1 to H5.
H 1 BACnet devices are exposed to known threats
H 2 Known BACnet attacks have distinguishable network patterns
H 3 Machine learning is capable of identifying one or more known attacks against BACnet/IP
networks
H 4 Machine learning is capable of identifying one or more unknown attacks against BACnet/IP
networks
H 5 Hidden Markov Models are more accurate at detecting unknown BACnet/IP based attacks
than known BACnet/IP based attacks
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3.5 Research design
The research design is defined by five distinct phases, visually represented as a framework in
Figure 3.5. The five phases detailed in the framework include:
1. The exploration phase: which involved investigating the BACnet/IP protocol specification
for understanding and identified potential vulnerabilities, retrieving known attacks from lit-
erature, examining existing simulation/network generation solutions, and collecting a range
of BACnet device information from devices connected to the Internet.
2. The contextualisation phase: where analysis of collected device information and threat model-
ling of defined BACnet devices and networks were undertaken. Further, potential algorithms
and techniques for anomaly detection were defined and selected for the research. Finally, a
trial dataset was generated to test existing simulators, implement a known attack and test
the shortlisted algorithms.
3. The data collection phase: which was split into two stages. Stage one involved the collection
of real data. Stage two detailed the generation of a synthetic dataset, which involved defining
a scenario, devices to simulate, and data generation algorithms of both normal and attack
type. Stage two also involved simulation validity testing.
4. The experimental phase: which involved preprocessing the datasets for the appropriate al-
gorithms, application of the selected algorithms to the generated and real datasets, and
recording the results.
5. Finally, the analysis phase, examined the results of the experiments to suggest answers to the
posed research questions and hypotheses.
3.5.1 Phase One: Exploration
The aim of phase one was to explore how the BACnet/IP protocol operates, how many devices are
directly accessible over the Internet, and how to generate BACnet/IP network communications.
BACnet has five different major standard revisions, with multiple addenda. At the time of this
research, the ASHRARE-135-2012 BACnet standard was the most recent, which incorporated both
BACnet/IP and the BACnet Security Services (BSS) features. As such, the research focused
on the 2012 version of the standard, with acknowledgement that other versions are also used in
real settings. The protocol specification was examined, with the data transmission and command
sections targeted for further analysis in regards to the security principles of confidentiality, integrity
and authentication. Further, identified from the literature review, a list of published BACnet
specific attack code was detailed, examining which commands were typically used to undertake
attacks against BACnet devices. In order for the research to proceed, a range of BACnet simulation
options were identified and examined for use in the research.
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Figure 3.5: The framework representation of the research design undertaken
To explore the connectedness of BACnet devices to the Internet, a means of collecting device
information from BACnet devices was investigated. Censys (Censys, 2018), an organisation which
frequently scans the Internet for specific protocols had the required open-access data for this re-
search. The data retrieved was stored for further analysis.
3.5.2 Phase Two: Contextualisation
The contextualisation phase consisted of four sub-phases. First, to undertake analysis on the
retrieved BACnet device data, to identify a range of details, including location, device profiles,
device vendors and common configuration settings. This analysis fed forward into the device
profiles selected in Phase three. Second, contextualising the threat to BACnet devices and networks
was defined using a threat modelling approach. The STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,
Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege) threat taxonomy (Howard & Lipner,
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2006) was selected given its prevalence in security research, further, modelling was taken from a
device profile and network level. Third, narrowing the scope of the research by shortlisting a range
of machine learning algorithms, and testing them against trial datasets. Fourth, generating a trial
dataset to test existing BACnet simulation software, implement a known BACnet attack, and trial
run a range of algorithms defined in the selection sub-phase. Where an algorithm or process did
not perform according to expectations, the selection process would iterate.
3.5.3 Phase Three: Data collection
The data collection phase was split into two sub-phases, real data collection and synthetic data
generation. To test attacks against a real BACnetwork is not feasible, as such a simulation was
required. To validate the simulation, real data was collected for statistical comparisons, network
topology definitions and example scenario definitions. The results from Phase two, sub-phase four
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regarding simulation testing fed into the definition of the simulation. Particularly, the requirement
to generate underlying synthetic data to traverse the network using the BACnet/IP protocol.
Data generation algorithms were defined, for both normal traffic and attack traffic. A simulation
environment was developed, which operated at a device and network level for generating data based
on a given scenario, with intermittent BACnet specific network attacks undertaken. The validity
of the scenario components was undertaken in this phase.
3.5.4 Phase Four: Experimental
The Experimental phase consisted of taking both the real-normal, synthetic-normal and synthetic-
attack datasets for testing of selected algorithms. Preprocessing was a core process of this phase,
to ensure the efficacy of the application of each algorithm.
3.5.5 Phase Five: Analysis
During the analysis phase, the results from each algorithm-dataset pairing was analysed, and stat-
istically compared. A range of measures relating to binary classification were used to evaluate the
algorithms, namely, the false positive rate, true positive rate, false negative rate, true negative
rate, and Matthews correlation coefficient. The precision and accuracy of each algorithm were also
evaluated.
3.6 Variables
There are a range of variables defined in the research of varying types.
3.6.1 Dependent variables
The dependent variables for the research were identified as the features which the selected al-
gorithms were applied to. These include the ∆t between two successive network frames, the BACnet
command which was executed and the packet size,
3.6.2 Independent variables
The independent variables for the research were defined as the specific algorithms and methods
used in the research.
1. Hidden Markov Model
2. Artificial Neural Network
3. Graph analysis
4. k-means clustering
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5. Gaussian mixture model clustering
6. Time series analysis
3.6.3 Control variables
To ensure the internal validity of each algorithms run, a number of control variables were defined.
The materials used in the data collection and analysis phases were held identical for each independ-
ent variable, see §3.7. Datasets generated in the contextualisation phase were undertaken earlier
than the data generation phase. As the network stack used was under active development, various
versions of the network stack were used. Each dataset generated used a specific version of the se-
lected network stack, defined in §3.7 As each dataset is different, comparisons between independent
variables are compared on a per dataset basis.
3.6.4 Compound variables
The pseudo random number generation functions of Python were used in a number of the syn-
thetic data generation algorithms. A common seed value was selected for the Python random.seed
function, allowing for the repeatability of data generation to occur.
3.7 Materials
A range of software and hardware were used throughout the research, detailed in Table 3.10. As the
research progressed, the environment used to generate datasets was iterated upon and improved,
as such, the materials used are classified by research usage.
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Table 3.10: Materials used throughout the research, classified by usage
Research Usage Hardware/Software Details Description
Development,
Analysis and
Writing
Macbook Pro 2015, 16GB ram, 2.9GHz
i5 processor
-
OS X 10.11.6 OS
Jupyter Notebook 1.0 Development Environment
Jupyter Core 4.4.0 Development Environment
matplotlib 1.3.1 Graphics
ipython 5.4.1 Development Environment
python 2.7 Programming Language
numpy 1.8.0rc1 Python Math Package
pandas 0.20.2 Python Data Science Package
pomegranate 0.8.1 Python Markov Model Package
Bibdesk 1.6.11 Referencing
TexPad 1.7.9 Word Processing
Omnigraffle 6.2.3 Graphics
Wireshark 2.2.6 Network Analysis for Mac
Theory Testing
Dataset
Raspbian Jessie R2016-09-23, V4.4 Rpi OS
CBMS Studio V1.3.7.1204 Simulation Software
CBMS Engineering configura-
tion tool
V1.3.1221.7 Simulation Software
Bacnet Open Stack V0.82 Networking Stack
Windows 7 SP1 OS
Windows 7 Desktop 16GB Ram, AMD FX-
8120 eight core processor
Desktop
Wireshark V1.12.1 Network Analysis
3x Raspberry Pi 2 1GB ram, 16GB SD card Sensors
Cisco Switch Catalyst 3560, SPAN con-
figured
Networking
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Research Usage Hardware/Software Details Description
Trial Dataset
SCADA Engine BACnet device
simulator
2.0 Simulation Software
Windows XP SP2 Virtual Machine OS
Windows XP VM 512 Mb ram, 1 processor
core
Virtual Machine
Ubuntu 13.04, 64bit Virtual Machine
Ubuntu VM 4GB ram, 1 processor core
Bacnet Open Stack V0.82 Networking Stack
Macbook Pro 2015, 16GB ram, 2.9GHz
i5 processor
-
OS X 10.10.5 OS
Real Data
Collection
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, 64bit OS
Ubuntu Desktop 16GB Ram, AMD FX-
8120 eight core processor
Capture Machine
Wireshark 2.2.6 Network Analysis
Dumpcap 2.2.6 Command Line Wireshark
Simulation Dataset
Vmware Fusion 6.0.6 Virtual Machine hosting
Vmware Fusion 8.5.0 Virtual Machine hosting
Windows 7 SP1 OS
Windows 7 Desktop 16GB Ram, AMD FX-
8120 eight core processor
64bit
Desktop
Cisco Switch Catalyst 2960, SPAN con-
figured
Networking
ESXi Vmware 6.0 Virtual Machine hosting
ESXi Vmware Server 32GB ram, AMD FX-8120
eight core processor
Virtual Machine hosting
Lubuntu 16.04 Virtual Machine
Actuator VM 256 MB Ram, 1 CPU core Virtual Machine
Sensor VM 256 MB Ram, 1 CPU core Virtual Machine
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Research Usage Hardware/Software Details Description
Thermostat VM 768 MB Ram, 1 CPU core Virtual Machine
VAV box VM 256 MB Ram, 1 CPU core Virtual Machine
Workstation VM 768 MB Ram, 1 CPU core Virtual Machine
Logger VM 256 MB Ram, 1 CPU core Virtual Machine
Capture VM 768 MB Ram, 1 CPU core Virtual Machine
BACnet Open Stack V0.85 Networking Stack
BACnet Open Stack V0.85-a Networking Stack amended
Flow Analysis
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, 64bit Virtual Machine
Ubuntu VM 16GB Ram, 4 processor
core
Virtual Machine
YAF 2.0.0 Flow Generation
Moloch 0.19.2 Network Analysis
Gephi 0.9.2 Graph Analysis and Community
Detection
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3.8 Limitations
The research conducted focused on BACnet/IP traffic which travels over IP based networks. While
some serial traffic is encapsulated in IP, the investigation did not specifically look at monitoring, nor
simulating the serial-based media of BACnet managed BAS. Serial-based communication medium
are traditionally used for the connections between sensors and controllers to reduce costs of system
implementation (Cisco, 2008). However, the BACnet standard is independent of the physical layer
implementation of the network, given the aim of the research is to assess the BACnet/IP version
of the protocol, sensor devices are implemented with BACnet/IP as the communication medium.
The representation of a device in BACnet is abstracted away from the communication medium,
thus allowing for the definition of BACnet/IP based sensors.
There is no assurance that the real dataset collected and used in the investigation does not
contain malicious traffic. Given that real data is used to validate the simulation, a necessary
assumption is made that there is no anomalous behaviour in the collected data.
3.9 Threats to research
Of the defined threats in Table 3.7, History, Testing, Instrumentation, Regression, Selection and
Selection Interactions can be seen as threats to this research. While Maturation and Mortality are
not applicable threats to this research due to the lack of human element. Table 3.11 details the
mitigations applied to combating the identified research threats, through the design and application
of the experiments.
Table 3.11: Potential mitigations to the associated threats of using experiments
Threat Employed Mitigation
History Isolated simulation network to prevent external interference
Testing Separate training and testing data sets
Instrumentation Consistent simulation, working environment and materials
Regression Identical training and testing datasets for all algorithms. Performance
criteria stays constant through testing and training phases
Selection Identical testing dataset allocation for testing of each algorithm
Selection Interactions Identical training and testing datasets for all algorithms, Performance
criteria stays constant through testing and training phases
3.10 Validity
Simulation validity was discussed in Section 3.2.10. Validation of each model used in the simulation
is undertaken. Where possible, the physics-model of the phenomena is used based on accepted
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laws relating to the nature of the universe. The selected models are typically used in the design
and analysis of HVAC systems and Building Energy Simulation programs, discussed further in
§4.6. Thus deemed appropriate for data generation for this simulation. Where accessible, the data
generated in the simulator was compared to real data, collected from external weather files. Further
discussion on validity is directed to the specific algorithm implementation sections in Chapter 4.
The Network topology was designed to represent a typical HVAC managed BAS, with topologies
taken from vendor documentation, discussion with BAS experts, and descriptions from the BACnet
standard, further discussed in Chapter 4. Device selection and definitions are based on national
and international industry standards, and configuration retrieved from vendor information, and
Internet scannable device configurations.
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Chapter 4
Exploratory Results
This chapter describes a range of initial results generated as part of this research. In §4.1, the results
derived from investigating the BACnet/IP protocol are presented, with two commands noted for
further investigation. §4.2 and §4.3 outline the existing threat to BACnet devices, presenting
collated data from Internet wide network scans and threat modelling of a network controller. Next,
one of the identified commands is modelled and tested using a network stack to determine the
viability of a theoretical vulnerability. In §4.4, a number of existing BACnet/IP simulators are
examined, with datasets generated to test the capability of the simulators generating normal and
malicious traffic. Two datasets were generated, the first to examine the use of a machine learning
algorithm for identifying a frequency attack, and the second to investigate the remaining command
identified in §4.1. Penultimately, §4.6 details the real network data collection, followed by the design
and implementation of a BACnet/IP network testbed. Finally, an attack framework is presented
which was applied to the defined network testbed for attack data generation.
4.1 Protocol analysis
This section describes a preliminary investigation of the BACnet protocol specification. The pur-
pose of this task was to identify additional objects and services which may be used to perform
legitimate-yet-malicious, commands. The section focusses on two identified components, namely,
Change of Value reporting functions, and the queuing implementation for priority commands. An
overview of the limitations of the security addendum is outlined in §2.5, and is thus not repeated
here.
4.1.1 BACnet change of value reporting
BACnet systems are data driven, with values passed over the network between devices using various
methods. As BACnet is a peer-based network, any capable device in a BACnetwork may request
values from other devices, or be notified of events occurring. To accommodate peer-based com-
munications as default, BACnet devices are passive servers which listen for requests and service
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received requests. Each data sharing transaction is represented as a client/server request, where the
device requesting data is a client, and the targeted device providing the data is the server. A server
in this case might be a sensor or actuator, while a client might be a controller or workstation. Data
can be shared using one, or multiple methods simultaneously. There are three defined methods,
polling, triggered collection and Change of Value (CoV) reporting.
Polling is a simple method, where data requests are made at pre-defined time intervals. Polling
has the potential to miss value changes if they occur between time intervals. As noted in Chipkin
(2009), a balance is required in regards to the polling interval, too large and data will be missed, too
small and the network will be impacted by the traffic size. Triggered collection defines a boolean
property in a device, when the property is true, data is retrieved from the device. External network
writes and internal processes such as alarms or other events can cause the trigger to become true,
and cause an immediate acquisition of values to occur. CoV reporting is an active data collection
method, defined in SSPC-135 (2012, pp. 461-464). CoV reporting defines subscriptions between
devices, where a threshold value is set. If the monitored value changes over the set threshold,
a notification is sent to all subscribed devices. The server device maintains a list of subscribers,
namely the Active CoV subscriptions which holds the CoV subscriptions. CoV subscriptions may
be either Confirmed or Unconfirmed, reminiscent of TCP and UDP in operation. Unconfirmed CoV
reporting sends a notification to the subscriber when a value changes within the CoV threshold
of the subscription. Confirmed CoV reporting incorporates acknowledgement of change, with an
ACK packet to be sent from the subscriber to the device serving the data.
Due to the variety of media on which BACnet operates some devices take longer to acknow-
ledge a Confirmed CoV notification than others. Two device object properties, APDU timeout and
Number Of APDU Retries, set on the client device determine how long to wait for an acknowledge-
ment, and how many times to retry waiting. The values for these properties are vendor and even
device-specific. The BACnet standard suggests between 6,000ms and 10,000ms (Newman, 2013);
the de-facto standard set by the vendors is a 3,000ms wait time with three retries (see Table 4.1).
However, some vendor guidelines suggest a 20,000ms or even 60,000ms wait time, dependent on
the capability of older devices. Further, one guide suggests all APDU timeouts should be set to
the highest value in the system (Contemporary Controls, 2014). In contrast, Siemens (2012) states
that any timeout over 30 seconds is too long. If a subscriber is offline when a Confirmed CoV
notification is sent, the CoV server device will wait the length of the APDU Timeout of the client
device, and then retry the CoV notification the specified number of times before processing the
next CoV notification. Given the length of some APDU timeout values and the number of retries,
network delays can occur (Chipkin, 2009).
Additionally, when a subscriber goes offline, CoV messages are not stored or queued, therefore
if a subscriber returns to the network, data synchronisation can be lost (Chipkin, 2009). If the
subscription is Unconfirmed, there is no feasible way to determine if the subscriber has received
the CoV notification, or tell if the subscribing device is offline. A combination of polling and
CoV is suggested to counteract devices power cycling, however the solution is not complete, as the
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logging device for the system could suffer from the same issue, and the log of a CoV will never
be recorded (Chipkin, 2009). Subscriptions to devices are not persistent between power cycles,
meaning if a device is reset for any reason, the subscriptions to other devices will not be preserved
and must be re-connected. Automatic re-subscriptions can be implemented, where a duration
property exists which triggers a CoV subscription to occur. However, automatic re-subscription is
also not persistent between power cycles.
Table 4.1: Sample of BACnet vendor APDU-Timeout and retry default values
and ranges, expanded from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p259)
Vendor Default
APDU timeout
value (ms)
Default
APDU
retries
APDU timeout
value (ms) Range
APDU retries
Range
ScadaEngine1 500 5 300-30,000 0-5
Kepware2 1,000 3 100-9,999 1-10
Siemens3 3,000 3 - 1<
Contemporary Controls4 3,000 3 - -
Tridium5 3,000 3 - -
UTC6 6,000/10,000 3 - -
Obvius7 6,000 3 6,000< -
Metasys8 20,000 3 500-20,000 -
Viking Controls9 3,000/60,000 3 - -
1 (Scada Engine, 2009b)
2 (Kepware, 2016)
3 (Siemens, 2012)
4 (Contemporary Controls, 2014)
5 (Tridium, 2017)
6 (UTC Fire and Security, 2015)
7 (Shepard, 2013)
8 (The S4 Group, 2015)
9 (Viking Controls, 2002)
Due to the limited capacity of BACnetworks oversubscription of CoV notifications is plausible.
Robust testing of oversubscription is often not carried out due to the risk of damage to devices
(Chipkin, 2009; Newman, 2013). Further, many devices have a maximum subscribers limit, which
is often short according to Chipkin (2009). There is no maximum limit of subscriptions defined in
the BACnet 2012 revision 19 of the standard (SSPC-135, 2012, p461). A device on the BACnetwork
may subscribe to the same object multiple times, as the unique identifier for each subscription is self-
assigned. Each implementation of a device may have a limit applied to the quantity of subscriptions
that each device can initiate. This bottleneck can create a network security issue, where critical
devices will not receive notifications due to the subscription limit being reached (malicious or not)
(Peacock et al., 2018).
A potential scenario defined in Peacock et al. (2018) is discussed here. A malicious device
could send Confirmed, low threshold value CoV subscriptions to every supported device on the
BACnetwork, and then disconnect from the network. Whenever a value on any device changes, the
malicious device will be notified, but as the malicious device is offline, each legitimate device will
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Figure 4.1: Malicious confirmed CoV transaction, red struck-out labels indicate
normal CoV transaction steps which do not occur due to the attack, replicated
from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p261)
then wait for the timeout to expire before sending the next notification. As the APDU timeout
property is defined on the client of the transaction, the malicious device may set the length to wait,
and the number of retry attempts. A model of the attack is detailed in Figure 4.1, and explored in
§4.4.4 and §5.4.
4.1.2 BACnet bounded priority arrays
In a similar fashion to reading data, any capable device in a BACnetwork may write to any writable
property on any other device. As some property values directly cause cyber-physical actions to
occur, conflict resolution in the form of a priority system is implemented. BACnet accounts for
the potential of conflicting commands through a conflict resolution process where properties are
split into commandable, and writeable types. Commandable properties are defined as those whose
value change causes physical actions, while all other properties are defined as writeable. Conflict
resolution is only applied to commandable properties, whereas writable properties have no priority
mechanism, meaning the last write to the property overwrites the previous value.
Priority arrays are defined in Section 19.2 of the BACnet 2012 standard. The present value
property of many objects in BACnet are classed as commandable properties, for example, Analog
Output and Binary Output objects. BACnet devices interact with commandable properties using
the Write property or Write property multiple service requests. The request primitive for both
services contain three parameters; Property Identifier, Property Value and Priority. The three
parameters contain the commandable properties ID, the desired value for the property, and the
priority value respectively. The priority value is a number set between 1 and 16 for that Write
property service request, the lowest number having the highest priority.
Outlined in Peacock et al. (2018), the BACnet standard defines consistent representations for
the applications of command priority levels, with five defined applications and eleven flexible open
applications which can be implementation specific, outlined in Table 4.2. When a client device no
longer requires access to the commandable property in a service provider, a relinquish command
is sent to the provider, using Write property or Write property multiple service requests. The
relinquish request uses the same parameters as a normal write request with the property value
parameter set to NULL. When a device is notified that no service request exists at that priority level,
the next priority array element is checked for a service request. When all elements in the priority
array are NULL the property value will be set to a default value, defined in the Relinquish Default
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Table 4.2: BACnet priority array applications, replicated from Peacock, John-
stone and Valli (2018, p257)
Priority level Application
1 Manual Life Safety
2 Automatic Life Safety
3 Available
4 Available
5 Critical equipment control
6 Minimum on/off
7 Available
8 Manual Operator
9 Available
10 Available
11 Available
12 Available
13 Available
14 Available
15 Available
16 Available
property of the object.
Each priority value in the array may only hold one command value at a time. If two devices
have written to a commandable property with the same priority level it is unclear which value has
precedent. As source authentication is not specified for write commands entering the priority table,
the priority array attempts to create a queue of values to enter into a commandable property. This
results in a similar scenario to writable properties, where last-write-wins occurs. Seemingly, this
negates the purpose of the priority array implementation. Further, upon relinquishing an array
position with a NULL value to the array position, the standard describes “unknown behaviour”
for any queued command which is in the same array position (SSPC-135, 2012). Due to a lack
of verification or limitation on which devices may issue specific priority levels, any capable device
may change the value of a commandable property at any priority (Peacock et al., 2018). As these
actions are defined normal in the standard, it is difficult to detect malicious use of this service.
Detection approaches to write commands are outlined in Johnstone et al. (2015), and expanded on
in §4.4.1. Further exploration of the priority array behaviour is undertaken in §4.3.1, and §5.4.
4.1.3 Summary of protocol analysis
Analysis of the protocol specification identified two potential issues which could manifest as vulner-
abilities. Both required further investigation, as it was unclear from the specification what would
be the correct behaviour of devices if the identified scenarios were to occur. Further exploration is
undertaken in §4.4.4 and §5.4 for the CoV reporting function, and §4.3.1, and §5.4 for the priority
array, respectively.
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4.2 Scan analysis
A number of authors have discussed the exposure of BACnet devices at various points in time,
identified in §2.4. As a longitudinal view of exposure of BACnet devices, Internet wide scans from
Censys (Censys, 2018), an open-access repository for researchers were retrieved and analysed. Scans
from the period December 2015 to January 2018 were retrieved. Over the period, 102 scans of the
Internet were undertaken against the BACnet default port 47808. 1,733,392 devices were probed,
with 76,489 unique devices identified. Over the entire duration, 3,670 devices were active in every
scan. See Figure 4.2 for a general perception of global location of unique devices over the scan
duration, derived from the Geolite 2 IP database (MaxMind, 2018). Further, Table 4.3 outlines
the ten countries with the highest proportion of scanned BACnet devices. Of note, Australia is
ranked 5th overall, with 3.585% of devices over the three year duration. In a similar outline to
Gasser et al. (2017), Table 4.4 outlines the five vendors with the highest representation of unique
devices in the Censys scans.
Table 4.3: Breakdown of countries and the number of unique hosts scanned
from December 2015 to January 2018
Country Unique Scanned Hosts Percentage of Total Unique Hosts
United States 30942 40.453%
Canada 9618 12.574%
France 4260 5.569%
Germany 2994 3.914%
Australia 2742 3.585%
Oman 1787 2.336%
Spain 1725 2.255%
Brazil 1553 2.030%
Italy 1536 2.008%
United Kingdom 1504 1.966%
Table 4.4: Unique device vendor counts identified over the duration of the
examined scans, 2015-2018
Vendor Unique Device Count Percentage of Scanned Devices
Delta Controls 7661 10.0%
Reliable Controls Corporation 7501 9.8%
Tridium 4953 6.5%
Automated Logic Corporation 3456 4.5%
SAUTER 2094 2.7%
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Figure 4.2: Overview of global unique device locations derived from Censys
scans and Geolite2 geolocation database
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4.3 Threat modelling
Threat models are often used to identify threats and systematically reveal vulnerabilities in a system
(Peacock et al., 2017, 2018). The core requirements for a threat model are the identification of
adversaries and their motivations, description of the system and identification of threats against
the system. The last published threat model undertaken for BACnet was by Holmberg (2003).
Adversaries, motivations and the connectivity of BAS have changed in the past 15 years, as such
threat modelling was undertaken to ground the research perspective. There exist many taxonomies
regarding adversary identification and classification, such as those presented in Magar (2016).
Further, generic adversaries and their motivations (see Table 4.5) were identified in Bernier (2013),
and presented in Peacock et al. (2018).
Table 4.5: Summary of cyber adversaries, adapted from Bernier (2013), replic-
ated from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p266)
Adversary Modus Operandi Motivation
Novice Denial of Service Attention Seeking
Pre-written Scripts Prestige
Hacktivist Denial of Service Political Cause
Defacement
Information Disclosure
Insider Sabotage Revenge
Information Disclosure
Internal Knowledge
Coder Develop scripts Power
Prestige
Organised Crime (Blackhat) Avoid Exposure Money
Highly Skilled Greed
Well Resourced
Targeted Attacks
Cyber Terrorist Destabilise Cyber or Physical assets Ideology
Disrupt Cyber or Physical assets
Destroy Cyber or Physical assets
Highly Skilled
Well Resourced
Nation-State State Sanctioned National Interests
Destabilise Cyber or Physical assets
Disrupt Cyber or Physical assets
Destroy Cyber or Physical assets
Highly Skilled
Well Resourced
Information Theft
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As noted by Newman (2013), the threat considered most damaging originally to BACnet was
the insider adversary, given the previously segregated nature of BAS networks, and the system
knowledge required. With increased connectivity and highly trusting devices, adversaries now have
external pathways to interact with BAS directly, or use BAS to pivot into enterprise networks
(Peacock et al., 2018). Given the defined modus operandi in Table 4.5, the motivation of each
adversary could be fulfilled when targeting an appropriate class of building system, e.g hospital,
office complex, government building.
Building on the threat modelling undertaken in Holmberg (2003), known BACnet specific vul-
nerabilities were collected from a range of sources (Holmberg, 2003; Kaur et al., 2015; Johnstone
et al., 2015; Caselli, 2016; Tonejc et al., 2016; Esquivel-Vargas et al., 2017; Peacock et al., 2017)
and summarised in (Peacock et al., 2018). The specific commands and properties used in these
vulnerabilities were identified, and classified using a STRIDE threat matrix (Howard & Lipner,
2006), presented as Table 4.6. To quantify the defined known attacks to a scenario, a model of the
interaction between a controller and other devices was defined in Figure 4.3. The model details
commands, objects and properties which are interacted with, sent or received by the controller
device.
Table 4.6: Known attacks classified against the STRIDE matrix, replicated
from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p268)
Attack Type Specific Command/Property S T R I D E
Denial of Service Subscribe-CoV X X X
Denial of Service Router-Busy-To-Network X X X
Denial of Service I-am-Router-to-Network X X X
Denial of Service Router-Available-to-Network X X X
Denial of Service Disconnect-Connection-To-Network X X
Denial of Service DeleteObject X X X
Flooding Who-is-Router-to-Network X X
Flooding Reinitialize-Device X X
Flooding I-am X X
Flooding Any Malformed Packet X X
Malformed Broadcast Reject-Message-To-Network X X
Malformed Broadcast CreateObject X X
NetworkLoop InitializeRoutingTable X X
Reconnaissance NPDU probes X
Reconnaissance Read Property X
Reconnaissance Whois X
Reconnaissance Whoami X
Reconnaissance Who-is-Router-to-Network X
Reconnaissance WhoHas X
Routing table attack InitializeRoutingTable X
Shutdown/Reboot Reinitialize-Device X
Smurf attack source address manipulation X X
Spoof device I-am X X X
Traffic Redirection I-am-Router-to-Network X X
Traffic Redirection Router-Available-to-Network X X
Write Attack Write Property X X
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Figure 4.3: DFD of controller actions in a BACnet managed HVAC scenario,
replicated from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p267)
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The appropriate STRIDE threat classes for each unique element in the model was defined, and
correlated with the STRIDE threat classification of known vulnerabilities presented in Table 4.6
(Peacock et al., 2018). The threats which each identified attack could initiate towards each element
was mapped, a subset is detailed in Table 4.7. To rank the impact of each attack against the
scenario, a count of threats against elements was used. The total threats posed by all noted attacks
was 652. Of the 652 total threat instances, Denial of Service was the largest threat class with 306
instances.
Table 4.7: Identified BACnet specific attacks, classified by the STRIDE matrix,
replicated from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p269)
Element A1 A2 A6 A7 A11 A13 A14 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24 A26
Alarm Alert T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Alarm Values T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Any Device S S S S S S - - - S S S -
Check Threshold
Values
T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D S,D T,I I T,D
Commence Polling
Command
T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
HMI S S S S S S - - - S S S -
Logger S S S S S S - - - S S S -
Manual Data Read T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D S,D T,I I T,D
Move to Logger T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D S,D T,I I T,D
Poll Data T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D S,D T,I I T,D
Polled Data T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Property Value(s) T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Raise Alarm T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D S,D T,I I T,D
Read Command T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Subscribe to Device T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D S,D T,I I T,D
Subscription T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Subscription Com-
mand
T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
TrendLog T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
TrendLog Values T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Write Command T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D D T,I I T,D
Write Value T,D T,D T,D D D D I D D S,D T,I I T,D
For each individual attack, the total impact of each threat class against the scenario was derived,
Table 4.8 outlines the full threat counts for each attack. Using this classification, the commands
which have the highest threat potential for legimiate malicious action can be obtained. Six attacks
were identified as equal highest with 39 threat counts, these attacks used application layer com-
mands Subscribe-CoV, I-am and DeleteObject, and network layer commands relating to BACnet
routers. Identifying legitimate malicious instances of these commands is dependent on the context
derived from the individual implementation of the BACnet system. Exploration of identifying these
attacks is undertaken in §4.6.9.
Object and service analysis against a number of retrieved devices is undertaken in §4.6.7. The
details of these devices were correlated with the classified attacks described in Table 4.6. Of the
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Table 4.8: Total threat counts based on known attacks against scenario model,
replicated from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p270)
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 Total
S 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
T 18 18 18 18 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 39 39 39 39 21 39 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24 A25 A26
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 3 3 3 0 58
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 18 126
R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I 18 18 18 18 18 18 0 0 0 18 18 18 0 162
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 18 18 0 0 0 18 306
E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 28 39 21 21 36 652
known attacks against BACnet, the occurrence of surveyed devices which implement the affected
services are identified, see Table 4.9
It follows that the most common threats to devices are those which use the most common
services to undertake malicious action. Thus, the most common services, Read property, Who-is, I-
am, Who-has, I-have and Write property which are contained in over 97.8% of the devices analysed
are of interest. As these are the most common services in use, it is difficult to undertake binary
classification between malicious and normal commands. Therefore, further analysis of these service
types in the network traffic is required to classify if a malicious-command is being undertaken, as
opposed to normal operations on the BAS.
Sensors and actuators are clearly the most limited devices in terms of attempting to attack
other devices.The majority of sensor and actuator devices do not operate the client side of each
service, which allows a device to initiate functions in other devices. Sensor and actuator devices, as
designed, can execute write and read commands, allowing for other non-sensor devices to instruct
sensor devices to maliciously write values into its data structures.
Controllers, advanced controllers and workstations, by design have both the server and client
side services available, which provides these devices with the means to control other devices. Thus,
an attacker has more control over a whole system if he/she has control of a workstation or controller-
type device.
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Table 4.9: Comparison of extracted device services, and occurrence in devices
to classified known threats
BIBBS Attacks Sensor
Percent
Controller
Percent
Actuator
Percent
advController
Percent
Workstation
Percent
AE-AVM-A Denial of Service, Malformed
Broadcast, Reconnaissance,
Write Attack
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.17
AE-N-E Reconnaissance 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.41 8.33
AE-VM-A Reconnaissance, Write Attack 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
DM-ADM-A Reconnaissance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 79.17
DM-ANM-A Reconnaissance, Flooding,
Spoofing
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 70.83
DM-BR-A Denial of Service, Malformed
Broadcast
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00
DM-BR-B Denial of Service 0.00 6.64 0.00 40.74 16.67
DM-DDB-A Reconnaissance, Flooding,
Spoofing
7.14 24.22 0.00 96.30 100.00
DM-DDB-B Flooding, Reconnaissance,
Spoofing
85.71 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
DM-DOB-A Reconnaissance 0.00 1.56 0.00 25.93 37.50
DM-DOB-B Reconnaissance 85.71 100.00 94.12 98.15 100.00
DM-OCD-A Denial of Service, Malformed
Broadcast
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67
DM-OCD-B Denial of Service, Malformed
Broadcast
0.00 2.34 0.00 18.52 20.83
DM-RD-A Denial of Service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.50
DM-RD-B Denial of Service 35.71 53.52 29.41 96.30 45.83
DS-AM-A Write Attack 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50
DS-AV-A Reconnaissance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67
DS-COV-A Denial of Service 0.00 7.03 0.00 27.78 70.83
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continuation of Table 4.9
BIBBS Attacks Sensor
Percent
Controller
Percent
Actuator
Percent
advController
Percent
Workstation
Percent
DS-COV-B Denial of Service 21.43 42.97 64.71 79.63 16.67
DS-M-A Write Attack 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
DS-RP-A Reconnaissance 0.00 14.06 0.00 51.85 100.00
DS-RP-B Reconnaissance 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
DS-V-A Reconnaissance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
DS-WP-A Write Attack 0.00 13.67 0.00 55.56 100.00
DS-WP-B Write Attack 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 66.67
NM-RC-B Denial of Service, Flooding,
Traffic Redirect
0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
SCHED-AVM-A Denial of Service, Malformed
Broadcast, Reconnaissance,
Write Attack
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.17
SCHED-E-B Reconnaissance,Write Attack 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.63 16.67
SCHED-I-B Reconnaissance, Write Attack 0.00 3.91 0.00 92.59 16.67
SCHED-R-B Reconnaissance 0.00 1.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
SCHED-VM-A Reconnaissance, Write Attack 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
SCHED-WS-A Reconnaissance, Write Attack 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33
SCHED-WS-I Reconnaissance, Write Attack 0.00 2.34 5.88 0.00 0.00
T-AVM-A Denial of Service, Malformed
Broadcast, Reconnaissance,
Write Attack
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50
T-VMT-E Reconnaissance 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 16.67
100
4.3.1 Attack modelling
As identified in section 4.6.5, there exists potential Denial of Service methods in BACnet’s priority
array implementation. Modelling the priority array was undertaken to identify approaches to detect
contextually abnormal commands, and improve understanding of the security requirement of the
bounded array. The Anylogic simulation software (AnyLogic, 2017) was used to model the priority
level security vulnerability, described in Section 4.1.2. A conceptual model of the problem space
was developed, detailed in Figure 4.5). From this model, a dynamic agent-based simulation model,
capable of representing the identified problem with objects and their associated properties in a
BACnetwork was generated.
A typical run of the simulation is outlined in Figure 4.4. An object can be connected to the
priority list at any priority level, as per the BACnet specification (SSPC-135, 2012). Results from
two devices writing to a property at the same priority level in the simulation model is detailed in
Table 4.10.
Figure 4.4: Sample simulation run of BACnet bounded priority array, replicated
from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p264)
Modelling the priority array has identified that the Denial of Service issue can exist, namely,
two devices can write to the same priority level in the array, with the second device overwriting
the first device’s value (Peacock et al., 2018). Due to the variance of BACnet implementations,
described in §4.1, this behaviour may not be representative or definitive for every BACnet device.
In a generic device, defined by the standard, this issue exists when represented as a theoretical
model.
101
Table 4.10: Simulated array before and after two devices write to a property at
priority 1, adapted from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p265)
Array after First Device Write Array After Other Device Write
Priority level Value Identifier Priority level Value Identifier
1 11 Device 1 68 Other Device
2 NULL 2 NULL
3 NULL 3 NULL
4 NULL 4 NULL
5 NULL 5 NULL
6 NULL 6 NULL
... ...
16 NULL 16 NULL
4.3.2 Priority array attack implementation
The BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017) was used to test the priority array issue. The procedure used
to test involved the following process.
1. Device A reads the base value of the Present value property of Device B
2. Device A writes an initial value to Priority array 12 on Device B
3. Device A reads the Present value property of Device B
4. Device A reads the Priority Array of Device B
5. Device C writes a different value to Priority Array 12 on Device B
6. Device A reads the Present value property of Device B
7. Device A reads the Priority Array of Device B
8. Device C writes a relinquish command to Priority array 12 on Device B
9. Device A reads the Present value property of Device B
10. Device A reads the Priority Array of Device B
Table 4.11 presents the values from this procedure. As can be seen, upon relinquishing the value
written into priority 12 on Device B, the original value written by Device A is lost. Therefore, when
two devices write to the same priority level in a third device, the last write wins scenario occurs.
Although the priority array allows for up to 16 devices to write values to the same property, each
of these devices must write to a different priority array value, else a value is lost. Given there are
no restrictions on which devices may write at specific priorities to devices, the priority array can
be overwritten.
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Table 4.11: Terminal output of priority array value overwrite testing
Source Device Command Output
Device A ./bin/bacrp 120 1 1 85 0
Device A ./bin/bacwp 120 1 1 85 12 -1 4 20.0 WriteProperty Acknowledged!
Device A ./bin/bacrp 120 1 1 85 20
Device A ./bin/bacrp 120 1 1 87 {NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
20.000000,NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL}
Device C ./bacwp 120 1 1 85 12 -1 4 50.0 WriteProperty Acknowledged!
Device A ./bin/bacrp 120 1 1 85 50
Device A ./bin/bacrp 120 1 1 87 {NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
50.000000,NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL}
Device C ./bacwp 120 1 1 85 12 -1 0 0 WriteProperty Acknowledged!
Device A ./bin/bacrp 120 1 1 85 0
Device A ./bin/bacrp 120 1 1 87 {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
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Figure 4.5: DFD of bounded array priority process, replicated from Peacock,
Johnstone and Valli (2018, p264)
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4.4 Assessing existing simulation environments
There is a lack of available network data for security analysis in BAS, particularly for BACnet.
However, the means for generating network traffic exists in the form of the BACnet open stack
(Karg, 2015), and a number of commercial simulation environments (Scada Engine, 2009a; CBMS,
2015b). To undertake analysis of intrusion detection techniques with machine learning, a large
amount of data is required dependent on the algorithm selected. To trial the generation of data,
and prototype the identified attacks, two smaller, focused datasets were implemented, classified as
Trial dataset and Theory testing dataset. The use of smaller datasets allowed for initial testing of
algorithms to be undertaken. Additionally, the prototyping of dataset generation allowed for short-
comings in existing BACnet simulation software to be identified, and determine the requirements
for a larger simulation, which is discussed in §4.6.3. Datasets were generated based on specific
scenarios, which incorporated a base BAS, and an implemented attack.
4.4.1 Trial Dataset: Write Attack
The Trial Dataset was designed as a minimal partial HVAC system, which consisted of one temper-
ature sensor, one fan and one controller device which communicated actions to the fan, based on
the sensor’s provided data readings. In accordance with HVAC design practices, fan speed changes
occurred at a minimum 15 second interval, to replicate time delays present to prevent fan drive
damage (Stanford III, 2011). The attack defined for the Trial Dataset was a dormant threat in
the controller which would pseudo-randomly interact with the fan. The attacker sent legitimate
fan speed change commands in quick succession of each other, with the intent to cause physical
damage to the fan. The generated Trial Dataset contained three hours of BACnet simulated data
in network capture format, equating to 25,000 frames. The topology of the simulation environment
is shown in Figure 4.6. The BACnet simulation tool SCADAengine (Scada Engine, 2009a) was
used for the simulated temperature sensor and fan, The BACnet open stack (Karg, 2015) acted as
the controller, receiving temperature readings from the simulated temperature sensor, and sending
fan speed commands to the simulated fan.
4.4.2 Trial Dataset: ANN approach
As an initial test of supervised machine learning, a backpropagation Artificial Neural Network
(ANN) was selected to identify the write attack. The ANN implementation is detailed as Equation
4.1 - Equation 4.4.
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Figure 4.6: Network topology for Trial Dataset experiments, replicated from
Johnstone, Peacock and den Hartog (2015, p60)
sj =
n∑
i=1
wixi
where
xi = Input i
wi = Weighting applied to xi
(Equation 4.1)
oj = φ(sj + bij)
where
oj = Output j
bij = Bias factor applied to node sj of (Equation 4.1)
φ = The activation function
(Equation 4.2)
δj = ejφ
′
j(sj) (Equation 4.3)
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δj = − ∂E
∂yj
φ′j(sj)
where
Neuron j is hidden
e = error term
(Equation 4.4)
Pre-processing of the dataset involved removing all but the write command frames, which were
paired into events. The pairing resulted in 1,000 write events which formed the final dataset. The
Delta time (∆t) between same frames (writes) are the events of interest, as each frame contains a
legitimate command with legitimate values.
The first 500 events were used to train the ANN. The remaining 500 events were used to
test the effectiveness of the trained ANN in classifying previously unseen events. The ANN was
optimised through testing the number of iterations, the number of hidden layers and the learning
rate. The number of hidden layers were enumerated from one through eight. Testing began with
a simple three-layer network, which held one hidden layer. The results were encouraging, with a
training time of 6.349 seconds and a classification accuracy of 90.4% against the test data, with
a classification time of 0.005 seconds. The ANN was then extended to four layers. In the two
hidden layer ANN, the training time was 5.718 seconds with a classification accuracy of 100.0%
(classification time 0.006 sec.). With three hidden layers, the training time was 2.059 seconds and
had a classification accuracy of 100.0% (classification time 0.007 sec.). Figure 4.7 shows that both
three and five hidden layers appear to be optimal, the classification time is longer for five hidden
layers (0.008 sec.).
Given that Backpropagation is a gradient descent method, it is possible the ANN to not perform
well if it does not converge on the global error minimum. The error rate was examined to ensure
that the ANN was not being trapped in a non-optimal local minimum, detailed in Figure 4.8. Table
4.12 shows that the training time for the ANN increases linearly with the number of iterations, this
is not an issue provided training time is not the rate determining step. There was a 10% decrease
in classification accuracy when the learning rate was varied from 1.0 to 0.1. The learning rate is a
measure of the size of the step taken down the gradient, so large values of learning rate correspond
to smaller steps (which would be more accurate, but take longer to converge).
4.4.3 Trial Dataset: Flow Analysis
An alternative approach to using the ANN was undertaking flow analysis. As the write attack
described in section §4.4.2 is a frequency attack, identifying increases in frequency can be used for
detection. The network commands sent over the network were converted into a time series line
plot with a bin size of one minute, detailed in Figure 4.9. Through frequency comparisons for each
command, it can be seen that Who-is and I-am command frequencies peak when Write property
and Read property commands peak in phase. These relationships exist due to the implementation
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Figure 4.7: Number of hidden layers compared to the training time, replicated
from Johnstone, Peacock and den Hartog (2015, p61)
Figure 4.8: Error convergence in the ANN, replicated from Johnstone, Peacock
and den Hartog (2015, p62)
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Table 4.12: Iterations of the ANN vs. Training Time of the Network, replicated
from Johnstone, Peacock and den Hartog (2015, p62)
Iterations Time (sec.)
100 0.875
200 1.710
300 2.593
400 3.522
500 4.302
of the network devices which do not hold network addresses, thus when a Write property or Read
property command occurs, the address of the device must be requested (Who-is) and received
(I-am). An improved dataset which holds network addresses would reduce this phenomenon.
Given we are looking for bursts of traffic over a short duration, further reducing the bin sizes
reveals the anomalous command events on the network. A comparison of bin sizes for write com-
mands are presented in Figure 4.10. Further analysis could identify a specific host generating this
traffic. While this analysis is useful for this specific attack, it requires contextual knowledge of the
normal network interactions for the attack to be identified. Further, non-frequency attacks may
not have an identifiable change in phase. Regardless, this method may be complementary to other,
more process intensive methods such as machine learning, and thus was explored further.
4.4.4 Theory Testing Dataset: CoV attack
As described in §4.3.1, a dataset was generated to undertake testing of the theoretical CoV at-
tack. Similar to the Trial Dataset, the Theory Testing Dataset represents a subset of a BACnet
controlled HVAC system, with the additional CoV reporting functionality. The Theory Testing
Dataset contains a thermostat, and an air handling unit (AHU) controller device, see Figure 4.11.
The thermostat Raspberry Pi used a CBMS BACnet server instance (CBMS, 2015b), while the
interaction from the controller device was implemented using the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2015).
The configuration of the thermostat required an additional CBMS engineering tool (CBMS, 2015a),
implemented on a Windows 7 machine. A controller acts as a client, subscribing to the thermostat
present value property. When a value change occurs over a threshold value, the controller is notified
(Peacock et al., 2018).
The scenario for testing the attack consisted of a a malicious client device subscribing to the
thermostat server device. When subscribing, the malicious client can set the timeout value and
retry attempts in the case of a device losing connection. For this test, the wait time is set to 10
seconds, and the retries are set to 3. Next, the malicious client disconnects from the network. While
disconnected, the subscribed value changes multiple times on the thermostat device. After a period
of time, the client reconnects to examine the behaviour. While the client is disconnected, the server
device attempts to send the CoV notifications, and waits the defined timeout and retry times. The
aim of creating this dataset was to determine if the client device received delayed notifications of
the server value changes after reconnecting to the network.
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Figure 4.9: Frequency breakdown of commands in the Test Dataset, with bin
size 1 minute
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Figure 4.11: Experimental simulation setup for Theory Testing Dataset, replic-
ated from Peacock, Johnstone and Valli (2018, p261)
4.4.5 Theory Testing Dataset: Analysis
Table 4.13 outlines an excerpt of the captured behaviour, outlined in (Peacock et al., 2018). Due to
a limited network handler implementation, the normal response from a confirmed request is a reject
response. Naturally, when the malicious device disconnects, the server can no longer communicate.
While attempting to communicate, the server waits 10 seconds for a response, and then resends
the confirmation twice, for three total confirmations. During the 30 second disconnected window,
the subscribed server value was changed multiple times, none of these changes triggered a further
notification while the server waited for the previous changes acknowledgement packet. Entry 81438
and 81439 in Table 4.13 detail a normal notification and ACK, after a value change and the malicious
client device was reconnected. When the malicious client reconnected, the changes that occurred
while waiting for the timeouts and retries were never disseminated to the client (Peacock et al.,
2018).
From the initial experiment and testbed implementation, the extent of the attack is unclear.
Further experimentation was required to implement additional devices, to determine if the attack
prevents the server device from communicating to other subscribed devices.
4.5 Simulator assessment and initial attack implementation out-
comes
For the simple write attack, the context of the command is of importance. The contextual inform-
ation in this case, is the ∆t between write commands occurring. By explicitly distinguishing this
feature, the ANN model was able to detect the context of the network command, and thus identify
the attack. More complex network scenarios would require additional learning for these contextual
details, which can be revealed through the use of temporal modelling, such as time series analysis
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Table 4.13: Initial experimentation results, replicated from Peacock, Johnstone
and Valli (2018, p262)
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info
80040 19:58:32.5 192.168.1.12 192.168.1.5 BACnet 85 Confirmed-REQ con-
firmedCOVNotification[
67] device, 9999 analog-
output, 1 present-value
80041 19:58:32.5 192.168.1.5 192.168.1.12 BACnet 60 Reject unrecognized-
service[ 67]
80327 19:58:48.4 192.168.1.12 192.168.1.5 BACnet 85 Confirmed-REQ con-
firmedCOVNotification[
69] device, 9999 analog-
output, 1 present-value
80510 19:58:58.4 192.168.1.12 192.168.1.5 BACnet 85 Confirmed-REQ con-
firmedCOVNotification[
69] device, 9999 analog-
output, 1 present-value
80656 19:59:08.4 192.168.1.12 192.168.1.5 BACnet 85 Confirmed-REQ con-
firmedCOVNotification[
69] device, 9999 analog-
output, 1 present-value
81438 19:59:48.5 192.168.1.12 192.168.1.5 BACnet 85 Confirmed-REQ con-
firmedCOVNotification[
70] device, 9999 analog-
output, 1 present-value
81439 19:59:48.5 192.168.1.5 192.168.1.12 BACnet 60 Reject unrecognized-
service[ 70]
or other machine learning algorithms.
As demonstrated, the basic time series analysis against the trial dataset was useful for identi-
fying the contextual write attack. Given the attack was frequency based, methods such as graph
analysis, and packet counting could be useful for either detection, or building the context around
normal network commands traversing the network between hosts. There may be limitations how-
ever, particularly if the distinguishing features between legitimate and malicious commands have
a closer value range. The ANN applied to test the dataset provided justification to pursue apply-
ing additional machine learning algorithms to the BACnet traffic classification problems. The CoV
proof of concept (POC) implementation in the theory testing dataset described the issues identified
in the protocol specification review. A larger, virtual testbed was deemed necessary which could
incorporate further devices to test the effect of the attack.
The current version of the SCADAengine BACnet simulator (Scada Engine, 2009a) had many
limitations, primarily, lack of value generation or non-linear value stepping, and the requirement
of Windows XP. The CBMS server device (CBMS, 2015b) used for the theory testing dataset also
had a restrictive value generation and value stepping implementation. Additionally, SCADAengine
(Scada Engine, 2009a) and CBMS (CBMS, 2015b) are closed source stacks, in which it is difficult
to implement missing features. Both SCADAengine (Scada Engine, 2009a) and CBMS (CBMS,
2015b) provided the ability to store BACnet data structures and undertake limited network interac-
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tions. However, for a larger, more robust simulation, further programmatic network interaction was
required. As such, given both SCADAengine (Scada Engine, 2009a) and CBMS (CBMS, 2015b)
are closed source, and hardware restrictive, they were not used further in the research.
Comparatively, the flexibility of the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2015) was promising for gen-
erating a larger testbed. Sample device templates existed in the stack which could be adapted to
the scenario, to be used for data storage and initiate network communications. Due to its ability
to have missing features implemented, and the ability to pass generated values to BACnet data
structures, the BACnet open stack was selected for further simulation of BACnetworks for the
research.
Lessons learned from the implementations of both simulators identified the requirements for
developing a larger testbed. Specifically, a means of generating values to send over the network,
the ability to construct BACnet devices, and storage of network addresses for devices. Further,
investigating the network footprint of a real BACnet/IP network was deemed useful to ground the
simulation scenario.
4.6 Data collection and generation
Section 4.6 describes the rationale of both collecting real and generating synthetic network traffic for
the purpose of anomaly detection. First, the real network data collection is described, followed by
initial analysis of the captured network data. Next, a description of the defined building simulation
scenario, physical data generation and network design for data generation is presented. Finally, the
designed attack framework is defined, with testing of each defined attack described.
4.6.1 Real data collection
Real BAS data was collected from an Australasian University for the study, with the intention of
being used for validation of the simulation implementation. Data capturing involved port mirroring
of the BAS VLAN for one building on campus. The building consisted of a number of network
visible controllers operating over BACnet/IP, with underlying sensors, actuators and application
specific controllers operating over serial connection using BACnet/MS-TP. One month of network
stream was collected, with network activity averaging 1GB per day, consisting of over one million
frames. The network capture was on the backbone/management level of the topology, as such, it
was not possible to capture sensor data for the building. However, the insights gained from this
dataset, discussed in §5.2.1 were used to define some interactions in the simulation.
4.6.2 Analysis and validity
Initial analysis of the network data was undertaken using Moloch (AOL, 2017), a network stream
visualisation and analysis tool. From this software per-host packet counts were obtained in addition
to visual flow structures of the traffic. It was revealed that the traffic is extremely regular, as the
majority of traffic is automated, based on time. Upon further analysis, it was determined that over
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78% of the traffic captured was not passing over the default BACnet port. Rather, the vendor of the
controller uses a proprietary middleware protocol to communicate with BACnet devices for point
configuration over a separate communication port. Point configuration, in this context consists of
Write property commands to devices. This poses a number of questions for intrusion detection in
BACnet-managed BAS. Given a portion of attacks operate using write commands, when a write
command is passed over the default BACnet port when running controllers from specific vendors, it
would be classed as anomalous, as write commands operate on the proprietary port. This reinforces
the requirement of learning each specific BAS network’s traffic profile for intrusion detection, rather
than developing a catch-all intrusion detection system for BAS. Thus, even though BACnet is an
open source protocol, there are fundamentally different proprietary elements dependent on the
vendor type of controllers and implementation. In addition to the wide range of technologies,
device versions and control strategies, a generic detection method does not seem suitable for all
BAS implementations. Further research is required to investigate vendor middleware protocols to
determine how they interface with BACnet, given the lack of network traffic dissectors, as attacks
could be propagated over the network using these middleware interfaces, if the protocol is reverse
engineered.
The original intention of collecting the real network data was to use this data for statistical
comparison to the synthetically-generated data for simulation validity and justification. Every
implementation of a BACnetwork is tailored to the specific building design. As such, each im-
plementation is different, given the wide range of devices, vendors and physical media which can
incorporate BACnet. Given that the research specifically looks at BACnet/IP, there are some limit-
ations to the real dataset collected. First, the design of the real buildings network does not have all
devices using BACnet/IP, rather only the controllers. All field devices used serial communications
from which it was not capable of capturing network traffic. Second, given the choice of vendor,
some of the network traffic was not dissectible due to a proprietary middleware implementation of
the BACnet protocol operating on the network. Therefore, a comparison between a network, which
only has one type of device, and utilises vendor specific protocol implementations compared to a
full BACnet/IP network was not a logical course of action. As such, the simulation design used for
the research was defined using a range of sources, discussed in §4.6.3.
4.6.3 Building simulations
There are two common use cases for simulation in building automation systems. One is network
analysis and protocol modelling, the focus of this research and other cyber security based projects
mentioned in §2. The second is for the building design domain, aimed at improving energy efficiency
through whole building modelling and simulation. A range of simulation and modelling software
exist for both use cases. For BACnet, network simulation software include SCADAengine (Scada
Engine, 2009a) and the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017). Typically, data generated in these
simulators are simplistic, with the aim to generate network traffic rather than have meaningful
data inside these network transactions.
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For building design, simulations are used to generate data for load calculations, to give an
understanding of energy impact and building material longevity. Thus, simulation software and
languages, such as Modelica (Modelica, 2018) and Energyplus (EnergyPlus, 2018) used by building
designers, are focused on accurate data and energy calculations, with network traffic rarely, if
ever, implemented. For this research, the primary interest is network simulation, however, the
data held in network transactions are of interest for the context of feature selection. While the
data would ideally be realistic, the estimations generated by building design simulations have a
high degree of variability compared to real-world conditions. The variability can be accounted for
by the modeller’s bias, or underestimating the impact of occupant and heat emitting equipment
operating within the building spaces. As such, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and
Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) define a building design model for an existing building to
be calibrated if it falls within ±10% of mean bias error and the coefficient of variation root mean
squared error falls within ±30% using hourly data, or ±5% using monthly data (ASHRAE, 2012b).
For modelling the internal systems of a building for energy simulation, a range of variables are
used, including local weather readings, occupancy models, building geometry details, construction
materials, internal equipment load, building occupancy schedule and HVAC type. Similarly, for
simulating a BACnetwork, appropriate digital representation of devices is required, in addition to
protocol defined network transactions.
Therefore, the simulation environment required for this research takes building design variables
into consideration, when developing a simulation scenario, to generate a simulation which accounts
for real-world data loads, as opposed to generating non-meaningful data for traffic analysis.
4.6.4 Simulation design
There are a number of interrelated parts operating as a control loop structure within BAS. Four
core requirements were identified for the generation of the simulation:
1. A system scenario;
2. Generation of environmental variables;
3. Definitions of devices;
4. Network communications.
These four requirements are split into corresponding simulation levels. The first level is the defini-
tion of a system scenario, which defines the user, and interaction of components in the other three
levels. The system scenario is defined in Section 4.6.5 The second level, defined as the physical
level describes how synthetic values will be representative of environmental phenomena. For this
to occur, a range of algorithms used in building energy simulation systems and HVAC engineering
were implemented, along with a range of core assumptions. Section 4.6.6 describes in detail the
physical level. The third level is the device level, which describes the BACnet representation of
devices which hold the synthetic data, and propogate the data around the system. Section 4.6.7
116
describes this level. The fourth and final level is the network level, which outlines the network
topology for the simulation, and simulates data traversal over the network dependent on the com-
munication processes implemented between devices, described in Section 4.6.8. Additionally, the
network level describes the implemented attack framework for attack data generation, described in
Section 4.6.9
4.6.5 Simulation scenario
Scenarios are used in building energy simulations to represent a building planned for construction,
or a pre-existing building. In this case however, no building plan or pre-existing building exists,
and thus to derive values for a generic building, a scenario was defined. The scenario selected was
to represent a typical office building’s HVAC system in Perth, Australia. Building types are classed
based on their purpose, with design guidelines for construction materials, air changes and occu-
pancy levels defined by the National Construction Code of Australia (NCC) (NCC, 2016). An office
building is denoted as a Class 5 building in Australia, with many variables for the scenario taken
from the NCC Building Code of Australia Volume one and best practices guidelines (NCC, 2016).
A core requirement for the scenario is the size of the building, from which physical simulation calcu-
lations are derived. The details of the average office building sizes in Australia were retrieved from
the commercial buildings baseline study, undertaken by the Australian government Department of
the Environment and Energy (Phillips, 2014). From the provided dataset, Perth was selected for
the average floor space containing both real and predicted data. Given the research aim is cyber
security of BAS, not architecture or building energy simulation, the scenario building defined is ba-
sic, and representative of the minimum requirements for data generation, and subsequent network
traffic simulation. Similarly, no year is defined for the simulation, thus the average floor space for a
Class 5 office in Perth of 2912m2 is used as a comparative measure. The simulation is designed in
such a way, that each device is encapsulated in a virtual machine, therefore there were some limit-
ations in regards to the size of the scenario defined. The floor space is relatively large due to the
multi-tenant office buildings in the Perth CBD. When designing a simulation to represent an office
space this large, the number of virtual machines required were larger than could be accommodated
with the hardware capabilities at the researcher’s disposal. As such, the scenario size was reduced to
be a smaller subset representing a business which encompases 480m2, consisting of both offices and
computer laboratories. From the defined sizing and best practices, the Australian HVAC standards
defined by the Australian Institute of Refrigeration, Air Conditioning and Heating (AIRAH) were
applied to detail the devices to be used in the scenario (AIRAH, 2015a, 2015b). There are three air
handling units, each supplying cooling to one office zone, sized 120m2 and one computer laboratory
zone, sized 40m2 See Figure 4.12 for the defined HVAC system scenario layout, which is based on
a default Variable air volume (VAV) system defined in ASHRAE (2009)[pp19.23]. The scenario
simulates the operation of a BACnet/IP managed BAS for the month of January, which is summer
in the southern hemisphere.
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Figure 4.12: Building HVAC plan for defined scenario
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4.6.6 Physical level simulation
There are a range of devices which are controlled and monitored by a BAS. As part of a cyber-
physical system sensors measure various environmental phenomena. These values are then sent to
controlling devices over the network, where controlling devices use predefined logic to enact change
on the system. In HVAC engineering and building energy simulation, a range of equations are used
to describe the monitored phenomena. For the defined scenario, and subsequent devices acting in
the system, a range of data were identified to be generated for operation of the simulation. The
devices and data generated are detailed in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14: Identified devices to be modelled for the simulation
Device Generated Data
Temperature Sensor (External) External Temperature
Temperature Sensor (Pre-Coil) Pre-Coil Temperature
Temperature Sensor (Return Air) ReturnAir Temperature
Zone Thermostat Zone 1 Temperature
Zone VAV box Zone 1 Airflow Volume
Zone VAV Box Zone 1 Pressure
Zone VAV Box Zone 1 Damper Settings
Zone Thermostat Zone 2 Temperature
Zone VAV box Zone 2 Airflow Volume
Zone VAV Box Zone 2 Pressure
Zone VAV Box Zone 2 Damper Settings
Flow Sensor Supply Fan Air Volume
Supply Fan Supply Fan Speed
Flow Sensor Return Fan Air Volume
Return Fan Return Fan Speed
Damper Actuator Recycle Air Damper Settings
Damper Actuator Exhaust Air Damper Settings
Damper Actuator Supply Air Damper Settings
Valve Actuator Cooling Valve Actuator Settings
Valve Actuator Heating Valve Actuator Settings
Flow Sensor Intake Airflow Sensor
Pressure Sensor Pre-Coil Pressure
The majority of devices in the network are dependent on other devices for reporting data and
for control of the system to provide optimum performance. The relationships between these devices
can be described as control loops, of which the major control loops are the air handling unit, chiller
control and zone control. The air handling unit control loop defines how much air will be ejected,
recycled and taken into the system, based on the temperature of the air returning from the zones,
the external temperature, the minimum required fresh air flow rate, and the amount of air required
to cool the zones. The chiller control loop defines the degree to which the valves providing cooling
into the system are open. The degree is determined by the Pre-coil temperature, and the cooling
load of the system. In the final control loop the zone control describes how much cooled air is
to be provided to the zone based on the internal temperature of the zone. The thermostat in the
zone thus controls the zone damper to limit or increase air flow into the zone, which affects the
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resistance to air in the system. With altered resistance the pressure changes which requires action
from the supply fan to maintain a static pressure setpoint.
The relationship and impact of external and internal temperature on a building is complicated,
and is the focus of much research in the building simulation domain (ASHRAE, 2009). HVAC
systems are defined by two core concepts, the cooling load, which defines the amount of cooling
required to keep a building at a set point temperature, and the heat gain, which is the rate at
which heat is generated, or conveyed into a building. ASHRAE defines a range of heat gains for a
building classified as either external or internal gains. External gains are derived from the impact
of solar radiation on the construction materials such as walls, roofs and windows. Internal gains
are derived from the impact of occupants, lighting, and equipment emitting heat (ASHRAE, 2009).
Models exist for calculating both external and internal gains, based on relevant international and
national standards including the NCC, AIRAH, and ASHRAE, models for internal heat gains range
from simplistic hourly operational models to models derived from real building occupancy sensor,
equipment power drain and light/heat emission data. For the defined scenario, the schedules for
occupancy, equipment and lighting usage are derived from Specification JV of the NCC standard,
detailed in Table 4.15, whereby the schedules detail the expected percentage of maximum operation
percentage at a given time. The heat gain implied by these profiles are calculated based on values
provided by the NCC standard, NCC (2016, p402,p446), based on the class of room in operation,
which is 75W sensible gain per person, 50W latent heat gain per person, 9W gain for lights and 15W
for equipment. Equation 4.5 is used to calculate the equipment and lighting heat gains, Equation
4.6 is used to calculate the occupant sensible and latent heat gains.
Ht = CASt
where
Ht = heat gain at time t
C = Energy use in Watts based on space class
A = Area of space
St = Schedule percentage at time t
(Equation 4.5)
Ht = O(
A
P
)St
where
Ht = heat gain at time t
O = Energy use in Watts based on occupancy per m2
A = Area of space
P = Area per Person in m2
St = Schedule percentage at time t
(Equation 4.6)
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Table 4.15: Occupancy, Equipment and Light schedules used in the scenario,
adapted from Table 2b of NCC (2016, p394)
Time Period
Occupancy Lighting Equipment AirConditioning
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend
0:00-1:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
1:00-2:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
2:00-3:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
3:00-4:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
4:00-5:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
5:00-6:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
6:00-7:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
7:00-8:00 15% 0% 40% 10% 25% 10% On Off
8:00-9:00 60% 0% 80% 10% 70% 10% On Off
9:00-10:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
10:00-11:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
11:00-12:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
12:00-13:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
13:00-14:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
14:00-15:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
15:00-16:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
16:00-17:00 100% 0% 100% 10% 100% 10% On Off
17:00-18:00 50% 0% 80% 10% 60% 10% On Off
18:00-19:00 15% 0% 60% 10% 25% 10% Off Off
19:00-20:00 5% 0% 40% 10% 15% 10% Off Off
20:00-21:00 5% 0% 20% 10% 15% 10% Off Off
21:00-22:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
22:00-23:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
23:00-24:00 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% Off Off
Naturally, external temperature values form a cyclical pattern based on the time of day; which
impacts the internal temperature of a building. While the relationship is not linear, it is often
correlated (Degelman, 2004). When the temperature is high outside, the cooling required to main-
tain an internal setpoint is increased. When the temperature is lower, less cooling is required,
with some control strategies switching off to rely on natural cooling to save energy. The optimal
zone of operation, whereby the HVAC can regain energy, is called the deadband, which is set as a
one degree distribution from the setpoint. Further, a proportional band is defined, which is set as
one degree below the deadband for heating and two degrees above the deadband for cooling. The
proportional band defines the ramp time for heating or cooling from the HVAC. For this scenario,
the setpoint is set as the Australian standard for Perth of 23 Degrees Celsius AIRAH (2015a), the
control bands are detailed as Figure 4.13.
Modelling external heat gain is more complex, due to environmental phenomena and the various
thermal properties of construction materials. External heat gains use cooling factors and the
properties of construction material for defining the absorbance of the building. Further, long-term
weather data are used to calculate the heat gain. While the impact of reducing thermal load
from construction materials is important for building simulations relating to energy usage and air-
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Figure 4.13: Control bands and setpoint for scenario, defined by NCC (2016)
conditioning design, for the use in this research it provides added complexity to the calculations
which have an undetermined impact on the variance of variable values. As such, an assumption-
based approach has been used for determining the effect of solar radiation on the zone temperatures
as 10% of external temperature interacts with the internal zone temperature.
The cooling load is the total amount of energy a cooling system is required to produce to
maintain a specific setpoint temperature ASHRAE (2009, p18.1). The peak cooling load is derived
to select the appropriate equipment to use in a HVAC system. There are various methods for
deriving the cooling load defined by ASHRAE and AIRAH, with the ASHRAE recommended
methods being the heat balance (HB) method and the radiant time series (RTS) method (ASHRAE,
2009). From the nature of these methods, there are algorithms which explain complex natural
phenomena, based on the physical characteristics of a building, its location, and usage. Given
the purpose of the simulation is to generate network traffic, rather than accurate physical based
variables, an assumption based approach is taken to generating the cooling load. For energy
modelling, typically, the cooling load is generated at a per hour rate, however, for generating
network simulation data a fidelity level of seconds is required. ASHRAE states that the mean bias
error for energy simulations can be up to 30% for hourly values. It is also unclear which simulation
variables are of most importance for the design cooling load. For the purpose of this research,
generating data at a fidelity of seconds, the values generated using the prescribed methods, HB
or RTS may not be accurate. Thus to reduce the complexity of the calculations, an assumption
is made with the cooling output required for an office building defined as 180W/m2 (Curnow &
Curnow, 2014). The equation used to generate a synthetic cooling load for the scenario is shown
in Equation Equation 4.7. The cooling load per floor of the system is thus 28.8kW (160m
2×180
1000 ).
122
§4.6.6.1 - §4.6.6.7 describe the models used for data generation in this research.
L =
AO
1000
in kW
where
L = Cooling load
A = Total area of space
O = Cooling Output constant180W/m2
(Equation 4.7)
4.6.6.1 External temperature generation
Degelman (2004) describes a Monte Carlo method of generating weather, using both deterministic
and stochastic models. The aim of the models in Degelman (2004) is the generation of synthetic
weather data for simulating building thermal loads, the flexible fidelity of the data generated by the
model provides the necessary level of data for the device logic designed for the network simulation.
Degelman (2004) notes two systems which have strong interrelationships which affect the majority of
financial impact of a building, namely, the thermal envelope of the building, and the air conditioning
system. The purpose of building energy performance simulation is thus for cost benefit analysis of
various operating profiles and lifecycles of a building. The most prominent mechanism of heat flow
in buildings is the climate in which the building is situated, making weather data an important
factor for simulation. Degelman’s model has two parts, a daily deterministic model representing
the cyclical diurnal pattern of temperature, and a stochastic model, which uses the Monte Carlo
method for deriving a sequence of days from the normalised cumulative distribution function of
real data recordings.
The model was applied to generate external temperature values for the simulated scenario.
Correlated, half-hourly weather readings from the Perth meteorological weather station (station
number 9021) were retrieved from Peterson (2013) for each day in January for the period 1998 to
2013. The external temperature readings were used to derive a range of descriptive statistics on a
per day basis.
The deterministic model used requires the sunrise time and solar noon, referred to as zenith
time henceforth. The typical values for January in Perth were retrieved from ‘Perth, Western
Australia, Australia - Sunrise, Sunset, and Daylength’ (2017) and an assumption was made to hold
the sunrise and zenith values constant on the hour for the month, with sunrise at 5am and zenith
at 12pm. Three algorithms, Equation 4.8, Equation 4.9, Equation 4.10 were used to calculate the
temperatures for a day in the deterministic model. The stochastic model generates the maximum
temperature and minimum temperature for each day, which is then chained together to form a
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simulated month of data.
Tt = Tave0 − ∆T
2
cos[pi
(t− tR)
(Z − tR) ]
where
Tt = temperature at time t
tave0 = average morning temperature
∆T = temperature range
tR = sunrise time
Z = zenith time
(Equation 4.8)
Tt = Tave1 +
∆T ′
2
cos[pi
(t− Z)
tR′+N ]
where
Tave = the average evening temperature
∆T ′ = the evening temperature range (Tmax − Tmin′)
tR′ = the time of sunrise the next day
N = constant
(Equation 4.9)
Tt = Tave1 +
∆T ′
2
cos[pi
t+N
TR′+N ]
where
Tave = the average evening temperature
∆T ′ = the evening temperature range (Tmax − Tmin′)
tR′ = the time of sunrise the next day
N = constant
(Equation 4.10)
The probability density function (PDF) for dry-bulb temperatures almost always follow the
normal distribution curve (Degelman, 2004). The objective of the stochastic model is thus to
sample a mean which follows the PDF. For simulation purposes the integral cumulative density
function (CDF) is used, defined as the area under the PDF curve from left to right. Thus, the
lowest temperature will be positioned at the left of the CDF, and the highest temperature at the
right. To derive days based on the standard deviation of real temperatures over a period, the CDF
Y axis is manipulated to represent days in the month, rather than probability of occurrence, with
the X axis being the temperature minus the mean temperature. The result is 31 unique normalised
values from the mean, which represents each day of the month. By selecting each day from the
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CDF without repetition, the pattern of the CDF and therefore the PDF of actual temperature
occurrences can be replicated for the simulation. The values required for calculation are the mean
temperature for each day, and the standard deviation of daily temperature. The standard deviation
of daily temperatures is calculated over a range of years, following Equation 4.11.
σ =
√∑
x2i − nx¯2
n− 1
where
σ = the standard deviation of the period
n = number of days in sample xi
x¯ = the mean for the period studied (
∑ xi
n
)
(Equation 4.11)
The normalised deviations are then sampled using the Monte Carlo method with a seed value for
future repeatability, resulting in the monthly mean temperature pattern in Figure 4.14. To generate
minimum and maximum values corresponding to the simulated monthly pattern, Equation 4.12 and
Equation 4.13 were used.
Mind = X¯d − σ
∣∣∣ ˆ¯X∣∣∣
where
X¯d = Mean on day d∣∣∣ ˆ¯X∣∣∣ = absolute value of normalised mean
(Equation 4.12)
Maxd = X¯d + σ
∣∣∣ ˆ¯X∣∣∣
where
X¯d = Mean on day d∣∣∣ ˆ¯X∣∣∣ = absolute value of normalised mean
(Equation 4.13)
The minimum and maximum values generated using the stochastic model are used in the de-
terministic model to generate temperature values for every second of the simulated January, shown
as Figure 4.15. With these external values, the logic of the BAS devices can then call values at a
fidelity level of seconds.
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Figure 4.14: Daily average temperatures generated using the Monte Carlo al-
gorithm
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Figure 4.15: Graph of simulated January external temperature values over time
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4.6.6.2 Internal zone temperature
There are two points at which the internal room temperature is measured, representing the two
types of zone being simulated, namely, Office Zone and Lab Zone. As discussed in §4.6.6, there are
a range of factors which affect the internal temperature of a space. A model is required for each
factor, which can then be used to generate the internal zone temperature. Each zone type will have
differing heat gains, due to the differences in area, and area per person specified by (NCC, 2016).
The output of heat gain calculations is the power of the system used to convert this power to a
temperature effect for which Equation 4.14 and Equation 4.15 are used. The internal heat gains,
and subsequent temperature increases for the Office and Lab zones, are detailed in Figure 4.16
PT
m
cp
where
P = Power in kW
T = Time in seconds
m = Mass of air in kg
cp = Specifc heat of air 1.005kJ/kgC
(Equation 4.14)
m =
V
ρ
where
m = Mass of air in kg
V = Volume of air in space in kg
ρ = Density of Air 1.200kg/M3
(Equation 4.15)
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To determine the external gain the assumption that 10% of external temperature is the external
heat gain was made. The temperature effect of the internal and external gains are combined, per
zone, to form the impact of all heat gains to each zone. Given the external temperature values, the
power of the external temperature is derived via Equation 4.16
G = TcpV ρ
where
G = Gain in kW
T = Temperature in degrees C
cp = Specific heat of air 1.005kJ/kgC
V = Volume of zone in m3
ρ = Density of air 1.205kg/m3
(Equation 4.16)
Given the air makeup in the zone is a mix between the supplied vent air and the existing room
air, the internal temperature is generated using the following process. First, a potential temperature
is generated, using Equation 4.17, a constant supply air temperature of 13 Degrees (the standard
for Australia (AIRAH, 2015b)), and the previous room temperature with the current time slice
heat gains.
MAt =
(SAtSAP t) + (RAt(100− SAP t))
100
where
MAt = Mixed air temperature in degrees Celsius at time t
SAt = Supply air temperature in degrees Celsius at time t
SAP t = Percentage of supply air at time t
RAt = Room air temperature in degrees Celsius at time t
(Equation 4.17)
A control function is used, which increases or decreases the supply air percentage based on the
∆T between the setpoint temperature, and the generated potential temperature, resulting in the
selected percentage of air for the next temperature generation. The actual temperature is then
generated using Equation 4.17. Of the generated values, less than 70 values fall outside the range
20-26 degrees C, specified by AIRAH as acceptable temperature in an office in Australia (AIRAH,
2015a). A model incorporating control functions, such as ramp up and purge could account for the
sudden increase in load at the start of each work day. Alternatively, a model which uses a data
driven, realistic internal load schedule, rather than the NCC standard, would have reduced load
spikes.
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4.6.6.3 Damper actuators
There exist two types of damper actuators in the system, those for control of air flow in the system,
termed Intake, Exhaust and Recycle, and the zone dampers controlled by the Thermostat. The
Intake, Exhaust and Recycle damper actuators form an integral part of the HVAC system. The
Intake damper defines the volume of air entering the building, equally, the Exhaust damper defines
the volume of air leaving the system. These dampers are intrinsically linked, as the equal volume
of air entering the system must also leave the system, while ignoring exfiltration loss through the
building envelope. The Recycle damper allows for part of the return air stream to re-enter the
HVAC process, reducing the amount of cooling and conditioning required. The total air makeup
of the system is controlled by the percent of air being recycled, given the air exiting the system
through the exhaust is equal to the air entering the system through the intake. Damper settings are
generally static setpoints, rather than having a high degree of control, to allow for system curves
to be generated for resistance in the air flow. In this system, the percentage the damper is open
has a linear relation to the percentage of air entering or exiting the system. A control function
was defined based on the difference in temperature between the return air temperature provided
by the recycle damper and the external temperature provided by air from the intake damper. The
function is detailed in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
The zone dampers are controlled by the zone thermostat. As the sensed temperature reaches
its defined setpoint the dampers close, which increases the resistance in the duct, which in turn
increases the fan speed to account for the pressure change. As the sensed temperature deviates
from the defined setpoint, the opposite control function occurs, the dampers open, which reduces
the resistance in the duct, which in turn reduces the fan speed to account for the pressure reduction.
Three zone damper positions are defined for the scenario, 10%, 50% and 100%. The current damper
position is determined based on the control function in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 1: Exhaust and Intake Air Percentage Control Function
1 function CalculateAirPercent(MixedAirPercent)
Input : Mixed air percentage
Output: Exhaust air percentage, intake air percentage
2 ExhaustAirPercent← 100−MixedAirPercent
3 IntakeAirPercent← ExhaustAirPercent
4 return ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent
4.6.6.4 Duct static pressure sensors
There are three pressure sensors in the system, one in each zone Variable Air Volume (VAV) box,
and one standalone sensor before the heating and cooling coils. Air flows from high pressure to low
pressure, thus HVAC systems are designed to have lower pressure in areas which air is to flow to,
such as zones. Static pressure is impacted by two major factors. The friction caused by the duct
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Algorithm 2: Damper Percentage Control Function
1 function DamperControlFunction(ExternalTemperature,ReturnAirTemperature)
Input : Two temperature values, ExternalTemperature and ReturnAirTemperature
Output: Mixed air percentage, recycle damper percentage, exhaust damper percentage, intake
damper percentage
2 DT ← ExternalTemperature−ReturnAirTemperature
3 if −3 < DT < 3 then
4 MixedAirPercent← 50
ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent← CalculateAirPercent(MixedAirPercent)
5 return MixedAirPercent, ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent
6 else if DT <= −3 then
7 MixedAirPercent← 20
ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent← CalculateAirPercent(MixedAirPercent)
8 return MixedAirPercent, ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent
9 else if DT >= 3 then
10 MixedAirPercent← 70
ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent← CalculateAirPercent(MixedAirPercent)
11 return MixedAirPercent, ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent
12 RecycleDamper,ExhaustDamper, IntakeDamper ←
MixedAirPercent, ExhaustAirPercent, IntakeAirPercent
13 return RecycleDamper,ExhaustDamper, IntakeDamper
Algorithm 3: Zone Damper Percentage Control Function
1 function ZoneDamperControlFunction(ZoneTemperature)
Input : One temperature value, ZoneTemperature
Output: Zone damper position
2 if ZoneTemperature < 21.0 then
3 ZoneDamperPercent← 100
4 return ZoneDamperPercent
5 else if ZoneTemperature < 22.5 then
6 ZoneDamperPercent← 50
7 return ZoneDamperPercent
8 else if ZoneTemperature < 23.5 then
9 ZoneDamperPercent← 10
10 return ZoneDamperPercent
11 else if ZoneTemperature <= 25.0 then
12 ZoneDamperPercent← 50
13 return ZoneDamperPercent
14 else if ZoneTemperature > 25.0 then
15 ZoneDamperPercent← 100
16 return ZoneDamperPercent
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material, air filters and dampers over a length of ducting, and any deviations in ducting size or
curves in the duct. Fans introduce static pressure to the air stream, allowing the air to flow from
the fan to the zone areas. The fan’s aim is to maintain a constant static pressure at the point of
air proliferation to the zone. When a damper moves, the resistance in the system increases which
in turn changes the pressure in the system. The fan must account for this pressure change, and
increase or decrease fan speed to add the appropriate amount of pressure into the system. Given
dampers have set positions, the resistance added, and thus pressure changes can be described.
The pressure changes in a system can be determined from one pressure reading coupled with a
volumetric air flow reading using the second Affinity law, see Equation 4.18.
SP2 = SP1(
Q2
Q1
)2
where
SP2 = The pressure at air flow reading Q2 in Pascals
SP1 = The pressure at air flow reading Q1 in Pascals
Q2 = Next volumetric air flow in M
3/s
Q1 = Current volumetric air flow in M
3/s
(Equation 4.18)
Given the first pressure reading for each damper position, all pressure readings for the air flows
entering each zone can be calculated. When the system changes resistance due to a damper moving,
the pressure curve generated by Equation 4.18 moves, thus Equation 4.18 is seeded with each zone’s
assigned static pressure point. To generate the complete zone static pressure, the static pressure
from each curve is selected based on the current damper position using Algorithm 4, accounting
for the pressure loss caused by duct length. The pre-coil pressure sensor values are also generated
using the second affinity law from Equation 4.18, with a lower seed value to represent the lower
pressure value before the fan imparts additional pressure into the airstream.
4.6.6.5 Fans
There are two fans in the scenario system, one for supplying air the zones, and one for returning
air from the zones. Each has equal actions to allow for balancing of air supply and return, thus the
fan speed and static pressure from each fan is identical. When one fan speed is known, all future
fan speeds can be calculated using the first affinity law, see Equation 4.19. The fan speed of the
supply fan is calculated using the total supply air derived from the sum of both zones generated air
flows. The static pressure introduced into the airstream by the fan is calculated using the second
affinity law, replacing the air flow with the fan speed, see Equation 4.20. The seed fan speed was
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Algorithm 4: Zone static pressure sensor data generation
Input : Three lists of generated static pressure values, one list of the zone damper positions, one
list of supply air volume and the duct length to the zone,
ZonePressureDamper100, ZonePressureDamper50,
ZonePressureDamper10, ZoneDamperPercent, ZoneSupplyAirV olume,DuctLength
Output: Zone pressure sensor readings
1 Control← 10
2 Loss← DuctLength ∗ Control
3 Set ZonePressure to []
4 for i← 0 to len(ZoneSupplyAirV olume) do
5 if ZoneDamperPercent[i] == 100 then
6 ZonePressure[i]← ZonePressureDamper100[i]− Loss
7 else if ZoneDamperPercent[i] == 50 then
8 ZonePressure[i]← ZonePressureDamper50[i]− Loss
9 else if ZoneDamperPercent[i] == 10 then
10 ZonePressure[i]← ZonePressureDamper10[i]− Loss
11 end
12 return ZonePressure
set to 700RPM, the seed fan static pressure was set to 500 Pa.
RPM2 = RPM1(
Q2
Q1
)
where
RPM2 = Next fan speed in Revolutions Per Minute
RPM1 = Current fan speed in Revolutions Per Minute
Q2 = Next volumetric air flow in M
3/s
Q1 = Current volumetric air flow in M
3/s
(Equation 4.19)
SP2 = SP1(
RPM2
RPM1
)2
where
SP2 = The pressure at air flow reading Q2 in Pascals
SP1 = The pressure at air flow reading Q1 in Pascals
RPM2 = Next fan speed in Revolutions Per Minute
RPM1 = Current fan speed in Revolutions Per Minute
(Equation 4.20)
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4.6.6.6 Air flow
For this research, air flow is assumed to be turbulent flow, thus with a constant velocity per unit
time, inline with the assumptions posited by ASHRAE (2012a). Air flow is sensed at five points
in the system scenario, namely, the intake air flow, supply air flow, zone air flows and return air
flow. For each air flow, the supply air mass flow is calculated, using Equation 4.21. From the mass
flow, the volumetric flow is calculated using Equation 4.22. The supply air flow is the sum of both
air flows entering the zone. Similarly, the return air flow is the sum of the zone air flows leaving
the zone. The Intake air flow volume is generated based on the percentage of external air flowing
into the system, defined by the damper percentage. Thus, when the Temperature is cooler outside,
more air is pulled into the system due to the damper control functions. As air flow before and after
the fan must be equal, the Intake air flow is generated using Equation 4.23.
m =
H
cp∆(Tr − Ts)
where
m = The mass flow rate in kg/s
H = The sensible heat gain in kW
cp = Specific heat of air 1.005kJ/kgC
Tr = Room temperature in Degrees C
Ts = Supply temperature in Degrees C
(Equation 4.21)
V =
m
ρ
where
V = Volume flow rate in m3/s
m = The mass flow rate in kg/s
ρ = Density of air 1.205kg/m3
(Equation 4.22)
Qi = Ip(Qt)
where
Qi = Intake air flow in M
3/s
Ip = Intake damper percentage
Qt = Total system air flow in M
3/s
(Equation 4.23)
There are three different internal points at which temperature is recorded in the ventilation
system, defined as; Pre-coil, Post-coil, and Return-vent. The Pre-coil temperature is a mix of
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the return temperature and the temperature of the external fresh air. The percentage of air mix
is determined by the Intake and Recycle dampers detailed in §4.6.6.3. The temperature value
generated determines the cooling valve uptime for supply air cooling, detailed in Equation 4.24.
MAt =
(OAtOAP t) + (RAt(100−OAPt))
100
where
MAt = Mixed Air temperature in degrees Celsius at time t
OAt = Outside air temperature in degrees Celsius at time t
OAP t = Percentage of outside air at time t
RAt = Return air temperature in degrees Celsius at time t
(Equation 4.24)
The Post-coil temperature is the reading generated from the Pre-coil temperature passing across
the cooling and heating coils to reach a setpoint temperature, which is then supplied to the zones.
In Australia, the recommended supply temperature is 12-13 Degrees C (AIRAH, 2015b), as such,
a constant value of 13 Degrees C is used as the Post-coil temperature.
The Return-vent temperature is generated using the mixed air temperature Equation 4.24. The
air flow supplied to the zone is equal to the air flow exiting the zone into the return duct. As such,
the total amount of return air is the sum of the Office zone and Lab zone supply air. The percentage
of Office return and Lab return airs are calculated, and used in Equation 4.24 to generate the return
air temperature.
4.6.6.7 Valves
There are two valves with attached actuators in the scenario, controlling the heating coil valve and
cooling coil valve respectively. For the summer profile in this scenario, the heating coil is always
fully closed, thus the valve percentage is a constant value of 0%. The cooling coil is calculated
using a number of equations. First, the mass flow rate of the coolant in the pipe is calculated, see
Equation 4.25. Second, the sensible cooling of the chiller is calculated. As per ASHRAE (2009),
with the assumption that no heat is lost through the pipe, the calculation for the sensible cooling
of the chiller is equal to the heat removed from the air, and the heat absorbed by the coolant flow.
This value is calculated using Equation 4.26 taken from ASHRAE (2009)[p23.7 e2a, e2b]. Next, the
coolant output temperature is calculated using Equation 4.27, which also results in the maximum
heat absorbed by the coolant. Finally, the maximum heat absorbed is taken as a constant, solving
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Equation 4.28 to determine the valve percentage for the cooling coil valve.
m˙ = ρV A
where
m˙ = Mass flow rate in kg/s
ρ = Density of water in kg/m3
V = Velocity of water inside pipe in l/s
A = Cross-sectional area of pipe in m2
(Equation 4.25)
Q = 1000Wacp∆T
where
Q = Cooling capacity in W
Wa = 60ρAaVa
cp = Specific heat of air in kJ/kg
∆T = Intake Air Temperature - Output Air Temperature
ρ = Density of Air in kg/m3
Aa = Coil Face in m
2
Va =
mair
Aa
in kg/s
(Equation 4.26)
Co = Ci +
Q
1000m˙cr
where
Co = Coolant Output in Degrees C
Ci = Coolant Intput in Degrees C
m˙ = Mass flow rate in kg/s
cr = Specific heat of water in Degrees C
(Equation 4.27)
V P t =
∆T
−C
where
V P t = Valve percentage at Time t
∆T = Co − Ci Air Temperature in Degrees C
− C = Q
1000m˙cr
in Degrees C
(Equation 4.28)
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4.6.7 Device level simulation
For simulating a BACnetwork, appropriate digital representation of each device is required. In
addition to the devices which generate values, described in §4.6.6, a controller device is required
which controls and monitors the damper actuators operating in the air handling unit (AHU), in
addition to a human machine interface (HMI) device to view trends in the system. The BACnet
standard defines six device profiles in Annex L (SSPC-135, 2012), which defines the minimum set
of tasks a device must perform to be classed as a specific type of device. Analysis of the required
devices for the simulation reveal five types of profiles in use, detailed in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16: Simulation devices classified via device profile
Device Device Profile
AHU Controller Advanced Application Specific Controller
Zone1 Thermostat Application Specific Controller
Zone2 Thermostat Application Specific Controller
HMI Advanced Operator Workstation
Zone1 VAV box Smart Actuator
Zone2 VAV box Smart Actuator
Supply Fan Smart Actuator
Return Fan Smart Actuator
Recycle Damper Actuator Smart Actuator
Exhaust Damper Actuator Smart Actuator
Supply Damper Actuator Smart Actuator
Cooling Valve Actuator Smart Actuator
Heating Valve Actuator Smart Actuator
Temperature Sensor (External) Smart Sensor
Temperature Sensor (Pre-Coil) Smart Sensor
Temperature Sensor (Return Air) Smart Sensor
Supply Flow Sensor Smart Sensor
Return Flow Sensor Smart Sensor
Intake Flow Sensor Smart Sensor
Pre-Coil Pressure Sensor Smart Sensor
To define the devices, the analysis of extracted profiles undertaken in §4.6.7.1 was used to
construct a generic device type for each profile. Each device incorporates the most prominent
objects and services implemented.
4.6.7.1 Device profile extraction
Due to the object-based approach to constructing BACnet devices, each vendor implementation
can differ for devices of the same type. As such, the task of defining a generic device is complicated,
given there are over 1,000 registered BACnet vendors. In order for a BACnet device to be sold
compliance testing is undertaken with a resulting Protocol Implementation Compliance Statement
(PICS) generated for each device. The PICS details the device profile, supported network services,
objects and properties of the device, differentiating between required and optional. In addition,
the BACnet testing and compliance process generates a product listing, which also contains the
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PICS data. ASHRAE provides a wide range of vendors PICs, and subsequent product listings
BTL (2018). ASHRAE/BACnet international provides a standard template for generating a PICS,
however from analysis of the retrieved files, and confirmation via Esquivel-Vargas et al. (2017),
the variance in template is not restricted between vendors. Rather, the same vendor may have
multiple representations of a PICS between different devices. The common datatype between all
PICS was the file format of Portable Document Format (PDF). Thus, to extract the PICS data
in a programmatic form, the approach outlined in Esquivel-Vargas et al. (2017) was investigated,
namely, transformation of a PDF into a data structure which can be manipulated using string
comparison algorithms. After analysis of the data extraction processes for PICS, the product
listings were investigated which contain the same information on devices as the vendor generated
PICS, however, the product listings are in a more structured format. The product listing PDFs used
tables to represent the core information about each device, thus the PDFs were converted to html
format to utilise tags and manipulation libraries such as Python’s Beautiful Soup. The template
for data extraction was derived from the product listing, allowing for extraction of PICS data in a
structured way. A total of 389 product listings were retrieved for five device profiles, namely, smart
sensor, smart actuator, application specific controller, advanced application specific controller and
operator workstation. The location of the objects table is dependent on the number of services
the device offers, as each class of service is detailed in a separate table. As such, a template was
defined for each type of device profile. Following the process in Figure 4.17, 389 files were directly
converted to html using Adobe Reader Pro DC 2018 (Adobe, 2018). Of these files, 365 extracted
correctly using the defined template, and data extraction process. Data extraction was undertaken
with the Python library Beautifulsoup4, regular expressions and the Aho-Corasick algorithm for
string matching. Verification of extraction was undertaken using further regular expressions and
the Python package pandas. The files which did not extract according the template were due to a
range of discrepancies in the data, from required objects missing in the object table, to incorrect
table structures. Therefore, the 24 files were discarded. The objects in use by these device types
are detailed in Table 4.17.
Services were matched to devices based on the BIBB classifications, see Table 4.18. 13 non-
standard defined BIBBs were encountered. In some product listings, where a BIBB by definition did
not have corresponding client and server functionality, the client and server BIBB classifier, A and B
respectively were omitted, resulting in further classification of seven BIBBs. Two BIBBS contained
in one device listing erroneously listed the class of the BIBB, DS-TS-B/DS-UTC-B rather than
DM-TS-B/DM-UTC-B respectively, as such those values were updated accordingly. The remaining
four BIBBs contained the characters T-XXX-XXX, whose meaning could infer all BIBBS of the T
class, a placeholder which was not finalised, or a misprint. As such, these four BIBB types were not
converted to service functions. With the types of objects used in real devices defined, the objects,
properties and services used by these identified devices were then used to construct BACnet devices
for the simulation. From the derived profiles, the objects and services implemented in the BACnet
open stack were identified. All objects used in the Actuator, Controller, Sensor and Workstation
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Figure 4.17: Process diagram of BACnet device product listing statement data
extraction and transformation
are implemented. However, five objects from the Advanced Controller profile, namely, Notification
class, Calendar, Program, Loop and Event enrolment were not implemented, and thus omitted.
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Table 4.17: Object occurrence in device profiles retrieved from device product
listing statements
Objects Sensor Controller Actuator Advance
Control-
ler
Work station Sensor
Percent
Controller
Percent
Actuator
Percent
Advance
Con-
troller
Percent
Work sta-
tion Per-
cent
accumulator 3 2 4 3 0 21.43 0.78 23.53 5.56 0.00
alert-enrollment 0 4 0 2 0 0.00 1.56 0.00 3.70 0.00
analog-input 13 223 14 49 4 92.86 87.11 82.35 90.74 16.67
analog-output 2 133 10 44 4 14.29 51.95 58.82 81.48 16.67
analog-value 6 224 11 54 5 42.86 87.50 64.71 100.00 20.83
averaging 0 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
binary-input 5 195 12 45 4 35.71 76.17 70.59 83.33 16.67
binary-output 3 144 10 44 4 21.43 56.25 58.82 81.48 16.67
binary-value 3 194 11 52 5 21.43 75.78 64.71 96.30 20.83
bitstring-value 0 5 2 0 0 0.00 1.95 11.76 0.00 0.00
calendar 0 14 0 54 4 0.00 5.47 0.00 100.00 16.67
characterstring-value 0 2 0 1 0 0.00 0.78 0.00 1.85 0.00
command 0 5 0 3 0 0.00 1.95 0.00 5.56 0.00
date-value 0 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
device 14 256 17 54 24 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
event-enrollment 0 7 0 15 4 0.00 2.73 0.00 27.78 16.67
event-log 0 5 0 8 0 0.00 1.95 0.00 14.81 0.00
file 0 47 3 32 6 0.00 18.36 17.65 59.26 25.00
group 0 19 0 0 0 0.00 7.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
integer-value 0 2 0 3 0 0.00 0.78 0.00 5.56 0.00
loop 0 19 0 16 4 0.00 7.42 0.00 29.63 16.67
multi-state-input 0 62 2 22 2 0.00 24.22 11.76 40.74 8.33
multi-state-output 0 50 2 18 3 0.00 19.53 11.76 33.33 12.50
multi-state-value 3 119 6 45 4 21.43 46.48 35.29 83.33 16.67
notification-class 1 40 0 54 4 7.14 15.63 0.00 100.00 16.67
octetstring-value 0 3 0 0 0 0.00 1.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
positive-integer-value 0 9 0 5 0 0.00 3.52 0.00 9.26 0.00
program 0 29 0 19 2 0.00 11.33 0.00 35.19 8.33
schedule 0 23 1 54 4 0.00 8.98 5.88 100.00 16.67
structured-view 0 6 0 2 0 0.00 2.34 0.00 3.70 0.00
trend-log 0 16 0 29 4 0.00 6.25 0.00 53.70 16.67
trend-log-multiple 0 1 0 2 1 0.00 0.39 0.00 3.70 4.17
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Table 4.18: BIBBs and occurrences extracted from selected product listings
BIBBS Sensor Controller Actuator Advanced
Controller
Work sta-
tion
Sensor
Percent
Controller
Percent
Actuator
Percent
Advance
Controller
Percent
Work sta-
tion Per-
cent
AE-ACK-A 0 0 0 3 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 100.00
AE-ACK-B 1 30 0 54 4 7.14 11.72 0.00 100.00 16.67
AE-AS-A 0 0 0 0 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
AE-AVM-A 0 0 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.17
AE-AVN-A 0 0 0 0 11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.83
AE-EL-I 0 5 0 8 0 0.00 1.95 0.00 14.81 0.00
AE-ELV-A 0 0 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.17
AE-N-A 0 0 0 1 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.85 100.00
AE-N-E 0 0 0 4 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.41 8.33
AE-N-I 1 37 0 54 4 7.14 14.45 0.00 100.00 16.67
AE-VM-A 0 0 0 0 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
AE-VN-A 0 0 0 0 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
DM-ADM-A 0 0 0 0 19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 79.17
DM-ANM-A 0 0 0 0 17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 70.83
DM-ATS-A 0 0 0 4 11 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.41 45.83
DM-BR-A 0 0 0 0 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00
DM-BR-B 0 17 0 22 4 0.00 6.64 0.00 40.74 16.67
DM-DCC-A 0 0 0 0 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.17
DM-DCC-B 4 256 5 54 13 28.57 100.00 29.41 100.00 54.17
DM-DDB-A 1 62 0 52 24 7.14 24.22 0.00 96.30 100.00
DM-DDB-B 12 256 17 54 24 85.71 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
DM-DOB-A 0 4 0 14 9 0.00 1.56 0.00 25.93 37.50
DM-DOB-B 12 256 16 53 24 85.71 100.00 94.12 98.15 100.00
DM-LM-A 0 0 0 0 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00
DM-LM-B 0 29 3 24 13 0.00 11.33 17.65 44.44 54.17
DM-MTS-A 0 0 0 1 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.85 100.00
DM-OCD-A 0 0 0 0 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67
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continuation of Table 4.18
BIBBS Sensor Controller Actuator Advanced
Controller
Work sta-
tion
Sensor
Percent
Controller
Percent
Actuator
Percent
Advance
Controller
Percent
Work sta-
tion Per-
cent
DM-OCD-B 0 6 0 10 5 0.00 2.34 0.00 18.52 20.83
DM-R-B 0 20 3 14 3 0.00 7.81 17.65 25.93 12.50
DM-RD-A 0 0 0 0 9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.50
DM-RD-B 5 137 5 52 11 35.71 53.52 29.41 96.30 45.83
DM-TS-A 0 2 1 3 18 0.00 0.78 5.88 5.56 75.00
DM-TS-B 3 121 7 54 11 21.43 47.27 41.18 100.00 45.83
DM-UTC-A 0 0 0 3 17 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 70.83
DM-UTC-B 0 61 6 45 12 0.00 23.83 35.29 83.33 50.00
DS-AM-A 0 0 0 0 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50
DS-AV-A 0 0 0 0 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67
DS-COV-A 0 18 0 15 17 0.00 7.03 0.00 27.78 70.83
DS-COV-B 3 110 11 43 4 21.43 42.97 64.71 79.63 16.67
DS-M-A 0 0 0 0 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
DS-RMP-B 0 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
DS-RP-A 0 36 0 28 24 0.00 14.06 0.00 51.85 100.00
DS-RP-B 14 256 17 54 24 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
DS-RPM-A 0 8 0 14 24 0.00 3.13 0.00 25.93 100.00
DS-RPM-B 11 211 14 54 15 78.57 82.42 82.35 100.00 62.50
DS-TS-B 0 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
DS-UTC-B 0 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
DS-V-A 0 0 0 0 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
DS-WP-A 0 35 0 30 24 0.00 13.67 0.00 55.56 100.00
DS-WP-B 14 256 17 54 16 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 66.67
DS-WPM-A 0 8 0 8 24 0.00 3.13 0.00 14.81 100.00
DS-WPM-B 1 126 5 54 13 7.14 49.22 29.41 100.00 54.17
NM-RC-B 0 2 0 0 0 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
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continuation of Table 4.18
BIBBS Sensor Controller Actuator Advanced
Controller
Work sta-
tion
Sensor
Percent
Controller
Percent
Actuator
Percent
Advance
Controller
Percent
Work sta-
tion Per-
cent
SCHED-
AVM-A
0 0 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.17
SCHED-E-B 0 0 0 16 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.63 16.67
SCHED-I-B 0 10 0 50 4 0.00 3.91 0.00 92.59 16.67
SCHED-R-B 0 4 0 0 0 0.00 1.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
SCHED-
VM-A
0 0 0 0 24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
SCHED-
WS-A
0 0 0 0 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33
SCHED-
WS-I
0 6 1 0 0 0.00 2.34 5.88 0.00 0.00
T-A-A 0 0 0 0 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.33
T-ATR-A 0 0 0 0 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 54.17
T-ATR-B 0 10 0 26 4 0.00 3.91 0.00 48.15 16.67
T-AVM-A 0 0 0 0 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50
T-V-A 0 0 0 0 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 95.83
T-VMT-A 0 0 0 0 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00
T-VMT-E 0 0 0 3 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 16.67
T-VMT-I 0 16 0 29 4 0.00 6.25 0.00 53.70 16.67
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4.6.8 Network level simulation
Historically, the network level of a BAS requires gateway devices to translate between protocols
to allow networking access between devices. Typically, a network controller connects multiple
application controllers together, which in turn are connected to a range of underlying sensors and
actuators. Protocol convertors and broadcast forwarders sit in between controllers and field devices,
or are embedded into the controllers. With a full BACnet/IP network, the topology can follow a
more traditional IP-based network. The network topology is considerably flat, with related sensors,
actuators and controllers all located within one subnetwork. Each air handling unit can be split
into separate subnetworks with BACnet-routers used for cross-subnet broadcasts, or, depending on
the size, the full system can be in one subnet. For this simulation, the entire building’s BAS is in
a single subnetwork. For network capture, all traffic is port forwarded to a capture port, where
Dumpcap (Combs, 2017) is used to capture the traffic. An external network connection exists to a
physical switch, whereby a deployment management system, and the external attacker device are
located. Further attacker information is defined in Section 4.6.9.
The BACnet devices and network traffic are defined using the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017),
where the profiles described in section 4.6.7 were used to construct the devices which are deployed
into lightweight Ubuntu virtual machines. Using the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017) allowed
the simulation to be defined in software, rather than being restricted based on the specific vendor
hardware controllers in use, providing a more generic simulation.
While the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017) is the most complete of any identified open source
BACnet stack, it is described as a baseline system, with the requirement of customising the BACnet
open stack to implement into a device. A number of core functions were required to be implemen-
ted into the BACnet open stack to represent the behaviour of the devices for this scenario. These
included a method of handling CoV requests, identified in Johnstone et al. (2015) as being in-
complete, and ensuring each device was represented appropriately. The BACnet open stack was
amended in the following ways to be used in this scenario.
1. The CoV handler function for analog input values was defined in the analog input object
definition, by default, only the CoV handler for binary input values was defined.
2. The present value for analog outputs had a range restriction from 0.0 to 100.0, this was
removed to allow fan speeds in RPM defined in the scenario to be held in analog output
objects.
3. To allow for controller devices to subscribe to other devices, the confirmed CoV subscription
code was implemented into the device code.
The behaviour of the devices are defined based on best practices (‘Best Practices in HVAC
Controls’, 2012) and analysis revealed by the real data analysis undertaken in §5.2.1. Each air
handling unit controller manages a range of sensors and actuators. Namely, each air handling unit
polls each duct sensor for its analog input. The analog outputs are used to control the actuators
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and fans. The values of the analog outputs are calculated based on the input values from the
sensors using the control logic defined in §4.6.6. Each thermostat controls an associated VAV box
in its zone, where it reads the values of the pressure sensor and flow sensor, and uses the analog
output control to position the damper actuator in the VAV box. The communication paths are
further detailed in Figure 4.18.
Drawn from the analysis of the real captured data from the university network, the choice of
controller impacts heavily on the BACnet commands traversing the network, particularly Write
property commands. Vendors can implement proprietary middleware network protocols, which
encapsulate BACnet commands. These commands are often classed as commandable properties,
such as write commands. As the real network data captured relies on a closed source middleware
BACnet layer for Write property commands, it is unclear what real network behaviour would entail
for write commands. Thus the assumption is made that write commands to output values, whose
values command physical changes in systems do occur; while write commands to input values do
not occur given they are used to hold sensor reading values. This assumption aligns with the
default behaviour of the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017), and was implemented as the normal
behaviour for the simulation scenario. Given the discrepancies between the simulation data, which
contains write commands in native BACnet, and the real dataset, which uses a proprietary protocol
to encapsulate the majority of BACnet write commands, the simulation data which involves write
commands has been omitted for statistical comparisons between the datasets.
Internally, for the simulation to operate the controllers need to make decisions based on the
data it holds on each sensor it manages. The logic of each device is defined in §4.6.6. The data read
from each sensor is stored in a corresponding input object, which informs the value to be written
to actuators from the output objects in the controller. For the simulation, this internal process
is undertaken through reading datapoints into the object after receiving the current value from
the sensor. This is dependent on timing, as the data is read in every second based on the values
generated, while the polling occurs at intervals. The polling interval is different for each vendor and
implementation. For example, Shepard (2013) details a one second minimum polling interval, while
Thn (2017) defaults its polling interval at two seconds. The real traffic analysis identified a polling
interval of eight seconds on setpoint values. Polling is synchronous, the device polls one object
then the next in a list. If the network bandwidth is limited, or there are a large number of polls,
the network would constantly be polling for values. For this simulation, the values being polled are
not static setpoints, rather, sensor values. Additionally, there are three controllers polling seven
sensors and two thermostats each, six thermostats polling six VAV boxes, and the logger device
polling every device in the network every 15 minutes. As such, an interval of 10 seconds between
polls was selected, to reduce the network bandwidth consumed if the minimum polling time was
set, and to ensure polling is not a continuous action in the network. Revealed through analysis of
the real network traffic detailed in §5.2.1, each object subscription has a subscription duration of
five hours, with re-subscriptions occurring every 20 minutes. This behaviour was replicated in the
simulation scenario.
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Some BACnet systems implement a logging device, which retrieves values from other devices in
the network for long term storage, either in a database or flat file. This type of logging often relies
on the trendlog object being implemented in a device. As noted from the analysis of Internet-facing
devices in §4.2, only supervisory/control devices typically implement trendlog objects. Alternat-
ively, a logging device could use normal polling via the Read property or Read property multiple
service to retrieve values from sensors and actuators, in addition to controllers. The polling ap-
proach was undertaken for the simulation scenario, whereby a logging device polled the present
value property in each object in each device every 15 minutes.
The simulation was run on a VMware ESXI 6.0 Server, which had 32GB of RAM and an AMD
3GHz 8 core processor, totalling 24GHz processing power for the virtual machines housed on the
server. The normal simulation consisted of 59 virtual machines running for 31 days. There were
seven classes of virtual machine, six for the types of devices running in the simulator, and one type
for capturing the network traffic. The simulation consisted of 21 actuator devices, 21 sensor devices,
3 controllers, 6 thermostats, 6 VAV boxes, 1 workstation and 1 logging device. The specifications
for each device type are detailed in §3.7, Table 3.10. The average load of the ESXi Host CPU
per virtual machine was 200 MHz, the average load of the ESXi Host memory per virtual machine
was 150 MB for sensors, and 400MB for controllers and thermostats. With a baseline defined and
used to generate network traffic classed as normal, an attack framework was developed to generate
malicious traffic for this scenario.
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4.6.9 Attack implementation
To generate malicious traffic for the purpose of testing intrusion detection methods, a range of
attacks were required to be implemented. Analysis of the attacks identified in §4.3, reveals which
attacks have previously been used in the literature to identify malicious activity. Of the 26 identified
known attacks, 8 have previously been used for testing anomaly detection methods. Many of the
identified attacks utilise application and network layer messages regarding BACnet routers. The
scenario testbed implemented does not implement BACnet routers, additionally, from the real
data collection, it was identified that router related commands are very rare, outlined further in
Table 5.3. Therefore, the 10 router based attacks are excluded from testing. Additionally, attacks
using malformed packets were discounted as the aim of the research is to identify normal packets
causing malicious actions. Further, the services create object and delete object are not implemented
services in the open BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017), used for the simulation testbed. Expansion of
these features was deemed out of scope for the research given the existence of more frequently used
services which could be deemed malicious, and thus two additional attacks were not investigated.
Finally, source manipulation for the Smurf attack identified was deemed very similar to a spoofing
attack using an I-am command, and thus exists as part of the I-am spoof attack. The remaining
identified attacks from §4.3, in addition to the priority array overwrite identified in §4.3.1 were used
to form the attack framework.
Some commands can have multiple potential behaviours. For example, a reconnaissance attack
using the Who-is command could request all devices at once, or each device individually with
pauses between requests. Therefore, behaviours for each attack were classified based on frequency
as outlined in Table 4.19.
As defined by the device profiles, only certain devices can initiate services by default. Specific-
ally, the majority of sensor and actuator devices analysed do not permit initiating commands which
cause action in other devices. The limited functionality of sensor devices reduces the risk they pose
to other devices in the network, however, it cannot be overstated that the device profiles outline
the minimum functionality defined for classification as the device type. Nothing prevents vendors
from implementing additional services into their devices (Distech, 2010). However, noted through
the analysis of Internet-accessible devices in §4.6.7.1, the number of sensors and actuators who can
initiate commands is low.
For the scenario in this research, there are three malicious devices in the network which all have
different capabilities due to their device classification.
1. One external device, which has not previously interacted with the system, and can undertake
reconnaissance and Denial of Service attacks.
2. One internal sensor, which has limited capabilities, but can undertake some reconnaissance
and flooding attacks.
3. One internal controller, which has initiate capabilities and thus can perform all classes of
attack.
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The internal devices continue to operate as normal, with sporadic malicious normal commands
occurring. To counter potential self bias, attacks are pseudo-randomly selected by the adversary
device prior to commencement. A random value is drawn form the Python random module and
set as the random seed for further random module calls for each attack instance. Each instance
of each command has a random seed generated for drawing from a range of random sleep times,
making the time between each malicious yet normal packet have no immediately similar pattern.
Further, the order in which properties are read by the attack code is also shuffled, to remove bias
from implementation. All seed values are recorded for future repeatability. Generating the attack
traffic dataset consisted of repeating the first week of the defined scenario with the addition of the
randomised malicious actions occurring.
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Table 4.19: Attack framework for simulation scenario, outlining attacks, ad-
versary launch point and network target
Type Class Command/Property Detail Adversary
Device
Target
Device
Anomaly Class
Frequency Flood Who-is - Controller,
Sensor
Network Known-Unknown
Frequency Flood I-am - Sensor Network Known-Unknown
Frequency Denial of Service I-am Smurf Attack Sensor Controller Known-Known
Frequency Reconnaissance Who-is Un-Restricted Who-is External,
Sensor
All Known-Unknown
Frequency Reconnaissance Who-has - External All Known-Known
Frequency Reconnaissance Read property multiple - Controller All Known-Known
Frequency Write Write property In Bounds Controller Actuator Known-Unknown
Frequency Write Write property Out of Bounds Controller Actuator Known-Known
Non-Frequency Denial of Service Subscribed Change of Value CoV Disconnect Controller Thermostat Unknown-Unknown
Non-Frequency Denial of Service Reinitialize device - External Controller,
Actuator
Known-Known
Non-Frequency Reconnaissance Who-is Individual Devices Controller,
Sensor
All Unknown-Unknown
Non-Frequency Reconnaissance Read property Individual Properties Controller All Unknown-Unknown
Non-Frequency Spoofing I-am - Sensor Controller Known-Unknown
Non-Frequency Write Write property Priority Array Controller Actuator Unknown-Unknown
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4.6.9.1 Flooding attack
The flooding attack class consists of repetitively sending a command across the network with the
aim of slowing traffic and/or preventing devices from operating correctly. In BACnet, any service
could be used for this purpose, however, for this scenario the I-am and Who-is services are selected.
The I-am service is used to answer unconfirmed broadcast messages from other BACnet devices
when queried for a device identifier from the Who-is service. As there is no authentication for
the I-am function, any device can claim to be any number of other device identifiers. Similarly,
the Who-is attack sends a wide range of device identifiers over the network, where legitimate
devices can then respond causing more traffic. The flooding attacks loop through a range of device
identifiers, requesting for each identifier, with the aim to disrupt the network. For the purpose of
this simulation, these attacks occur pseudo-randomly for a variable range of time.
4.6.9.2 Spoofing attack
For a more targeted attack, the I-am command is used to trick specific BACnet devices into sending
unintended traffic towards it. For this attack scenario, a specific device is selected to spoof, when
activated, the device claims to be a different device to cause traffic to be sent to itself. A potential
issue with the spoofing attacks is preventing the real device from sending back an I-am and the
interaction of two devices claiming a single device ID. It was expected that this behaviour will
be vendor device specific, as the BACnet standard claims no handling of misconfigured devices
(SSPC-135, 2012). For the BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017), if a device identifier was saved in
the address cache of the device, claiming to be a device did not change which device was sent the
message. If the device had no address cache, the first device to claim a device identifier was sent
the message.
4.6.9.3 Write attack
Three write attack class scenarios were defined for the framework. First, with in-bounds value sent
repeatedly to a specific device, similar to the attack undertaken in §4.4.1. Second, an out-of-bounds
write attack, where the values are not what should be expected by the device. To determine the
behaviour of the device defined in the simulation, a range of values were selected for writing to each
object in various data formats. One each of a control character, negative value, string value and
long integer were sent to the present value property of each object type operating in the simulation.
The BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017) provides error handling and range limits for some objects.
In total, 224 out-of-bounds command combinations were constructed, using the four data inputs,
seven object types and eight data type tags. Each command was sent to the default server device
in the BACnet open stack for testing (Karg, 2017). 24 out of bounds values were accepted by the
stack with varying changes to the input stored in the object, see Table 4.20. 22 of the commands
resulted in a null or zero value writing into the present value property of the object, regardless of
the input. One command written to the Analog value object was written directly, while another was
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incorrectly written due to a float precision error. Finally, the priority array write attack identified
in §4.3.1 and discussed in §4.3.2 was implemented.
Table 4.20: Results from out-of-bounds values sent to specific objects
Object Type Data Type Tag Value to Write Value sent
Analog Output 0 (Null) \x03 NULL
Analog Output 4 (Real) \x03 0
Analog Output 0 (Null) -1 NULL
Analog Output 0 (Null) a NULL
Analog Output 4 (Real) a 0
Analog Output 0 (Null) 9999999999999999-
9999999999999999
NULL
Analog Value 4 (Real) \x03 0
Analog Value 4 (Real) -1 -1
Analog Value 4 (Real) a 0
Analog Value 4 (Real) 9999999999999999-
9999999999999999
10000000331813535-
1409612647563264
Binary Input 9 (Enumerated) \x03 0
Binary Input 9 (Enumerated) a 0
Binary Output 0 (Null) \x03 NULL
Binary Output 9 (Enumerated) \x03 0
Binary Output 0 (Null) -1 NULL
Binary Output 0 (Null) a NULL
Binary Output 9 (Enumerated) a 0
Binary Output 0 (Null) 9999999999999999-
9999999999999999
NULL
Binary Value 0 (Null) \x03 NULL
Binary Value 9 (Enumerated) \x03 0
Binary Value 0 (Null) -1 NULL
Binary Value 0 (Null) a NULL
Binary Value 9 (Enumerated) a 0
Binary Value 0 (Null) 9999999999999999-
9999999999999999
NULL
4.6.9.4 Reconnaissance
An adversaries goal of reconnaissance can be achieved through a range of commonly operating
services. To determine which devices are operating on the network, five different scenarios were
constructed. The Who-is command was used without a limiting device range, with the aim of
requesting every device in the network to respond. Similarly, the Who-has command was used
to request a range of object identifiers, whereby devices which hold the specific object identifier
would respond. The Who-has is the object equivalent of the Who-is command, where a broadcast
is sent to request either object names or object IDs. Any device which has a request object name
or object ID will broadcast a response. For the purpose of this simulation, the range of object
identifiers to enumerate is restricted, as undertaking a full linear search of all device identifiers
and object identifiers in the simulation network would result in 13,363,049,358 requests. The range
is restricted to eight object types, and six object identifier numbers, resulting in 2,736 requests.
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The last frequency based reconnaissance command used was the Read property multiple command,
which reads all properties from a device in the network in one transaction.
The network typically requests specific device addresses using Who-is, as such a non-frequency
based command behaviour was defined which requested a range of existing device identifiers in a
random order, with different timing between each request. The same approach was taken with the
Read property command, where only existing properties are read from a device.
4.6.9.5 Denial of Service
A device can be denied service through sending a ReinitializeDevice service, which essentially
restarts a device. ReinitializeDevice is typically undertaken by a human operator through a work-
station machine, and it is recommended to be a password protected action. For this scenario, it
is an assumption that this password has been obtained by the adversary for the ReinitializeDevice
to occur. Given the lack of default encryption on BACnetworks, any device which is listening on
the network could easily capture the password when a legitimate ReinitializeDevice command is
used, as the password would be travelling unencrypted over the network. Given the sensitivity of
this service, alerts should be generated whenever this command is executed, making it far easier
to find than the other services, as it is a service that is only used in specific situations executed by
a human operator, and is thus uncommon. The BACnet open stack (Karg, 2017) implementation
of ReinitializeDevice does not restart the device, but provides the correct network transaction over
the network. This allows for the network action to be demonstrated, but not impact the device,
providing a means to capture this class of network attack without a long-term effect on the sim-
ulation environment. The last class of attack tested was the CoV subscription theoretical attack,
initially tested in Johnstone et al. (2015), and further modelled in Peacock et al. (2018). The
extended scenario discussed in Peacock et al. (2018) was undertaken, whereby multiple devices are
subscribed to the attacker devices target, to determine if a delay in CoV notifications to other
hosts occurs.
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4.7 Chapter summary
This chapter detailed phases one, two, and three of the research design as described in §3.5, with the
aim of understanding and identifying issues in the BACnet/IP protocol. First, the BACnet standard
was reviewed, identifying commands which could be used for malicious means. Next, device details
from three years of network scans were retrieved from Censys (Censys, 2018), and analysed for
device types, and profiles. Following, known attacks from the literature were retrieved, coupled
with the identified potential attacks, and formed into a threat model using the STRIDE threat
matrix. The threat model was then applied to a controller device, to identify which commands
used in each attack posed the largest threat to controller devices. The identified commands were
then compared to the device profiles extracted from the network scans to summarise the potential
risk posed to open BACnet devices. The section concludes with modelling and implementation
testing of the Priority Array overwrite attack.
Next, a range of BACnet/IP simulators were identified and tested for configurability to im-
plement a range of scenarios for data generation. To test each simulator, two datasets (trial and
theory-test) were generated using basic scenarios and some malicious traffic. The Trial Dataset was
used to evaluate if a machine learning algorithm could detect BACnet specific network attacks. A
back-propagation Artificial Neural Network was tested against a frequency based Write property
attack, with 100% detection rate. Further, a flow analysis method using command frequencies was
tested, with positive visual identification of the attack occurrences. The Theory Test Dataset was
generated to assess further simulators, and implement the theoretical CoV attack identified. The
results were positive, but required a larger dataset for further testing.
With the requirement for more data identified, data was collected from a real BACnetwork,
to understand generally how network controllers communicate. Further, a larger testbed for data
generation was designed and implemented, using a defined simulation scenario, algorithms to gen-
erate data, and a BACnet/IP network topology. Finally, an Attack Framework was defined from
the applicable attacks identified in §4.3. The Attack Framework was then generated and tested,
before being implemented into the testbed scenario for malicious traffic generation.
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Chapter 5
Results
This chapter describes the application of a range of defined experiments undertaken against the
three major datasets, denoted as the Real Normal, Synthetic Normal and Synthetic Attack sets.
First, a generic preprocessing method is discussed for the network capture files used. Next, a
range of unsupervised methods were used to explore the structure of the Real Normal Dataset,
including community detection, a comparison of clustering approaches, and time series analysis.
Then, the results of the unsupervised methods applied to the Synthetic Normal Dataset, along
with a discussion comparing the two Normal Datasets are presented. Following, the unsupervised
methods were applied to the Synthetic Attack Dataset, with comparisons between the Synthetic
datasets drawn to highlight the differences between normal and malicious network traffic in the
simulation. With the differences stated, the results of building, training and testing a range of
Hidden Markov Models defined using ten equally-sized samples drawn from the Synthetic Normal
Dataset for training, and a shared testing sample from the Synthetic Attack dataset are elaborated
upon. Finally, a comparison of evaluation metrics for the six Hidden Markov Model approaches
are presented using six hosts as examples.
5.1 Preprocessing
Preprocessing was undertaken for each dataset to present the data in the necessary format for each
experiment. The raw data for each dataset consisted of multiple pcapng network capture files,
which contained both BACnet and other network protocol traffic. Each pcapng file was filtered and
split into files containing only BACnet traffic, and finally merged into a single file using Tshark.
The Wireshark native BACnet statistics plugin was then used via Tshark to output frequency
values at a service level. Further manipulation was undertaken using sed, before being loaded
into a Python Pandas dataframe for application of each method. For the real network dataset, IP
address anonymisation was undertaken using pycryptopan 0.01 a Python implementation of the
Crypto-PAn algorithm, a prefix-preserving anonymisation tool (Bauer, 2012). For each dataset,
flow records were generated using the CERT NetSA Security Suite utility YAF (Yet Another Flow
meter) (Trammell, 2018), into IPFIX format flows. Further, the bounded limits for generating
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the flows were set to 300 seconds for the Idle-Flow-Timeout and 1800 seconds for the Active-Flow-
Timeout.
5.2 Real Normal Dataset
The Real Normal Dataset is comprised of one month of real network data collected from an Aus-
tralasian university. All hosts in the network are controller-level devices, with no sensor data
represented. Additionally, part of the network implementation uses a proprietary middleware im-
plementation of BACnet/IP, which was out of scope of the research conducted.
5.2.1 Real Normal Dataset: Analysis
To visualise the full network, the service counts between hosts were derived from the data collected
and used to generate a directed network graph, detailed in Figure 5.1. Hosts were defined as nodes,
with network services, and network service counts used between each host as the edges, and edge
weights respectively. Community detection has been used in cyber security for identifying critical
nodes in a network, to better target defences. As such, a range of community detection algorithms
were explored and applied to the network. To identify the importance of hosts in the network, the
degree of centrality, and the eigenvector centrality were used. Further, modularity, a measure of
network and graph structure which can measure connections between nodes was used. Modularity
is the density measurement of edges inside a community compared to edges connected to outside
communities, minus the expected fraction if edges were distributed randomly, with values ranging
from -1 to +1. A positive value describes that the edges in the group exceeds the number expected
based on a random distribution of edges. The Louvain community detection unsupervised algorithm
(Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte & Lefebvre, 2008) was used against the network graph, revealing
three communities, with a modularity ranking of 0.238 using the standard modularity resolution
of 1.0. The eigenvector centrality was calculated with 100 iterations of the Gephi graph algorithm
package (Gephi, 2017). Larger nodes in the graph represent higher eigenvector centrality values.
The degree (total connections) and eigenvector centrality values for the network are detailed in
Table 5.1.
Figure 5.1 shows the observed connection between all hosts, the degree of interaction between
hosts, and the centrality of specific hosts. Specifically, it can be seen that host 246.35.6.57 sends
a significant amount of network traffic to the subnet broadcast address (anonymised to .254).
Unsurprisingly, the controllers of interest in the monitored building have the higher eigenvector
values. However, what was not anticipated was the regularity of individual controllers communic-
ating between controllers located in other buildings. Through evaluation of the network graph, the
large amount of outbound traffic from host 246.35.6.57 with no inbound connections was a prime
candidate for a misconfiguration, or potential network attack, and was investigated further. The
community detection algorithms applied identified a range of underlying, connected hosts, which
align with the understanding of the network.
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Table 5.1: Hosts exhibiting measures of centrality, modularity and clustering
coefficients for the Real Normal Dataset
IP Address Eigenvector
centrality
Indegree Outdegree Degree Modularity Class Clustering
Coefficient
246.35.6.165 1 27 23 50 2 0.29064
246.35.6.172 0.885535 21 18 39 2 0.359684
246.35.6.174 0.884594 13 15 28 2 0.52381
246.35.6.254 0.598651 65 0 65 1 0.017788
246.35.6.80 0.320134 8 10 18 2 0.266667
246.35.6.24 0.159789 2 7 9 1 0.238095
246.35.6.214 0.150417 2 3 5 1 0.666667
246.35.6.49 0.150417 2 4 6 2 0.666667
246.35.6.56 0.150417 2 7 9 2 0.285714
246.66.248.219 0.150417 2 4 6 2 0.666667
246.35.6.52 0.150417 2 6 8 2 0.266667
246.34.95.8 0.150417 2 7 9 2 0.190476
56.0.15.254 0.058332 8 0 8 0 0
246.35.6.71 0.052616 2 3 5 2 0.333333
246.35.6.160 0.052616 2 4 6 2 0.333333
246.35.6.15 0.03973 3 1 4 1 0.25
246.35.6.63 0.025817 3 2 5 2 0
246.35.6.57 0.014989 4 2 6 1 0
246.35.6.62 0.001163 1 3 4 1 0
246.35.6.25 0.001163 1 1 2 1 0
246.35.6.60 0.000832 1 2 3 1 0.333333
246.35.6.30 0 0 3 3 1 0.333333
Further analysis was undertaken through flow analysis of the network communication. A flow is
a series of frames describing a conversation between two hosts. Flow analysis ignores the content of
messages, and rather infers knowledge from the meta-properties of the conversation, such as start
time, end time, frame size and packet occurrences. Further information can be generated from these
properties, including session duration, and average packets per second. A total of 39,478,148 frames
were processed into 56,613 flows for the 51 communicating hosts, outlined in Table 5.2. 56% of these
flows (32,241) were uni-directional flows, which highlights the large amount of broadcast traffic in
BACnetworks. 31,560 flows reached the Active-Flow-Timeout value, and 25,028 flows ended due to
the Idle-Flow-Timeout being reached. The last 25 flows of the capture period ended prematurely
due to the end of the capture file being reached. As denoted in Table 5.2, host 246.35.6.57 has
a large proportion of total packets compared to total flows, indicating that each flow has a long
duration and many packets.
Analysis of the defined flows was undertaken using the Python Pandas library. The aim was to
identify common patterns and infer the sequences of commands being sent over the network from
these basic features. Each bi-directional flow can contain a sequence of commands occurring in
the network split by the flow specification features discussed (active and idle time). These natural
sequences defined by time could reveal contextual patterns for the specific network in terms of the
normal order of network commands between hosts.
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Figure 5.1: Real Normal Dataset directed network graph
To identify patterns in the network flows, unsupervised clustering was undertaken. Two clus-
tering algorithms were used with varying cluster sizes. First, k-means clustering was explored using
the two features; number of packets in flow and session duration. K-means requires the cluster size
a priori, as such, the count of unique commands each host used was selected as a na¨ıve cluster size.
Further, a k-means cluster can be influenced by its starting random centroid position. As such, the
k-means clusters were calculated using 1,000 different seed values for each input. The occurrences
of each cluster counts was determined with the first seed value, which matches the highest occurring
cluster value set, selected. For example, for host 246.35.6.80 with four clusters, all 1,000 iterations
of the starting seed value returned the same clustering pattern, thus the random seed selected was
zero. An example of a k-means cluster for host 246.35.6.172 is detailed in Figure 5.3 top. With
a larger number of clusters, varying the starting state increased the variance in cluster labels, an
after effect of edge-cases between adjoining clusters. Thus the selection of starting state based on
na¨ıve occurrence counts for cluster size was not as certain when larger cluster numbers are selected.
Of interest, host 246.35.6.11 held three flow records, consisting of nine packets which contained
two commands. The clustering size selected is thus two, however, upon inspection of the scatter
graph there appeared to be only one class. The k-means algorithm could not split this hosts traffic
into two clusters as they exhibit the same base properties for the selected features. This highlights
the limitations of clustering as a whole, the semantic meaning of the clusters are not necessarily
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Table 5.2: Outline of generated flows and packet counts for a range of hosts in
the Real Normal Dataset scenario, Host 246.35.6.57 has a high proportion of
total packets compared to flows
Host Flows Packets Total Flow % Total Packet %
246.35.6.80 13329 865020 23.54406% 2.19114%
246.35.6.24 10648 4040832 18.80840% 10.23562%
246.35.6.165 5194 2363202 9.17457% 5.98610%
246.35.6.174 4452 7012981 7.86392% 17.76421%
246.35.6.62 1518 1744548 2.68136% 4.41902%
246.35.6.164 1488 133800 2.62837% 0.33892%
246.35.6.173 1488 133794 2.62837% 0.33891%
246.35.6.175 1488 133800 2.62837% 0.33892%
246.35.6.18 1487 308184 2.62661% 0.78064%
246.35.6.27 1487 231114 2.62661% 0.58542%
246.35.6.16 1487 803085 2.62661% 2.03425%
246.35.6.19 1486 2137281 2.62484% 5.41383%
246.35.6.31 1486 1817463 2.62484% 4.60372%
246.35.6.30 1486 537453 2.62484% 1.36139%
246.35.6.57 1484 13567584 2.62131% 34.36733%
246.35.6.60 1482 1875513 2.61777% 4.75076%
246.35.6.172 1181 535355 2.08609% 1.35608%
246.35.6.71 1073 810329 1.89532% 2.05260%
246.35.6.68 857 102081 1.51379% 0.25858%
... ... ... ... ...
Total: 56,613 39,478,148
correct, based on the distinguishing features selected. Further features would be required, which
are not available from a basic network flow.
The second clustering algorithm explored was a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). The same
features, flow packet size and session duration, were also selected. A GMM can have the cluster
size defined a priori, or use a maximisation function to derive an appropriate number of clusters.
GMM clustering was undertaken using both methods. An example of GMM clustering using the
same cluster numbers as the k-means approach is detailed in Figure 5.4 top.
To improve on the na¨ıve cluster values a model was constructed for each host with cluster sizes
between 1 and 30. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) were used to compare each model with the aim of identifying local and global optima in
cluster size selection. The comparison of the models for a range of hosts is detailed in Figure 5.2.
Of note, some hosts had insufficient flow records to fully enumerate a 30 cluster model, and thus
were explored with a smaller range of cluster sizes. The k-means and GMM clustering approaches
were then re-run using the selected global minima for each model, and detailed in Figure 5.3 and
Figure 5.4
The variance of state occurrences in host 246.35.6.71 causes each run to have a unique starting
state, and thus each run classifies the data differently. Originally, it was thought that a lack of flows
may be a cause of this, however host 246.35.6.24 has a maximum state occurrence of 5, but has an
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order of magnitude more flow data. With larger cluster sizes, the start state seems to have a more
prominent effect on the clustering approach, due to the added variance in classes. Analysis of the
GMM step clustering to determine optimal cluster size was informative, but also non-authoritative.
The maximisation clustering step-approach potentially overfits on some hosts.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of AIC and BIC cluster size optimisations for selected
hosts in the Real Normal Dataset
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Figure 5.3: Comparison between na¨ıve (k=10) and
optimised (k=16) k-means clustering approach for host
246.35.6.172
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Figure 5.4: Comparison between na¨ıve (k=10) and
optimised (k=16) GMM clustering approach for host
246.35.6.172
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There is, however, a tradeoff to set between the number of clusters and a minimised error rate
criterion value. When the value differential is small, but the number of clusters between two points
is large, a selection is required based on interpretation. For example, in host 246.35.6.30, the
minimisation of the criterion for the number of clusters analysed is 30, but the difference between
six clusters and 30 clusters is 1,000, compared to the difference between five and six clusters being
28,000. In this scenario, a selection of six clusters, opposed to 30 clusters could be justified.
Based on the clustering schema for host 256.35.6.28, when using the selected commands of
size three, the next cluster size is a significant reduction, which also falls into a local minima.
As with the k-means method for host 246.35.6.11, the minimum clusters from the AIC/BIC is
one, however there are two commands from this host. The sample size is comparatively small
however (three flows), leaving little distinction between the two types of commands which have the
same characteristics in these occurrences. For hosts 246.35.6.78 and 246.35.6.77, the criterion is
minimised at the same cluster size as the number of commands issued by the host. Further, the
criterion increases after this point, inferring the commands sent by the host are distinguishable
enough to be used as the cluster size. For some hosts, the sample size is too small to derive robust
cluster sizes. The optimisation processes reduce down to each flow record classed as its own cluster,
specifically in host 246.34.95.8, there are seven commands used by the host and 12 flows, the AIC
and BIC minimise at 12 clusters. There is clearly information lost, however a number of flows are
closely grouped, implying the same type of command sequence.
A major problem with unsupervised methods can be the lack of ground truth. Specifically for
the flow data extracted, as each instance is a sequence of events and the sequences are constructed
using the same variables across the entire dataset, there is room for misclassification inside the
flows. Additionally, the initial cluster sizes are selected based on the number of commands the host
undertakes during the duration of the capture. As stated, flow records could contain more than
one command type, and thus the combinations of command sequences in each flow could increase
the number of unique clusters beyond the base value selected.
The purpose of clustering for this research was to discover natural groups in datasets. Flow
clustering has provided an overview of sequences of commands which occur in the network. How-
ever, with the various additional factors not captured by the flow data, the clustering approach is
not definitive for classifying network command sequences. Further insight was obtained through
investigating the sequences of individual packets in the network.
The dimensionality of data increases substantially when progressing from flow level to packet
level data. For the Real-Normal dataset, 39,478,148 BACnet packets were transmitted over the
network between the 51 hosts. The context provided by this data provides the level of detail for
increased analysis, as opposed to the flow data. As the packet level traffic is parseable and each
can be assigned a class based on a range of features labelling the packets in a semi-supervised
method is possible. Labelling can be undertaken using a range of data transformation methods,
examples include data structures such as JSON, XML or text-based representations which allow
the use of text searching methods such as regular expressions. Previous labelling was undertaken
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in §4.4.1 using JSON constructions of each packet for feeding an ANN for classification. The
dataset used for the proof of concept was significantly smaller, but resulted in large interim data
quantities when processing between formats. The analysis tool chosen for this dataset was the
Python library Pandas, which can use both raw text and JSON based data. A text based approach
was selected due to a reduced interim data size, with the largest non-reduced host capture text
file being 1.4GB, as opposed to the smaller dataset with greater than 1GB JSON files. Further,
the text data provided the possibility of using regular expressions and Unix commands such as
sed for labelling. The core features of interest for each packet were packet time of arrival, source
IP address, destination IP address, packet size, and BACnet contextual information including
command, and additional command properties such as sequence numbers, BACnet addresses and
object names. These features were extracted using Tshark, and parsed using regular expressions
and sed into comma separated value (csv) format files containing bi-directional packets for each
host. The major classification feature was the command sent by the source address.
Per host data was preprocessed to anonymise the network addresses. Scatter plots of destination
IP and packet size were created for each labeled command sent by the source IP. An example
scatter graph is defined in Figure 5.5 The scatter graphs identify very few size variances between
packets sent to the same host for each command. The size differences can be accounted for by the
address size of the BACnet object identifier being queried in the device, or the difference between
sending a Who-is broadcast command looking for a specific BACnet ID, or all BACnet devices.
The percentage breakdown of commands sent over the network is detailed in Table 5.3. Further
investigation at a packet level was undertaken to extract command frequencies. Figure 5.6 outlines
the breakdown of commands for host 246.35.6.172. For the outlined host, the CoV command traffic
is relatively static, while the Who-is command causes the change in phase.
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167
Table 5.3: Command breakdown of full network capture for the Real Normal
Dataset
Command Unique
Hosts
Count Total Com-
mand %
who-Is (Unconfirmed Service Request) 33 28,436,828 72.0318%
confirmedCOVNotification (SimpleAck) 5 4,222,241 10.6951%
confirmedCOVNotification (Confirmed Service Request) 6 4,154,232 10.5229%
i-Am (Unconfirmed Service Request) 47 881,131 2.2319%
subscribeCOV (Confirmed Service Request) 6 519,254 1.3153%
subscribeCOV (SimpleAck) 6 511,223 1.2950%
readProperty (Confirmed Service Request) 2 335,619 0.8501%
readProperty (ComplexAck) 1 334,488 0.8473%
writeProperty (Confirmed Service Request) 2 73,932 0.1873%
confirmedEventNotification (Confirmed Service Request) 2 4048 0.0103%
confirmedEventNotification (SimpleAck) 4 3294 0.0083%
ERROR:confirmedEventNotification 1 346 0.0009%
who-is-Router-to-Network (NPDU) 7 329 0.0008%
i-am-Router-to-Network (NPDU) 22 258 0.0007%
writeProperty (SimpleAck) 1 234 0.0006%
ICMP 3 192 0.0005%
readPropertyMultiple (ComplexAck) 2 167 0.0004%
readPropertyMultiple (Confirmed Service Request) 2 167 0.0004%
unconfirmedPrivateTransfer (Unconfirmed Service Request) 2 165 0.0004%
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Figure 5.6: Command breakdown for host 246.35.6.172
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So far, analysis has been concerned with the type of traffic transmitted across the network
and the destination of that traffic. Time series analysis methods were explored to identify when
traffic occurred. The primary aim for the time series analysis was to identify periodicity of net-
work traffic. Seasonal decomposition using the Python statsmodel implementation of a na¨ıve Loess
function (Cleveland, Cleveland, McRae & Terpenning, 1990) was undertaken with a rolling win-
dow mean of one hour (referred to further as bins). Seasonal decomposition for each host was
undertaken, in addition to the the full network in Figure 5.7. For the full network decomposition
there is a large drop in traffic on the 22/01/18. Further investigation revealed a power outage on
the university campus during this period after which the traffic returned to its previous pattern.
Seasonal decomposition does not handle missing values, therefore sporadic traffic can be identified
through preprocessing the data into one hour bins. 29 hosts were identified as having sporadic
network activity, defined for this network as having less than 1,000 network flows over the duration
of the network traffic, or hosts which go six hours without a flow. Hosts 246.35.6.172, 246.35.6.57,
246.35.6.60, and 246.35.6.71 have over 1,000 flows, and infrequently have less than two flows per
hour. Hosts 246.35.6.57, 246.35.6.60 and 246.35.6.71 were missing one, two and six hour bins re-
spectively over the entire duration of the dataset. As such, time based interpolation was applied to
generate the missing bin values. For example, host 246.35.6.172 was missing values for 231 of 744
bins. However, on inspection 963 flows occur before 10:00/17/01/2018, after which 218 flows occur.
This causes a large discrepancy in averaging methods, with one missed value before 17/01/2018,
and 230 after this period. The periodic traffic changes volume, thus making interpolation over the
entire set not truly explanatory. Therefore, the traffic was split into weekly records further analysis.
The mean weekly traffic for the network is outlined in Figure 5.8, which details the diurnal
pattern of the network traffic, (the First of January in 2018 was a Monday). From the collection of
weekly graphs, not reproduced here, some of the periodic hosts exhibit clear diurnal network pat-
terns, while others have a static consistent packet count. Sporadic hosts are also clearly identified.
In total, 22 hosts are classified as periodic. Of note, host 246.35.6.172 has two distinct behaviours,
which prompted for further investigation of factors. A larger bin size of four hours was used for
seasonal decomposition, reducing the amount of interpolation required from 230 to 34. Compared
to the full dataset where the power outage can be seen, with traffic then returning to the regular
pattern, it is unclear why the phase change occurs in host 246.35.6.172. It is clearly not a power
outage, as the traffic does not return to a regular pattern, a larger network capture consisting
of multiple months may reveal further information. Na¨ıve analysis of the network has revealed
interesting features for the Real Normal Dataset, which was applied to the synthetic datasets to
identify differences in behaviour between normal and malicious actions.
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Figure 5.7: Seasonal decomposition of the Real Normal Dataset
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Figure 5.8: Average weekly time plot of the Real Normal Dataset
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5.3 Synthetic Normal Dataset
This section presents the community detection, clustering, and na¨ıve time series analysis for the
Synthetic Normal Dataset. The Synthetic Normal Dataset consists of the network traffic from one
month of the simulator defined in §4.6.5. Through initial exploration of the command sequences
in the Synthetic Normal Dataset, 6 unexpected data troughs were identified. It was unclear what
caused these reductions in traffic with no distinct pattern identified between occurrences. As this
was not controlled behaviour, the data generation procedure was investigated, with the data in
these windows regenerated to test for repeatability. Regenerating the data at these points did not
replicate the unexpected troughs and may be an unexplained remnant of limitations in the base
hardware implementation of ESXi. Given that the data affected represents 0.8% (six hours) of total
traffic, investigating the cause of these unexpected reductions in traffic was deemed out of scope of
the research. As such, the data for all hosts encompassing these points, totalling 206,995 frames
were removed from the dataset.
5.3.1 Synthetic Normal Dataset: Analysis
The process described in §5.2.1 was also undertaken for the Synthetic Normal Dataset. The eigen-
vector centrality for the dataset describes the hosts which communicate the most with other hosts
in the network. Details of the community detection algorithm applied to a sample of the hosts is
outlined in Table 5.4. As the logger device at 192.168.10.91 consistently communicates with all
other known devices in the network, it has the highest degree, and thus an eigenvector centrality
of 1.0. The controllers are the second most connected, followed by the broadcast network address.
While the broadcast address of 255.255.255.255 is clearly not a host, it is the destination address
of 59 services in the network, as denoted by the Indegree value in Table 5.4, and as such has a
measure of centrality in the network. Further, as detailed in §5.4.1, the broadcast network address
is used in many BACnetwork attacks. Following the broadcast address, the thermostats and VAVs
are the next most connected. Finally, the sensors and actuators, which normally only communicate
with the managing controller, and the logging device are the least connected.
Six classes are defined with the Louvain algorithm, with a modularity ranking of 0.321 using
the standard modularity resolution of 1.0. One class describes the controller, and all its connected
sensors and actuators, in addition to the logger device, and one thermostat/VAV pair. A further
three thermostat/VAV pairings are classed separately. The next class describes a controller, its
sensors and the two remaining thermostat/VAV pairs. Finally, a class describes a controller, its
sensors and actuators, the broadcast address and some sensors from a different controller. There
are differences in the communication pathways between hosts from the design. It is of interest,
given each grouping uses the same data, but resolves to different classes. Reducing the resolution
of the Louvain algorithm increases the number of classes present in the network, as such a range
of resolution values were enumerated. Reducing the modularity resolution to 0.8 resulted in nine
classes with a modularity ranking of 0.323, where each thermostat/VAV pair is classed together,
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the two sets of controllers and actuators are classed together, one set of controllers, actuators and
sensors are classed with the logger device, and the broadcast address and remaining sensors are
classed together. For the Synthetic Normal Dataset, maximising the modularity ranking value
presented a classification of nodes which was closer to the topological design of the simulator
network. The network graph for the Normal Synthetic Dataset traffic at the maximised modularity
ranking value is detailed in Figure 5.9.
Table 5.4: Hosts exhibiting measures of centrality, modularity and clustering
coefficients for the Synthetic Normal Dataset
IP Address Eigenvector
centrality
Indegree Outdegree Degree Modularity Class Clustering
Coefficient
192.168.10.91 1 118 112 230 6 0.12662
192.168.10.102 0.558824 51 59 110 4 0.405367
192.168.10.100 0.555273 52 56 108 6 0.409702
192.168.10.101 0.552736 50 58 108 5 0.414096
255.255.255.255 0.223583 59 0 59 2 0.064874
192.168.10.190 0.124058 12 15 27 0 0.295238
192.168.10.130 0.123843 12 16 28 1 0.279167
192.168.10.195 0.123101 12 15 27 4 0.295238
192.168.10.160 0.122332 12 13 25 5 0.217949
192.168.10.165 0.122332 12 13 25 3 0.217949
192.168.10.131 0.121563 11 11 22 1 0.44697
192.168.10.191 0.121561 11 11 22 0 0.44697
192.168.10.136 0.117654 11 11 22 7 0.44697
192.168.10.196 0.117407 10 11 21 4 0.472727
192.168.10.166 0.117255 10 11 21 3 0.472727
192.168.10.161 0.117255 10 11 21 5 0.472727
192.168.10.135 0.106489 11 16 27 7 0.279167
192.168.10.186 0.096857 5 5 10 4 0.433333
192.168.10.185 0.096857 5 5 10 4 0.433333
192.168.10.184 0.096857 5 5 10 4 0.433333
Flow records were generated for the Synthetic Normal Dataset, using the settings described
in §5.1. 25,634,367 frames were processed into 406,426 flows for the 58 communicating hosts, see
Table 5.5 for an overview. 42.1% of these flows (171,101) were uni-directional flows. 48,521 flows
reached the Active-Flow-Timeout value, while 357,754 flows ended due to the Idle-Flow-Timeout
being reached. The last 151 flows of the capture period ended prematurely, due to the end of
the capture period being reached. Compared to the real network dataset there are far less active
timeout flows (11.94% vs 55.75%), primarily due to the lack of constant Who-Is commands from the
previously identified misconfigured device. Additionally, the inclusion of the logger device which
cycles through each device in the network and reads specific object’s properties causes a large
number of idle flows. Specifically, as only one property is read for sensor devices, a large portion
of network flows contain only two frames.
The command details for the full network of the Normal Synthetic Dataset are outlined in
Table 5.6. Of note, 95.6379% of the network traffic consists of polling values from the sensors by the
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Figure 5.9: Synthetic Normal Dataset directed network graph
controller, thermostat and logger devices, via Read property requests and acknowledgements. This
breakdown is quite different to the Real Normal Dataset, primarily due to the Real Normal Dataset
only encompassing controller devices. The Synthetic Normal Dataset has primarily sensor and
actuator devices, which are often not capable of CoV reporting, and thus have polling implemented
using the Read property command. A scatter graph of the destination, and byte size of the Write
property command for host 192.168.10.101 is shown in Figure 5.10. As detailed, the byte size of
each command packet is identical across the hosts, due to a low variance in requests, and a similarly
sized addressing scheme. If the addressing scheme for communicating devices differed, the byte size
of the Write property command to each host may differ, or be unique per host such as in the Real
Normal Dataset in Figure 5.5. The full breakdown of commands for the duration of the simulation
for host 192.168.10.101 (a controller) is detailed in Figure 5.11.
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Figure 5.10: Scatter graph of packet size and destination for command packets
sent by host 192.168.10.101
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Table 5.5: Outline of generated flows and packet counts for a range of hosts in
the Synthetic Normal Dataset scenario
Host Flows Packets Total Flow % Total Packet %
192.168.10.91 171100 1009053 42.0987% 3.9363%
192.168.10.100 32322 4911135 7.9527% 19.1584%
192.168.10.101 17399 4915843 4.2810% 19.1768%
192.168.10.102 17395 4913097 4.2800% 19.1661%
192.168.10.130 4430 1616197 1.0900% 6.3048%
192.168.10.160 4430 1616027 1.0900% 6.3041%
192.168.10.190 4429 1614971 1.0897% 6.3000%
192.168.10.135 4428 1614377 1.0895% 6.2977%
192.168.10.165 4427 1614480 1.0893% 6.2981%
192.168.10.195 4426 1612874 1.0890% 6.2918%
192.168.10.186 2961 7166 0.7285% 0.0280%
192.168.10.156 2960 6752 0.7283% 0.0263%
192.168.10.181 2953 4044 0.7266% 0.0158%
192.168.10.150 2952 3687 0.7263% 0.0144%
192.168.10.191 2952 11026 0.7263% 0.0430%
192.168.10.196 2952 11030 0.7263% 0.0430%
192.168.10.185 2951 3314 0.7261% 0.0129%
192.168.10.182 2951 3316 0.7261% 0.0129%
192.168.10.180 2951 3320 0.7261% 0.0130%
192.168.10.161 2951 9940 0.7261% 0.0388%
192.168.10.152 2951 3316 0.7261% 0.0129%
192.168.10.151 2951 3316 0.7261% 0.0129%
192.168.10.112 2951 2952 0.7261% 0.0115%
192.168.10.113 2951 2952 0.7261% 0.0115%
192.168.10.136 2951 9942 0.7261% 0.0388%
192.168.10.131 2951 9940 0.7261% 0.0388%
Total 406426 25634367
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Figure 5.11: Command breakdown for host 192.168.10.101
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Table 5.6: Command breakdown of full network capture for Synthetic Normal
Dataset
Command Unique
Hosts
Count Total Com-
mand %
readProperty(Confirmed-REQ) 10 12,258,404 47.8202%
readProperty(Complex-ACK) 57 12,257,753 47.8177%
i-Am(Unconfirmed-REQ) 57 336,302 1.3119%
who-Is(Unconfirmed-REQ) 1 336,299 1.3119%
confirmedCOVNotification(Confirmed-REQ) 33 104,569 0.4079%
confirmedCOVNotification(Simple-ACK) 9 104,459 0.4075%
subscribeCOV(Confirmed-REQ 9 86,440 0.3372%
subscribeCOV(Simple-ACK) 33 86,435 0.3372%
writeProperty(Confirmed-REQ 9 31,643 0.1234%
writeProperty(Simple-ACK) 24 31,643 0.1234%
readProperty(Error) 9 341 0.0013%
unrecognized-service(Reject) 7 79 0.0003%
A comparison of clustering approaches taken on the Synthetic Normal Dataset is detailed
in Table 5.7. As the optimised clustering sizes increase in size, the start state tends to have a
higher impact on the clustering, as can be seen when comparing the start state occurrences for the
1,000 selected state values. For example, the controllers and logger device (hosts 192.168.10.100,
192.168.10.101, 192.168.10.102, and 192.168.10.91, respectively) which optimise to over 25 states
have low state occurrence rates and as such are heavily affected by the starting state for cluster-
ing each flow. It can be seen in Figure 5.12, where the AIC and BIC diverge in maximising the
function that lowering the cluster size increases the occurrence of generating the same classifica-
tions from different starting states. Of interest, identified in Figure 5.12, many of the sensor and
actuator hosts which contain multiple types of commands have reduced cluster sizes when applying
the AIC and BIC. This implies the relationship between commands and cluster size is closer in
the sensor and actuator devices than the controllers; perhaps due to the reduced variance in com-
mands for sensors and actuators compared to controllers. A non-global optimums, or evaluating
further cluster sizes with the AIC and BIC algorithms may reveal a better fitting cluster model
for the higher interactive hosts, such as the controllers and logger. Additionally, using a simple
max occurrences selection criteria does not necessarily identify the most appropriate start state,
when evaluating using 1,000 differing start states. Some start states have similar occurrence rates,
further enumeration of start state values may result in different starting state seed values when
using an occurrence based selection criteria.
Due to the necessity of removing the unknown network data, interpolation was required for the
seasonal decomposition of the network flows. Looking at the weekly breakdown of traffic is more
descriptive in this case, (see Figure 5.16) highlighting the relatively steady state of the network
during normal operation. The broken troughs in the network traffic are due to the six hours of
removed traffic, outlined in §5.3. Further, the variation in packets per hour outlined in Figure 5.15,
shows the cyclical nature of the traffic.
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Table 5.7: Comparison of start states and occurrences with AIC/BIC selected
cluster sizes for select Normal Synthetic Dataset hosts
IP Na¨ıve
State
Na¨ıve Oc-
currences
Cluster
Size
AIC
State
AIC Occur-
rences
AIC Cluster
Size
BIC
State
BIC Occur-
rences
BIC Cluster
Size
Samples
(flows)
192.168.10.100 0 492 8 277 1 27 277 1 27 32322
192.168.10.101 0 795 8 167 2 30 167 2 30 17399
192.168.10.102 1 369 8 397 3 30 397 3 30 17395
192.168.10.110 0 1000 5 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.111 0 1000 5 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.112 0 1000 5 0 1000 2 0 1000 2 2951
192.168.10.113 0 1000 5 0 1000 2 0 1000 2 2951
192.168.10.114 0 1000 5 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.115 0 1000 5 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.116 0 1000 4 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.120 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.121 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.122 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.123 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.124 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.125 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.126 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.130 0 999 10 14 29 30 13 144 22 4430
192.168.10.131 0 347 5 0 706 4 0 706 4 2951
192.168.10.135 0 986 10 21 26 30 1 23 29 4428
192.168.10.136 2 559 5 0 723 4 0 723 4 2951
192.168.10.140 0 1000 3 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.141 0 1000 3 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.142 0 1000 3 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.143 0 1000 3 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.144 0 1000 3 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.145 0 1000 3 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
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continuation of Table 5.7
IP Na¨ıve
State
Na¨ıve Oc-
currences
Cluster
Size
AIC
State
AIC Occur-
rences
AIC Cluster
Size
BIC
State
BIC Occur-
rences
BIC Cluster
Size
Samples
(flows)
192.168.10.146 0 1000 2 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.150 0 1000 4 0 1000 3 0 1000 2 2952
192.168.10.151 0 1000 4 0 1000 2 0 1000 2 2951
192.168.10.152 0 1000 4 0 1000 2 0 1000 2 2951
192.168.10.153 0 1000 4 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.154 0 1000 4 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.155 0 1000 4 0 1000 1 0 1000 1 2950
192.168.10.156 0 990 4 0 1000 11 0 1000 2 2960
192.168.10.160 1 720 9 6 48 30 6 48 30 4430
192.168.10.161 1 455 5 2 954 3 2 954 3 2951
192.168.10.165 4 284 9 83 31 29 83 31 29 4427
192.168.10.166 1 559 5 1 707 4 1 707 4 2950
192.168.10.190 0 929 10 18 74 30 18 74 30 4429
192.168.10.191 1 699 5 3 423 6 3 423 6 2952
192.168.10.195 3 694 10 39 48 30 23 60 28 4426
192.168.10.196 0 818 5 9 289 9 0 983 4 2952
192.168.10.91 0 1000 2 885 1 29 343 2 22 171100
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of AIC and BIC cluster size optimisations for a range
of hosts in the Synthetic Normal Dataset
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Figure 5.13: Comparison between na¨ıve (k=8) and
optimised (k=30) k-means clustering approach for host
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Figure 5.14: Comparison between na¨ıve (k=8) and
optimised (k=30) GMM clustering approach for host
192.168.10.101
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Figure 5.15: Seasonal decomposition of the Synthetic Normal Network
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Figure 5.16: Average weekly packets for the Synthetic Normal Network
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5.4 Synthetic Attack Dataset
The Synthetic Attack Dataset is constructed of a re-run of the first week of the network simulation
with the attack framework defined in §4.6.9 implemented. In total, 163 attacks were launched
against the simulation network over the one week duration from three adversarial hosts, one con-
troller, one sensor and one external. The occurrence time, duration, and specific attack launched
by each adversarial host were pseudo-randomly selected using the Python random function. The
attack occurrences classed by attack and adversary type are outlined in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Ground truth attack occurrences in Synthetic Attack Dataset
Attack Class Controller Sensor External
CovAttack 2 - -
IamFlood - 34 -
IamFloodSpoofIP - 2 -
IamSpoofIP - 5 -
PriorityArrayWrite 4 - -
ReadPropertyAll 1 - -
ReadPropSneak 3 - -
RestartController - - 4
RestartDevice - - 18
WhoHasRecon - - 19
WhoIsFlood 8 4 -
WhoIsRecon - 3 19
WhoIsReconSneak 2 1 -
WritePropInBounds 32 - -
WritePropOutBounds 2 - -
Total Per Device Type 54 49 60
Total 163
5.4.1 Synthetic Attack Dataset: Analysis
5,977,356 frames were processed into 93,755 flows for the 60 communicating hosts in the Synthetic
Attack Dataset, see Table 5.10 for an overview. 42.68% of these flows (40,014) were uni-directional
flows. 11,028 flows reached the Active-Flow-Timeout value, and 82,579 flows ended due to the
Idle-Flow-Timeout being reached. The last 148 flows of the capture period ended prematurely,
due to the end of the capture file being reached. Compared to the Synthetic Normal Dataset,
there is a similar split for active (11.76% vs 11.94%) and idle (88.08% vs 88.03%) flow timeout’s.
Highlighting that cumulatively, the malicious commands in the Synthetic Attack Dataset do not
cause large deviations in traffic type breakdown.
Six classes are identified with the Louvain algorithm with a modularity ranking of 0.179 using
the standard modularity resolution of 1.0. Two classes are defined which represent individual
thermostat/VAV pairings. Two further thermostat/VAV pairs are classed together. Two controllers
and their associated sensors are classified as individual classes. Finally, a controller, the logging
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device, the external adversary, the broadcast address and the majority of actuators are in the final
class. With a lower modularity ranking value the modularity resolution was reduced to investigate
improved classification schemas. Optimising for the highest modularity resolution, a resolution of
0.9 or 0.8 can be used, where the modularity ranking increased to 0.228, with seven classes defined.
The network graph for the Synthetic Attack dataset with modularity resolution 0.9 is presented
in Figure 5.17. Comparing the network graph for the Synthetic Attack Dataset in Figure 5.17 to
that of the Synthetic Normal Dataset in Figure 5.9, there are clear differences. The broadcast
address becomes the central node to the network for the Synthetic Attack Dataset as outlined
by the eigenvector centrality in Table 5.9. The increase can be attributed to the implemented
network attacks as many of the attacks used the broadcast address to proliferate to all hosts. This
is unlike both the Synthetic Normal and Real Normal Datasets, even with 75% of network traffic
in the Real Normal Dataset directed at the broadcast address. When maximising the modularity
ranking value, the number of classes reduces to seven from nine between the Synthetic Attack and
Synthetic Normal graphs. It was expected that more classes would be defined when introducing
more communication paths between hosts, however, the opposite occurred, with the malicious
devices blurring the classes. Further, evident through visually comparing the two graphs, the
Synthetic Attack Dataset graph is loosely clustered whereas the Synthetic Normal Dataset graph
is tightly clustered. This suggests that the network attacks have had an effect on the underlying
structure of the network, and thus presents a difference in the network pattern between normal and
attack data.
The percentage breakdown of commands for the full Synthetic Attack Dataset is detailed in
Table 5.11. There is little variation compared to the Synthetic Normal Dataset in Table 5.6 for
the commands which were used in both datasets, due to the quantity of commands used in the
attacks. To present individual results of the clustering and time series analysis the malicious
controller host 192.168.10.101 was selected. The data size and destination for each command sent
by host 192.168.10.101 is outlined in Figure 5.18. There is a variation in packet sizes between same
destinations for some commands, unlike in the Synthetic Normal Dataset. This variation can be
used as a distinguishing feature, however, it should be noted that the lack of size variance is due
to the addressing scheme selected for the research. As can be seen in the Real Normal Dataset in
Figure 5.5, where a higher variance in addressing exists, variance in packet size increases. However,
packet size may still be a useful discriminator in networks with higher variance in packet sizes, with
the caveat of a higher signal-to-noise ratio.
Evaluating Figure 5.19, compared to the Synthetic Normal Dataset in Figure 5.12, the optimised
cluster sizes for all hosts are significantly larger, due to the wider range of messages passing over
the network. This infers that clustering the flow traffic can distinguish between different BACnet
commands sent over the network. However, a similar trend follows whereby the controller hosts
with a high variance of commands have lower occurrence rates, regardless of sample size, outlined in
Table 5.12. The AIC and BIC for sensor hosts (192.168.10.110-115 inclusive) in Figure 5.19 however
suggests smaller sized clusters, and identify potential non-global optima when using larger cluster
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Table 5.9: Hosts exhibiting measures of centrality, modularity and clustering
coefficients for the Synthetic Attack Dataset
IP Address Eigenvector
centrality
Indegree Outdegree Degree Modularity Class Clustering
Coefficient
255.255.255.255 1 402 0 402 5 0.087071
192.168.10.91 0.511762 115 162 277 5 0.125776
192.168.10.101 0.310557 58 115 173 3 0.332876
192.168.10.102 0.281355 51 72 123 2 0.434551
192.168.10.100 0.276146 51 71 122 5 0.42234
192.168.10.151 0.139735 15 8 23 3 0.316993
192.168.10.183 0.128872 14 8 22 3 0.330882
192.168.10.112 0.12853 14 14 28 3 0.34632
192.168.10.145 0.088325 9 11 20 3 0.367647
192.168.10.160 0.087015 14 18 32 0 0.345029
192.168.10.182 0.076697 8 14 22 2 0.380952
192.168.10.165 0.075681 13 17 30 1 0.356209
192.168.10.161 0.074783 11 14 25 0 0.47619
192.168.10.130 0.074618 13 18 31 5 0.356725
192.168.10.131 0.072662 11 14 25 5 0.47619
192.168.10.190 0.07255 13 17 30 2 0.356209
192.168.10.136 0.071255 11 14 25 4 0.47619
192.168.10.135 0.066711 12 17 29 4 0.356209
192.168.10.195 0.064528 12 19 31 2 0.356725
192.168.10.154 0.06262 6 7 13 3 0.472222
192.168.10.155 0.06262 6 7 13 3 0.472222
192.168.10.156 0.06262 6 7 13 3 0.472222
192.168.10.150 0.06262 6 7 13 3 0.444444
192.168.10.152 0.06262 6 7 13 3 0.472222
192.168.10.153 0.06262 6 7 13 3 0.472222
192.168.10.180 0.05956 6 7 13 2 0.472222
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
192.168.10.66 0.00895 2 51 53 5 0.038431
sizes, specifically for hosts 192.168.10.110 and 192.168.10.114. As expected, the BIC generally
suggest simpler clustering models compared to the AIC. For host 192.168.10.101, the AIC and BIC
both minimised to a 30 cluster size. As such, only the AIC is presented in Figures 5.20 and 5.21. It
is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of increasing the clustering size. For host 192.168.10.101 the
error rate differential between the na¨ıve and optimised cluster sizes (11 and 30) is 978.8 for the BIC
and 1697.6 for the AIC from a cluster size increase of 19. This is not a large increase, and perhaps
the optimised cluster size should not be selected. However, this is unlike host 192.168.10.100, where
the error rate differential is 48729.3 for the BIC and 49557.7 for the AIC between the na¨ıve and
optimised cluster sizes (10 and 30). A different approach is required to identify the optimal cluster
sizes for this dataset to reduce potential overfit. As can be identified in Figures 5.20 and 5.21, there
seems to be little added benefit for understanding the breakdown of flows for using a 30 cluster size
approach.
Figure 5.22 details the command breakdown over time for the malicious controller host 192.168.10.101.
For the Write property command, a number of spikes can be identified which relate to frequency
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Table 5.10: Outline of generated flows and packet counts for a range of hosts
in the Synthetic Attack Dataset scenario
Host Flows Packets Total Flow % Total Packet %
192.168.10.91 38976 229857 41.57218% 3.84546%
192.168.10.100 7388 1119081 7.88011% 18.72201%
192.168.10.101 4063 1193926 4.33364% 19.97415%
192.168.10.102 4007 1121788 4.27391% 18.76729%
192.168.10.130 1025 367687 1.09328% 6.15133%
192.168.10.190 1025 368494 1.09328% 6.16483%
192.168.10.165 1024 367036 1.09221% 6.14044%
192.168.10.135 1024 367489 1.09221% 6.14802%
192.168.10.160 1024 368451 1.09221% 6.16411%
192.168.10.195 1023 367241 1.09114% 6.14387%
192.168.10.182 707 2731 0.75409% 0.04569%
192.168.10.145 698 23572 0.74449% 0.39435%
192.168.10.144 697 1489 0.74343% 0.02491%
... ... ... ... ...
192.168.10.66 87 1002 0.09280% 0.01676%
Total 93755 5977356
Table 5.11: Command breakdown of the Synthetic Attack Dataset
Command Unique
Hosts
Count Total Com-
mand %
readProperty (Confirmed-REQ) 10 2,790,724 46.69%
readProperty (Complex-ACK) 57 2,790,182 46.68%
i-Am (Unconfirmed-REQ) 57 137,961 2.31%
who-Is (Unconfirmed-REQ) 5 100,078 1.67%
writeProperty (Confirmed-REQ) 9 32,400 0.54%
writeProperty (Simple-ACK) 24 32,001 0.54%
confirmedCOVNotification (Confirmed-REQ) 33 23,750 0.40%
confirmedCOVNotification (Simple-ACK) 9 23,709 0.40%
subscribeCOV (Confirmed-REQ) 9 19,741 0.33%
subscribeCOV (Simple-ACK) 33 19,738 0.33%
i-Have (Unconfirmed-REQ) 57 5,216 0.09%
who-Has (Unconfirmed-REQ) 1 912 0.02%
readProperty (Error) 13 466 0.01%
writeProperty (Error) 2 399 0.01%
unrecognized-service (Reject) 3 31 0.00%
reinitializeDevice (Confirmed-REQ) 1 22 0.00%
reinitializeDevice (Simple-ACK) 2 22 0.00%
readPropertyMultiple (Complex-ACK) 1 1 0.00%
readPropertyMultiple (Confirmed-REQ) 1 1 0.00%
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Figure 5.17: Synthetic Attack Dataset directed network graph, malicious hosts
are identified in red
attacks launched by the controller against other hosts in the network. When compared to host
192.168.10.102 in Figure 5.23, a non-malicious controller, the Write property command difference
is clear. For frequency-based attacks, as noted in §4.4.1, counts over time are a useful measure. The
trend analysis in Figure 5.24 shows the corresponding peaks in network traffic, and the increasing
trend of data until the network attacks finish. Comparing the trend analysis in Figure 5.24 to the
first week of average weekly packets in the Synthetic Normal dataset in Figure 5.16, there are clear
differences from the steady state.
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Figure 5.18: Scatter graph of packet size and destination for command packets
sent by host 192.168.10.101
191
Table 5.12: Comparison of start states and occurrences with AIC/BIC selected
cluster sizes for Synthetic Attack Dataset hosts
IP Na¨ıve
State
Na¨ıve Oc-
currences
Cluster
Size
AIC
State
AIC Occur-
rences
AIC Cluster
Size
BIC
State
BIC Occur-
rences
BIC Cluster
Size
Samples
(flows)
192.168.10.100 0 168 10 876 2 30 485 2 29 7388
192.168.10.101 11 249 11 598 2 30 598 2 30 4063
192.168.10.102 12 53 9 347 3 22 347 3 22 4007
192.168.10.110 3 508 6 3 219 21 1 444 9 689
192.168.10.111 0 921 6 0 665 30 0 901 15 689
192.168.10.112 1 486 7 0 246 15 0 246 15 687
192.168.10.113 0 265 6 0 785 30 10 201 10 688
192.168.10.114 0 786 6 0 501 23 0 573 14 689
192.168.10.115 1 517 6 0 877 30 2 352 11 688
192.168.10.116 2 477 5 0 934 30 0 934 30 689
192.168.10.120 0 1000 3 0 798 30 0 872 9 689
192.168.10.121 0 999 3 3 512 30 0 605 10 688
192.168.10.122 0 1000 3 0 802 30 0 845 9 688
192.168.10.123 0 927 4 1 587 30 1 465 10 689
192.168.10.124 0 1000 3 0 768 30 0 799 8 688
192.168.10.125 0 999 3 0 823 30 0 802 8 689
192.168.10.126 0 1000 3 0 822 30 6 298 9 689
192.168.10.130 0 568 10 0 411 19 3 170 17 1025
192.168.10.131 0 725 6 1 638 13 1 638 13 691
192.168.10.135 0 942 10 0 508 19 0 508 19 1024
192.168.10.136 2 420 6 0 621 11 0 621 11 690
192.168.10.140 0 989 4 0 767 30 4 244 11 688
192.168.10.141 0 997 4 4 293 30 2 392 13 689
192.168.10.142 2 369 4 0 632 14 0 632 14 687
192.168.10.143 0 988 4 0 859 30 0 875 28 688
192.168.10.144 0 299 5 3 308 12 3 308 12 697
192.168.10.145 0 999 5 1 271 25 1 271 25 698
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continuation of Table 5.12
IP Na¨ıve
State
Na¨ıve Oc-
currences
Cluster
Size
AIC
State
AIC Occur-
rences
AIC Cluster
Size
BIC
State
BIC Occur-
rences
BIC Cluster
Size
Samples
(flows)
192.168.10.146 0 1000 3 0 658 30 0 734 13 689
192.168.10.150 0 556 5 0 976 30 1 483 12 690
192.168.10.151 2 431 6 0 973 30 0 497 12 687
192.168.10.152 1 514 5 0 920 30 0 911 9 688
192.168.10.153 0 626 5 0 969 30 0 291 12 689
192.168.10.154 3 265 5 0 710 30 1 635 10 688
192.168.10.155 0 260 5 0 951 30 0 612 10 688
192.168.10.156 0 988 5 0 912 30 0 543 14 690
192.168.10.160 0 547 11 0 854 21 1 358 16 1024
192.168.10.161 5 417 6 0 573 14 0 561 11 689
192.168.10.165 0 580 10 0 393 18 0 393 18 1024
192.168.10.166 1 266 6 0 796 16 0 589 11 689
192.168.10.180 0 463 5 0 924 30 0 858 9 689
192.168.10.181 1 315 5 0 897 30 1 687 13 688
192.168.10.182 0 366 7 26 37 17 26 37 17 707
192.168.10.183 0 579 6 3 568 30 0 810 10 688
192.168.10.184 0 615 5 2 830 30 2 458 13 689
192.168.10.185 2 235 5 0 958 30 1 673 9 688
192.168.10.186 4 383 5 0 929 30 0 902 9 687
192.168.10.190 1 447 10 0 297 23 4 376 17 1025
192.168.10.191 3 219 6 0 617 13 2 592 11 688
192.168.10.195 0 629 10 1 421 18 3 163 13 1023
192.168.10.196 1 405 6 1 865 16 1 865 16 690
192.168.10.66 0 1000 3 0 1000 5 0 1000 4 87
192.168.10.91 0 1000 2 469 2 25 0 808 10 38976
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Figure 5.19: Comparison of AIC and BIC cluster size optimisations for a range
of hosts in the Synthetic Attack Dataset
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Figure 5.20: Comparison between na¨ıve (k=11) and
optimised (k=30) GMM clustering approach for host
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Figure 5.21: Comparison between na¨ıve (k=11) and
optimised (k=30) GMM clustering approach for host
192.168.10.101
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Figure 5.22: Command breakdown for Host 192.168.10.101
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Figure 5.23: Command breakdown for Host 192.168.10.102
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Figure 5.24: Seasonal decomposition of the Synthetic Attack Dataset
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5.4.2 Synthetic Dataset comparisons
While comparing the two dataset clusters side-by-side distinctly reveals many of the network at-
tacks, this is not a realistic approach for real network detection. Without a ground truth, as would
be faced when applying exploratory analysis to real network data, the differences between legitimate
and malicious traffic have limited contextual meaning.
From this unsupervised exploration of the Synthetic Normal and Synthetic Attack Datasets,
known BACnet attacks have a clearly distinguishable network pattern. For the simulated data,
many of the commands do not occur normally, and as such can be identified when used for a
malicious purpose. Comparing the use of these identifiable commands to the command breakdown
of the Real Normal Dataset, commands such as Who-has, and I-have, are low in quantity, or non-
existent. Thus, for these types of commands, existence is enough for identification and investigation.
Other core commands, such as Read property, Write property, I-am and Who-is can be identified by
distinguishable patterns based on frequency, or variable packet sizes. These patterns are highlighted
through the difference in cluster structure between Synthetic Normal and Synthetic Attack results
in Figures 5.13 and 5.20. The clusters formed for host 192.168.10.101 in the Synthetic Normal
Dataset forms a linear function from low duration, low packet count flows to high duration, high
packet count flows. Comparatively, host 192.168.10.101 in the Synthetic Attack Dataset, does not
follow a linear function, with clusters forming around low duration low packet count, low duration
and high packet count, and high duration and low packet count. Given a large proportion of the
implemented network attacks increase the frequency of packets in short bursts, clustering these
features, and taking a comparison between the two synthetic datasets reveals a distinction between
the network data when malicious commands exist in the network. As noted, with a higher variance
of BACnet address lengths, and data requests in the network, there will be a higher signal-to-
noise ratio in packet sizes which will require further investigation. Due to the previously discussed
proprietary middleware protocol implementation, it was not possible to compare a higher variance
of packet sizes given the Write property commands which caused the variance in the Synthetic
Datasets was not accessible in the Real Normal Dataset.
5.5 Hidden Markov Models
This section details the use of Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) to identify malicious network
transactions in the Synthetic Datasets generated using the simulator defined in §4.6.5.
5.5.1 Preprocessing for Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov Models require transition probabilities between emissions to define a model, and
sequences of emissions to train and test the model. Therefore, preprocessing was required to
transform the categorical data of each network packet into an emission label, generate sequences
of these labels, and then define the transition probabilities between each emission. Two emission
labelling schemata were developed from a number of features from each packet. First, the features
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source IP, destination IP, command, and command type were used to define a unique emission
for each packet henceforth referred to as the CMD schema. Second, the LEN schema was defined
which supplemented the features used in the CMD schema with the byte length feature, to evaluate
the use of packet length as a discriminative feature. Each packet in the Synthetic Normal Dataset,
and the Synthetic Attack Dataset was assigned two emission labels based on the two schemata.
Sequences were defined using a fixed time length window. Two time lengths were initially
investigated. First, sequences were derived using a 2 second window, then a 30 second window. Due
to the periodic bursts of traffic, a feature of polling and CoV reporting, the 30 second window would
capture two polling sequences in each window, and was thus discarded in favour of the 2 second
window size. Using a time window rather than a fixed sequence length allows for variable length
sequences to be generated, which better reflects the bursts in traffic on the network. A number
of low occurring sequences were generated due to multiple communication sequences overlapping
relating to the same host. For example, take normal sequences (a, b, c, d) and (e, f, g), if they
occur in the same time window, a new sequence such as (a, b, e, f, c, d, g) may be derived. These
sequences would not necessarily be identified if deriving the sequences from a purely theoretical
model, or when inserting defined malicious sequences into a normal sequence, and as such increases
the robustness of the sequencing time window approach.
Sequences were constructed at a host level specificity due to the number of emission symbols
generated using the schemata. For the CMD schema, 460 and 524 emission symbols were identified
in the Synthetic Normal and Synthetic Attack Datasets respectively, while the LEN schema gen-
erated 460 and 597 emission symbols. The difference only existing in the Synthetic Attack dataset
symbols indicates that the length of the packet can be a distinguishing feature between normal and
malicious traffic for this dataset. A limitation of the HMM implementation was that only unary
symbols could be passed as a sequence, and as such, 525 and 598 unique emission symbols would
be required for the CMD and LEN schemas respectively. As such, a network level HMM is left for
future work.
Sequences were generated for both the Synthetic Normal and Synthetic Attack datasets based
on the two schemata, for each host, resulting in two sets of sequences per host which represent the
same data. The Synthetic Normal sequences were used for training each HMM, while the Synthetic
Attack sequences were used to test each HMM, for each respective schema.
For the full Synthetic Normal and Synthetic Attack datasets for each host, the majority of
dataset pairs had between a 22.6% and 27.8% proportional split in size. One host (the target of
many attacks) had a 38.1% split. Given the differences in proportion between each dataset pair,
the number of samples used for each model was normalised to have a 80% training and 20% testing
data split. Further, to reduce potential sampling bias for the training dataset, each full Synthetic
Normal Dataset for each host was split into ten equally-sized training sets. Each training set was
then used to train a HMM resulting in ten HMMs for each host. The proportionally-sampled
Synthetic Attack dataset was kept constant for testing each hosts ten models.
When a HMM is faced with an emission in the testing set which was not encountered in the
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training set, a transition probability is not defined. Following the approach of Ariu et al. (2007), the
unique emission symbols in the testing set which do not occur in the any of the training sets were
changed to a wildcard symbol. The wildcard symbol is added as a transition in each model with
a zero emission transition probability from every other emission symbol. This allows the model to
clearly identify emission symbols which have not been encountered previously. As noted by Ariu et
al. (2007), if the emission symbols are highly representative of the dataset, then it is appropriate for
the wildcard emissions to be referred to as an anomaly. Given that the Synthetic Normal Dataset
only contains normal network commands, while the Synthetic Attack Dataset contains both normal
and attack traffic, wildcard symbols are classed as known anomalies as they are distinct from the
normal commands on the network. For classification problems with a HMM, each class to be
identified requires a separate model (Ariu et al., 2007). Given the binary classification pursued in
this research (normal or anomalous), only a normal model is generated for each training dataset
and used to classify presented sequences from the testing dataset. To classify each sequence in the
testing set as normal or anomalous, the log likelihood probability of each test sequence was derived
from the trained model, with a range of discriminating thresholds used.
The accuracy of HMMs can be affected by the initial hidden state transition probabilities, the
number of hidden states, and the size of the dataset (Ariu et al., 2007). For the defined models, the
hidden state transition probability matrix for each model was generated pseudo-randomly using
the Python numpy random function using a seeded value for repeatability. Further, the effect of
altering the hidden model size on the classification ability of the HMM was explored using models
of 10, 20 and 30 hidden states. As such, 580 models were generated for the CMD schema, and an
additional 580 models for the LEN schema, for the three hidden state model types, totalling 3480
models.
The HMM’s were implemented using the Python library pomegranate (Schreiber, 2018). Each
model was trained using the Baum-Welch algorithm until the emission transition probabilities
converged, or 100 iterations of training was completed, whichever occurred first. As noted by
Schreiber (2018), parallelisation can be used for training, however it has a detrimental effect on
training times when using small numbers of states. This detrimental behaviour occurred when
training the 10-state models with an increase in time relative to the number of jobs given to
the queue. For the 20-state, and 30-state models, parallelisation was used with two jobs with
a significant reduction in training time compared to the 10-state model. The training times for
selected models are detailed in Table 5.13.
5.5.2 Defining the testing set ground truth
Only two hosts initiate both normal and malicious traffic, host 192.168.10.101 the malicious control-
ler, and host 192.168.10.182 the malicious sensor device. Host 192.168.10.66 is the external device
which generates only malicious traffic and as such does not have normal behaviour traffic defined.
A network level model could identify this type of adversary with the proposed labelling schema
as the new host and commands will have new defined unique emission labels. Further, previous
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Table 5.13: Hidden Markov Model training and classification durations for se-
lected hosts
IP Hidden
States
Training
Time (s)
Classification
Time (s)
Training Sequence
Length
Labelling
Schema
192.168.10.100 10 217.264 12 8207 CMD
192.168.10.100 20 28.980 112 8207 CMD
192.168.10.100 30 66.299 263 8207 CMD
192.168.10.101 10 285.080 14 8255 CMD
192.168.10.101 20 28.915 111 8255 CMD
192.168.10.101 30 63.805 262 8255 CMD
192.168.10.160 10 208.427 18 13,714 CMD
192.168.10.160 20 22.915 39 13,714 CMD
192.168.10.160 30 39.662 90 13,714 CMD
192.168.10.161 10 145.948 12 8133 CMD
192.168.10.161 20 8.330 32 8133 CMD
192.168.10.161 30 21.763 71 8133 CMD
192.168.10.126 10 62.253 6 8021 CMD
192.168.10.126 20 6.738 6 8021 CMD
192.168.10.126 30 13.106 10 8021 CMD
192.168.10.182 10 66.097 5 8076 CMD
192.168.10.182 20 7.034 7 8076 CMD
192.168.10.182 30 13.609 10 8076 CMD
192.168.10.100 10 232.877 11 8207 LEN
192.168.10.100 20 29.553 116 8207 LEN
192.168.10.100 30 64.470 258 8207 LEN
192.168.10.101 10 273.899 14 8255 LEN
192.168.10.101 20 32.188 118 8255 LEN
192.168.10.101 30 56.237 261 8255 LEN
192.168.10.160 10 203.398 17 13,714 LEN
192.168.10.160 20 24.735 40 13,714 LEN
192.168.10.160 30 32.659 84 13,714 LEN
192.168.10.161 10 140.170 12 8133 LEN
192.168.10.161 20 10.323 32 8133 LEN
192.168.10.161 30 16.818 69 8133 LEN
192.168.10.126 10 63.022 5 8021 LEN
192.168.10.126 20 7.316 8 8021 LEN
192.168.10.126 30 8.775 11 8021 LEN
192.168.10.182 10 65.249 5 8076 LEN
192.168.10.182 20 9.984 6 8076 LEN
192.168.10.182 30 10.600 11 8076 LEN
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work in the literature has focused on identifying out-of-bounds threats from new hosts, such as that
by Tonejc et al. (2016) with graph analysis. As such, the analysis of the external hosts malicious
sequences was not undertaken using the HMM approach as there was no defined training data, and
a model defined for this host would consist of each transition probability between emissions to be
zero, and thus classify all traffic as malicious; which, while accurate, is not particularly interesting.
Many of the other hosts, however, contain malicious sequences generated through responding to
the malicious initiators.
All hosts had a semi-supervised method applied for identifying and classifying the malicious
sequences in the testing dataset for defining the ground truth of the system. As part of the
implemented attack framework when each attack launched the start and end times were recorded.
This provided the duration of the attack, allowing each hosts testing data-frame to be sliced based
on the periods defined by the attack framework. Each slice was adjusted to start and end on an
even number to fit the 2 second window sequence generation method. The sequencing approach was
then applied to each slice, generating sequences which were classed as malicious. This approach was
taken for every host in the network for the malicious initiator hosts, 1244, 133, and 53 sequences
were defined for the malicious controller, sensor and external device respectively for both the CMD
schema and LEN schema. The unique sequences generated for each malicious host were 257, 29 and
10 for the CMD schema, and 301, 27 and 10 for the LEN schema. To determine the accuracy of each
labelling approach each unique malicious sequence was searched for in the corresponding training
dataset which does not contain malicious traffic. Due to the length of some attacks, the duration
defined by the data-frame slice allows for some normal sequences to be contained in these slices,
resulting in mis-classed sequences. On average, 42.93% of the classified malicious sequences existed
in the training dataset. Consequently, these sequences were re-classified as normal sequences. The
remaining identified sequences were defined as the malicious sequences for each host. All other
sequences in the testing datasets for each host were then classed as normal to conclude the ground
truth dataset creation. This process was undertaken for each labelling schema dataset individually,
as the emission labels, sequence lengths and thus malicious sequences differ. For some hosts, the
change in labelling schema further differentiates the attacks sent and received by hosts. This is
evident from the size differences between same class Write property command attacks defined in the
attack framework, and the change in unique malicious sequences, but not total malicious sequences
between the two schemas. As such, different ground truth datasets are defined for each labelling
schema.
5.5.3 Selected models
For presenting the results of the HMMs six hosts were selected, one for each device type, in ad-
dition to the two internal malicious hosts. Of the selected hosts, 192.168.10.100, 192.168.10.101
and 192.168.10.160 have only known malicious traffic, identified as wildcard emissions. Hosts
192.168.10.126, 192.168.10.161, and 192.168.10.182 have unknown attacks defined as part of the
testing set, in addition to known attacks, further referred to as mixed traffic. Note that for this re-
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search unknown attacks are defined as a legitimate-yet-malicious command, which occurs normally
in the training dataset, but is also used for a malicious action in the testing dataset. An example
of this may be a Write property command which is sent between the same source and destination
pair, and for the sake of the LEN labelling schema also has the same packet length.
5.5.4 Evaluation of Hidden Markov Model classifiers
Depending on the purpose of the model an appropriate measure to evaluate the classification ability
of the model can be selected. For this research, the interest is in being accurate at distinguishing
between anomalies (True Positives), and normal traffic (True Negative), while reducing the number
of incorrectly classified traffic (False Positive and False Negative). Consequently, the True Positive
Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Negative Rate (FNR)
measures, defined in Equation 5.3-Equation 5.6 were selected for evaluating the performance of the
models. Given that anomaly detection datasets have imbalanced classes by design, certain measures
are more indicative of the performance of the classification model than others. Specifically, accuracy
is a poor selection measurement for binary classification as it does not take into account the sizes of
each class type (Powers, 2011). Often, the F1 measure is used to account for imbalanced datasets,
as it is the harmonic mean of precision and TPR (Bekkar, Djemaa & Alitouche, 2013). While the
F1 measure is an improvement over the accuracy measure, it does not evaluate the classification
with respect to the true negatives (Powers, 2011; Bekkar et al., 2013). Noted by Powers (2011)
and Bekkar et al. (2013), the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) (Matthews, 1975) is a single
performance measure which can be used for evaluating binary classifiers that is less influenced by
imbalanced classes within a dataset. Further, the MCC provides an evaluation metric of correctly
classifying both classes (True Positive and True Negative), unlike the F1 measurement. Hence, the
MCC measure defined in Equation 5.7 was selected as the core evaluation criterion. For comparison,
the Precision and Accuracy measures, defined in Equation 5.1 and Equation 5.2 are also included
when presenting results of each HMM.
Pr =
TP
TP + FP
where
Pr = Precision
TP = Quantity of True Positive
FP = Quantity of False Positive
(Equation 5.1)
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ACC =
(TP + TN)
(TP + TN + FP + FN)
where
ACC = Accuracy
TP = Quantity of True Positive
TN = Quantity of True Negative
FP = Quantity of False Positive
FN = Quantity of False Negative
(Equation 5.2)
TPR =
TP
(TP + FN)
where
TPR = True Positive Rate
TP = Quantity of True Positive
FN = Quantity of False Negative
(Equation 5.3)
TNR =
TN
(FP + TN)
where
TNR = True Negative Rate
TN = Quantity of True Negative
FP = Quantity of False Positive
(Equation 5.4)
FPR =
FP
(FP + TN)
where
FPR = False Positive Rate
FP = Quantity of False Positive
TN = Quantity of True Negative
(Equation 5.5)
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FNR =
FN
(TP + FN)
where
FNR = False Negative Rate
FN = Quantity of False Negative
TP = Quantity of True Positive
(Equation 5.6)
MCC =
(TP × TN)− (FP × FN)√
(TP + FP )(TP + FN)(TN + FP )(TN + FN)
where
MCC = Matthews Correlation Coefficient
TP = Quantity of True Positive
TN = Quantity of True Negative
FP = Quantity of False Positive
FN = Quantity of False Negative
(Equation 5.7)
5.5.5 Hidden Markov Model results for CMD schema
The average results for each model for the CMD schema stated hosts are outlined in Tables 5.14
- 5.19. Of note, the classification ability of the models stays constant when increasing the number
of hidden states from 20 to 30 for all models. This infers that, for this dataset, it is not optimal
to generate models with more than 20 hidden states given the increase in training time for no
increase in classification ability. Further, the optimal quantity of hidden states for the model lies
between 10 and 20 states. Seymore, Mccallum and Rosenfeld (1999), observed a plateau and then a
gradual decline in accuracy for the HMM when the number of hidden states was increased. Further
evaluation of the quantity of hidden states for this dataset is the interest of future work.
No defined classifier is optimal over all hosts in the CMD schema models. Similarly, no quantity
of hidden states is optimal for every host, rather, the classification ability is dependent on the
individual host data. The best result, in terms of the MCC, for host 192.168.10.100 was 0.902 from
C11 for hidden state model 20 with a TNR of 0.994, see Table 5.14b. Each classifier for both the
10-state and 20-state models correctly classifies each known anomaly in the network as outlined by
the TPR of 1.0 for all classifiers in Table 5.14. For hosts 192.168.10.101 and 192.168.10.160, C11 is
also the optimal classifier, with a MCC of 1.0 in both the 10-state and 20-state models as outlined
in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, respectively. The results from these three hosts support H3: Machine
learning is capable of identifying one or more known attacks against BACnet/IP networks, where
the TPR is 1.0.
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For Host 192.168.10.161, classifiers C9-C11 for the 10-state model in Table 5.17a, and classifiers
C10-C11 for the 20-state model in Table 5.17b obtain the same MCC and TPR values of 0.851 and
0.750 respectively. Similarly, classifiers C3-C9 and classifiers C4-C10 for the 10-state and 20-state
models for host 192.168.10.126, outlined in Tables 5.18a and 5.18b, generate the same MCC value
of 0.802 with a TPR 1.0. Unlike models for hosts 192.168.10.161 and 192.168.10.126, the models for
host 192.168.10.182 are capable of obtaining a MCC of 1.0 for classifier C10, detailed in Table 5.19a.
This result supports H4: Machine learning is capable of identifying one or more unknown attacks
against BACnet/IP networks, as the classifier can correctly identify a number of unknown attacks
in the dataset with a FPR of 0.000.
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Table 5.14: Evaluation metrics for the normal controller 192.168.10.100 with
CMD labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr Accuracy MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.000
C1 1.000 0.045 0.955 0.000 0.026 0.069 0.034
C2 1.000 0.058 0.942 0.000 0.026 0.081 0.039
C3 1.000 0.064 0.936 0.000 0.027 0.088 0.041
C4 1.000 0.149 0.851 0.000 0.029 0.171 0.066
C5 1.000 0.209 0.791 0.000 0.031 0.229 0.081
C6 1.000 0.268 0.732 0.000 0.034 0.286 0.095
C7 1.000 0.293 0.707 0.000 0.035 0.311 0.101
C8 1.000 0.293 0.707 0.000 0.035 0.311 0.101
C9 1.000 0.673 0.327 0.000 0.073 0.681 0.221
C10 1.000 0.703 0.297 0.000 0.080 0.711 0.236
C11 1.000 0.993 0.007 0.000 0.787 0.993 0.884
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr Accuracy MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.000
C2 1.000 0.013 0.987 0.000 0.025 0.038 0.018
C3 1.000 0.033 0.967 0.000 0.026 0.058 0.029
C4 1.000 0.071 0.929 0.000 0.027 0.094 0.044
C5 1.000 0.088 0.912 0.000 0.027 0.111 0.049
C6 1.000 0.122 0.878 0.000 0.028 0.144 0.059
C7 1.000 0.135 0.865 0.000 0.029 0.156 0.062
C8 1.000 0.135 0.865 0.000 0.029 0.156 0.062
C9 1.000 0.295 0.705 0.000 0.035 0.313 0.102
C10 1.000 0.531 0.469 0.000 0.052 0.543 0.166
C11 1.000 0.994 0.006 0.000 0.820 0.994 0.902
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr Accuracy MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.000
C2 1.000 0.013 0.987 0.000 0.025 0.038 0.018
C3 1.000 0.033 0.967 0.000 0.026 0.058 0.029
C4 1.000 0.071 0.929 0.000 0.027 0.094 0.044
C5 1.000 0.088 0.912 0.000 0.027 0.111 0.049
C6 1.000 0.122 0.878 0.000 0.028 0.144 0.059
C7 1.000 0.135 0.865 0.000 0.029 0.156 0.062
C8 1.000 0.135 0.865 0.000 0.029 0.156 0.062
C9 1.000 0.295 0.705 0.000 0.035 0.313 0.102
C10 1.000 0.531 0.469 0.000 0.052 0.543 0.166
C11 1.000 0.994 0.006 0.000 0.820 0.994 0.902
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Table 5.15: Evaluation metrics for the malicious controller 192.168.10.101 with
CMD labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C1 1.000 0.012 0.988 0.000 0.244 0.251 0.049
C2 1.000 0.052 0.948 0.000 0.252 0.281 0.114
C3 1.000 0.081 0.919 0.000 0.257 0.303 0.144
C4 1.000 0.169 0.831 0.000 0.277 0.370 0.216
C5 1.000 0.213 0.787 0.000 0.288 0.403 0.248
C6 1.000 0.264 0.736 0.000 0.302 0.442 0.282
C7 1.000 0.299 0.701 0.000 0.313 0.468 0.306
C8 1.000 0.299 0.701 0.000 0.313 0.468 0.306
C9 1.000 0.641 0.359 0.000 0.470 0.728 0.549
C10 1.000 0.898 0.102 0.000 0.792 0.923 0.843
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C2 1.000 0.011 0.989 0.000 0.244 0.250 0.052
C3 1.000 0.034 0.966 0.000 0.248 0.267 0.091
C4 1.000 0.077 0.923 0.000 0.257 0.300 0.141
C5 1.000 0.099 0.901 0.000 0.261 0.317 0.161
C6 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.271 0.350 0.197
C7 1.000 0.159 0.841 0.000 0.275 0.363 0.209
C8 1.000 0.159 0.841 0.000 0.275 0.363 0.209
C9 1.000 0.368 0.632 0.000 0.335 0.521 0.351
C10 1.000 0.615 0.385 0.000 0.453 0.708 0.528
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C2 1.000 0.011 0.989 0.000 0.244 0.250 0.052
C3 1.000 0.034 0.966 0.000 0.248 0.267 0.091
C4 1.000 0.077 0.923 0.000 0.257 0.300 0.141
C5 1.000 0.099 0.901 0.000 0.261 0.317 0.161
C6 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.271 0.350 0.197
C7 1.000 0.159 0.841 0.000 0.275 0.363 0.209
C8 1.000 0.159 0.841 0.000 0.275 0.363 0.209
C9 1.000 0.368 0.632 0.000 0.335 0.521 0.351
C10 1.000 0.615 0.385 0.000 0.453 0.708 0.528
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 5.16: Evaluation metrics for the thermostat 192.168.10.160 with CMD
labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.000
C1 1.000 0.043 0.957 0.000 0.020 0.062 0.030
C2 1.000 0.080 0.920 0.000 0.021 0.098 0.041
C3 1.000 0.163 0.837 0.000 0.023 0.179 0.062
C4 1.000 0.514 0.486 0.000 0.040 0.524 0.143
C5 1.000 0.753 0.247 0.000 0.075 0.758 0.238
C6 1.000 0.959 0.041 0.000 0.349 0.960 0.575
C7 1.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.500 0.980 0.700
C8 1.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.500 0.980 0.700
C9 1.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.500 0.980 0.700
C10 1.000 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.517 0.981 0.711
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.000
C1 1.000 0.020 0.980 0.000 0.020 0.039 0.020
C2 1.000 0.120 0.880 0.000 0.022 0.137 0.052
C3 1.000 0.172 0.828 0.000 0.024 0.188 0.064
C4 1.000 0.320 0.680 0.000 0.029 0.333 0.096
C5 1.000 0.493 0.507 0.000 0.038 0.503 0.137
C6 1.000 0.650 0.350 0.000 0.054 0.657 0.187
C7 1.000 0.730 0.270 0.000 0.069 0.735 0.224
C8 1.000 0.730 0.270 0.000 0.069 0.735 0.224
C9 1.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.500 0.980 0.700
C10 1.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.500 0.980 0.700
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.000
C1 1.000 0.020 0.980 0.000 0.020 0.039 0.020
C2 1.000 0.120 0.880 0.000 0.022 0.137 0.052
C3 1.000 0.172 0.828 0.000 0.024 0.188 0.064
C4 1.000 0.320 0.680 0.000 0.029 0.333 0.096
C5 1.000 0.493 0.507 0.000 0.038 0.503 0.137
C6 1.000 0.650 0.350 0.000 0.054 0.657 0.187
C7 1.000 0.730 0.270 0.000 0.069 0.735 0.224
C8 1.000 0.730 0.270 0.000 0.069 0.735 0.224
C9 1.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.500 0.980 0.700
C10 1.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.500 0.980 0.700
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 5.17: Evaluation metrics for the normal VAV 192.168.10.161 with CMD
labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.125 0.125 0.000
C1 1.000 0.107 0.893 0.000 0.138 0.219 0.122
C2 1.000 0.107 0.893 0.000 0.138 0.219 0.122
C3 0.750 0.290 0.710 0.250 0.127 0.345 0.028
C4 0.750 0.541 0.459 0.250 0.184 0.567 0.190
C5 0.750 0.721 0.279 0.250 0.270 0.724 0.325
C6 0.750 0.862 0.138 0.250 0.429 0.848 0.489
C7 0.750 0.962 0.038 0.250 0.775 0.936 0.722
C8 0.750 0.962 0.038 0.250 0.775 0.936 0.722
C9 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.970 0.851
C10 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.970 0.851
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.970 0.851
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.125 0.125 0.000
C1 1.000 0.107 0.893 0.000 0.138 0.219 0.122
C2 1.000 0.107 0.893 0.000 0.138 0.219 0.122
C3 0.750 0.276 0.724 0.250 0.125 0.333 0.019
C4 0.750 0.428 0.572 0.250 0.153 0.467 0.118
C5 0.750 0.621 0.379 0.250 0.214 0.636 0.245
C6 0.750 0.655 0.345 0.250 0.231 0.667 0.271
C7 0.750 0.655 0.345 0.250 0.231 0.667 0.271
C8 0.750 0.655 0.345 0.250 0.231 0.667 0.271
C9 0.750 0.966 0.034 0.250 0.750 0.939 0.716
C10 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.970 0.851
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.970 0.851
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.125 0.125 0.000
C1 1.000 0.107 0.893 0.000 0.138 0.219 0.122
C2 1.000 0.107 0.893 0.000 0.138 0.219 0.122
C3 0.750 0.276 0.724 0.250 0.125 0.333 0.019
C4 0.750 0.428 0.572 0.250 0.153 0.467 0.118
C5 0.750 0.621 0.379 0.250 0.214 0.636 0.245
C6 0.750 0.655 0.345 0.250 0.231 0.667 0.271
C7 0.750 0.655 0.345 0.250 0.231 0.667 0.271
C8 0.750 0.655 0.345 0.250 0.231 0.667 0.271
C9 0.750 0.966 0.034 0.250 0.750 0.939 0.716
C10 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.970 0.851
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.970 0.851
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Table 5.18: Evaluation metrics for the normal sensor 192.168.10.126 with CMD
labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C1 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C2 1.000 0.414 0.586 0.000 0.423 0.590 0.418
C3 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C4 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C5 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C6 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C7 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C8 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C9 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C10 0.667 0.875 0.125 0.333 0.667 0.818 0.542
C11 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.833 0.522
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.300 0.300 0.000
C1 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C2 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C3 1.000 0.429 0.571 0.000 0.429 0.600 0.429
C4 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C5 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C6 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C7 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C8 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C9 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C10 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C11 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.833 0.522
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.300 0.300 0.000
C1 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C2 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C3 1.000 0.429 0.571 0.000 0.429 0.600 0.429
C4 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C5 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C6 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C7 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C8 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C9 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C10 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C11 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.833 0.522
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Table 5.19: Evaluation metrics for the malicious sensor 192.168.10.182 with
CMD labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320 0.320 0.000
C1 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C2 1.000 0.235 0.765 0.000 0.381 0.480 0.299
C3 1.000 0.706 0.294 0.000 0.615 0.800 0.659
C4 1.000 0.871 0.129 0.000 0.785 0.912 0.827
C5 1.000 0.894 0.106 0.000 0.818 0.928 0.855
C6 1.000 0.894 0.106 0.000 0.818 0.928 0.855
C7 1.000 0.900 0.100 0.000 0.827 0.932 0.863
C8 1.000 0.900 0.100 0.000 0.827 0.932 0.863
C9 1.000 0.912 0.088 0.000 0.844 0.940 0.877
C10 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.926 0.824
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320 0.320 0.000
C1 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C2 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C3 1.000 0.471 0.529 0.000 0.471 0.640 0.471
C4 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C5 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C6 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C7 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C8 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C9 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C10 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.926 0.824
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320 0.320 0.000
C1 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C2 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C3 1.000 0.471 0.529 0.000 0.471 0.640 0.471
C4 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C5 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C6 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C7 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C8 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C9 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C10 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.926 0.824
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5.5.6 Hidden Markov Model results for LEN schema
Identical to the CMD schema the 30-state models share the same results as the 20-state models
for the LEN schema. The results for the LEN schema are detailed in Tables 5.20-5.25. For host
192.168.10.100, classifier C11 for the 20-state model has the highest MCC with 0.892, however the
TPR is 0.8. The classifier with the highest MCC and TPR is C4 for the 10-state model, with 1.0
TPR, 0.075 MCC and 0.943 FPR. However, this FPR makes the classifier unusable for real network
detection purposes, as the resulting detection system would classify the majority of network traffic
incorrectly. Host 192.168.10.101 is optimal with classifier C11 for the 10-state and 20-state models,
with a 0.982 and 0.985 MCC values respectively. The TPR for classifier C11 in the 10-state model
is slightly higher than the classifier C11 for the 20 state model (0.986 vs 0.983). For a TPR of 1.0,
classifier C9 for both the 10-state and 20-state models are optimal, however they have a 0.342 and
0.605 FPR respectively. Of note, the LEN schema identifies the existence of unknown attacks in
hosts 192.168.10.100 and 192.168.10.101. This can be identified through comparing the results for
the TPR between the two schemata, where in the CMD schema, for each classifier the TPR is 1.0,
inferring all known attacks, while for the LEN schema, there is a reduction in TPR, outlined in
Tables 5.20a, 5.20b, 5.21a and 5.21b. The identified variance in TPR further supports hypothesis
H4, given the ability of the 10-state and 20-state models for host 192.168.10.100 and 192.168.10.101
to detect unknown attacks. Unlike hosts 192.168.10.100 and 192.168.10.101, host 192.168.10.160,
all the evaluated classifiers have a TPR of 1.0. Further, classifiers C9 through C11 for both the
10-state and 20-state models provide a 1.0 MCC value for host 192.168.10.160. As more than just
classifier C11 provides a MCC of 1.0, it infers that there are no normal sequences in the dataset
which have low occurrence probabilities.
Host 192.168.10.161 has three classifiers, C10 and C11 for the 10-state, and C11 for the 20-
state models which obtain an MCC of 0.603. However, these classifiers all obtain a TPR of 0.4.
Classifiers C1 and C2 for both the 10-state and 20-state models provide a TPR of 1.0, however
the accompanying MCC is 0.138 with a FPR of 0.889. The results for hosts 192.168.10.126 and
192.168.10.182 are identical between the two schemata. This occurs due to the lack of variance
in packet lengths for these hosts, inferring that for the unknown attacks in the dataset for hosts
192.168.10.126 and 192.168.10.182, the packet length is not useful for distinguishing between normal
and malicious commands.
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Table 5.20: Evaluation metrics for the normal controller 192.168.10.100 with
LEN labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.031 0.031 0.000
C1 1.000 0.045 0.955 0.000 0.032 0.074 0.038
C2 1.000 0.057 0.943 0.000 0.033 0.086 0.043
C3 1.000 0.064 0.936 0.000 0.033 0.093 0.046
C4 1.000 0.155 0.845 0.000 0.036 0.181 0.075
C5 0.800 0.232 0.768 0.200 0.032 0.249 0.013
C6 0.800 0.297 0.703 0.200 0.035 0.312 0.037
C7 0.800 0.326 0.674 0.200 0.036 0.340 0.046
C8 0.800 0.326 0.674 0.200 0.036 0.340 0.046
C9 0.800 0.715 0.285 0.200 0.082 0.718 0.194
C10 0.800 0.742 0.258 0.200 0.089 0.744 0.209
C11 0.800 0.999 0.001 0.200 0.980 0.993 0.882
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.031 0.031 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.031 0.031 0.000
C2 1.000 0.013 0.987 0.000 0.031 0.043 0.020
C3 1.000 0.033 0.967 0.000 0.032 0.063 0.032
C4 1.000 0.070 0.930 0.000 0.033 0.099 0.048
C5 1.000 0.088 0.912 0.000 0.034 0.116 0.054
C6 1.000 0.127 0.873 0.000 0.035 0.154 0.067
C7 1.000 0.140 0.860 0.000 0.036 0.167 0.071
C8 1.000 0.140 0.860 0.000 0.036 0.167 0.071
C9 0.800 0.355 0.645 0.200 0.038 0.369 0.056
C10 0.800 0.620 0.380 0.200 0.063 0.626 0.148
C11 0.800 1.000 0.000 0.200 1.000 0.994 0.892
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.031 0.031 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.031 0.031 0.000
C2 1.000 0.013 0.987 0.000 0.031 0.043 0.020
C3 1.000 0.033 0.967 0.000 0.032 0.063 0.032
C4 1.000 0.070 0.930 0.000 0.033 0.099 0.048
C5 1.000 0.088 0.912 0.000 0.034 0.116 0.054
C6 1.000 0.127 0.873 0.000 0.035 0.154 0.067
C7 1.000 0.140 0.860 0.000 0.036 0.167 0.071
C8 1.000 0.140 0.860 0.000 0.036 0.167 0.071
C9 0.800 0.355 0.645 0.200 0.038 0.369 0.056
C10 0.800 0.620 0.380 0.200 0.063 0.626 0.148
C11 0.800 1.000 0.000 0.200 1.000 0.994 0.892
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Table 5.21: Evaluation metrics for the malicious controller 192.168.10.101 with
LEN labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C1 1.000 0.012 0.988 0.000 0.244 0.251 0.048
C2 1.000 0.051 0.949 0.000 0.251 0.280 0.113
C3 1.000 0.086 0.914 0.000 0.259 0.307 0.149
C4 1.000 0.192 0.808 0.000 0.283 0.388 0.233
C5 1.000 0.239 0.761 0.000 0.295 0.423 0.266
C6 1.000 0.285 0.715 0.000 0.308 0.458 0.296
C7 1.000 0.333 0.667 0.000 0.324 0.494 0.328
C8 1.000 0.333 0.667 0.000 0.324 0.494 0.328
C9 1.000 0.658 0.342 0.000 0.483 0.741 0.564
C10 0.997 0.867 0.133 0.003 0.730 0.898 0.793
C11 0.986 0.996 0.004 0.014 0.987 0.993 0.982
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C2 1.000 0.011 0.989 0.000 0.244 0.250 0.051
C3 1.000 0.033 0.967 0.000 0.248 0.267 0.090
C4 1.000 0.092 0.908 0.000 0.260 0.311 0.155
C5 1.000 0.114 0.886 0.000 0.265 0.328 0.173
C6 1.000 0.151 0.849 0.000 0.273 0.357 0.203
C7 1.000 0.168 0.832 0.000 0.277 0.369 0.215
C8 1.000 0.168 0.832 0.000 0.277 0.369 0.215
C9 1.000 0.395 0.605 0.000 0.345 0.541 0.369
C10 0.983 0.631 0.369 0.017 0.458 0.716 0.526
C11 0.983 0.998 0.002 0.017 0.995 0.995 0.985
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C1 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.242 0.242 0.000
C2 1.000 0.011 0.989 0.000 0.244 0.250 0.051
C3 1.000 0.033 0.967 0.000 0.248 0.267 0.090
C4 1.000 0.092 0.908 0.000 0.260 0.311 0.155
C5 1.000 0.114 0.886 0.000 0.265 0.328 0.173
C6 1.000 0.151 0.849 0.000 0.273 0.357 0.203
C7 1.000 0.168 0.832 0.000 0.277 0.369 0.215
C8 1.000 0.168 0.832 0.000 0.277 0.369 0.215
C9 1.000 0.395 0.605 0.000 0.345 0.541 0.369
C10 0.983 0.631 0.369 0.017 0.458 0.716 0.526
C11 0.983 0.998 0.002 0.017 0.995 0.995 0.985
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Table 5.22: Evaluation metrics for the normal thermostat 192.168.10.160 with
LEN labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.000
C1 1.000 0.045 0.955 0.000 0.021 0.064 0.031
C2 1.000 0.083 0.917 0.000 0.022 0.102 0.043
C3 1.000 0.150 0.850 0.000 0.024 0.167 0.060
C4 1.000 0.516 0.484 0.000 0.041 0.526 0.146
C5 1.000 0.767 0.233 0.000 0.082 0.771 0.251
C6 1.000 0.973 0.027 0.000 0.449 0.973 0.659
C7 1.000 0.990 0.010 0.000 0.667 0.990 0.812
C8 1.000 0.990 0.010 0.000 0.667 0.990 0.812
C9 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C10 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.000
C1 1.000 0.021 0.979 0.000 0.021 0.041 0.021
C2 1.000 0.125 0.875 0.000 0.023 0.143 0.054
C3 1.000 0.169 0.831 0.000 0.024 0.186 0.064
C4 1.000 0.323 0.677 0.000 0.030 0.337 0.098
C5 1.000 0.493 0.507 0.000 0.039 0.503 0.139
C6 1.000 0.646 0.354 0.000 0.056 0.653 0.189
C7 1.000 0.750 0.250 0.000 0.077 0.755 0.240
C8 1.000 0.750 0.250 0.000 0.077 0.755 0.240
C9 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C10 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.000
C1 1.000 0.021 0.979 0.000 0.021 0.041 0.021
C2 1.000 0.125 0.875 0.000 0.023 0.143 0.054
C3 1.000 0.169 0.831 0.000 0.024 0.186 0.064
C4 1.000 0.323 0.677 0.000 0.030 0.337 0.098
C5 1.000 0.493 0.507 0.000 0.039 0.503 0.139
C6 1.000 0.646 0.354 0.000 0.056 0.653 0.189
C7 1.000 0.750 0.250 0.000 0.077 0.755 0.240
C8 1.000 0.750 0.250 0.000 0.077 0.755 0.240
C9 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C10 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C11 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 5.23: Evaluation metrics for the normal VAV 192.168.10.161 with LEN
labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.156 0.156 0.000
C1 1.000 0.111 0.889 0.000 0.172 0.250 0.138
C2 1.000 0.111 0.889 0.000 0.172 0.250 0.138
C3 0.800 0.264 0.736 0.200 0.163 0.345 0.052
C4 0.600 0.541 0.459 0.400 0.184 0.550 0.100
C5 0.600 0.721 0.279 0.400 0.270 0.703 0.242
C6 0.600 0.862 0.138 0.400 0.429 0.824 0.405
C7 0.400 0.947 0.053 0.600 0.567 0.869 0.403
C8 0.400 0.947 0.053 0.600 0.567 0.869 0.403
C9 0.400 0.967 0.033 0.600 0.667 0.886 0.458
C10 0.400 1.000 0.000 0.600 1.000 0.914 0.603
C11 0.400 1.000 0.000 0.600 1.000 0.914 0.603
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.156 0.156 0.000
C1 1.000 0.111 0.889 0.000 0.172 0.250 0.138
C2 1.000 0.111 0.889 0.000 0.172 0.250 0.138
C3 0.600 0.310 0.690 0.400 0.130 0.353 -0.068
C4 0.600 0.428 0.572 0.400 0.153 0.453 0.020
C5 0.600 0.621 0.379 0.400 0.214 0.618 0.159
C6 0.600 0.655 0.345 0.400 0.231 0.647 0.186
C7 0.600 0.655 0.345 0.400 0.231 0.647 0.186
C8 0.600 0.655 0.345 0.400 0.231 0.647 0.186
C9 0.600 0.931 0.069 0.400 0.600 0.882 0.531
C10 0.400 0.967 0.033 0.600 0.667 0.886 0.458
C11 0.400 1.000 0.000 0.600 1.000 0.914 0.603
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.156 0.156 0.000
C1 1.000 0.111 0.889 0.000 0.172 0.250 0.138
C2 1.000 0.111 0.889 0.000 0.172 0.250 0.138
C3 0.600 0.310 0.690 0.400 0.130 0.353 -0.068
C4 0.600 0.428 0.572 0.400 0.153 0.453 0.020
C5 0.600 0.621 0.379 0.400 0.214 0.618 0.159
C6 0.600 0.655 0.345 0.400 0.231 0.647 0.186
C7 0.600 0.655 0.345 0.400 0.231 0.647 0.186
C8 0.600 0.655 0.345 0.400 0.231 0.647 0.186
C9 0.600 0.931 0.069 0.400 0.600 0.882 0.531
C10 0.400 0.967 0.033 0.600 0.667 0.886 0.458
C11 0.400 1.000 0.000 0.600 1.000 0.914 0.603
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Table 5.24: Evaluation metrics for the normal sensor 192.168.10.126 with LEN
labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C1 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C2 1.000 0.414 0.586 0.000 0.423 0.590 0.418
C3 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C4 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C5 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C6 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C7 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C8 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C9 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C10 0.667 0.875 0.125 0.333 0.667 0.818 0.542
C11 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.833 0.522
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.300 0.300 0.000
C1 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C2 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C3 1.000 0.429 0.571 0.000 0.429 0.600 0.429
C4 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C5 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C6 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C7 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C8 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C9 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C10 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C11 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.833 0.522
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.300 0.300 0.000
C1 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C2 1.000 0.143 0.857 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.218
C3 1.000 0.429 0.571 0.000 0.429 0.600 0.429
C4 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C5 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C6 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C7 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C8 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C9 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C10 1.000 0.857 0.143 0.000 0.750 0.900 0.802
C11 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.833 0.522
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Table 5.25: Evaluation metrics for the malicious sensor 192.168.10.182 with
LEN labelling schema
(a) 10 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320 0.320 0.000
C1 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C2 1.000 0.235 0.765 0.000 0.381 0.480 0.299
C3 1.000 0.706 0.294 0.000 0.615 0.800 0.659
C4 1.000 0.871 0.129 0.000 0.785 0.912 0.827
C5 1.000 0.894 0.106 0.000 0.818 0.928 0.855
C6 1.000 0.894 0.106 0.000 0.818 0.928 0.855
C7 1.000 0.900 0.100 0.000 0.827 0.932 0.863
C8 1.000 0.900 0.100 0.000 0.827 0.932 0.863
C9 1.000 0.912 0.088 0.000 0.844 0.940 0.877
C10 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.926 0.824
(b) 20 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320 0.320 0.000
C1 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C2 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C3 1.000 0.471 0.529 0.000 0.471 0.640 0.471
C4 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C5 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C6 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C7 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C8 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C9 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C10 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.926 0.824
(c) 30 Hidden State Model
Classifier TPR TNR FPR FNR Pr ACC MCC
C0 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320 0.320 0.000
C1 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C2 1.000 0.059 0.941 0.000 0.333 0.360 0.140
C3 1.000 0.471 0.529 0.000 0.471 0.640 0.471
C4 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C5 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C6 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C7 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C8 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C9 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C10 1.000 0.941 0.059 0.000 0.889 0.960 0.915
C11 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.926 0.824
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5.6 Chapter summary
This chapter presented the core results of this research, relating to SQ2, SQ3 and SQ4. Three
datasets, the Real Normal Dataset, Synthetic Normal Dataset and Synthetic Attack Dataset were
evaluated. First, the Real Normal Dataset was explored using a range of unsupervised methods,
including the Louvain community detection algorithm, k-means and GMM clustering, and time
series analysis to describe the network and evaluate features which may be appropriate for clas-
sifying BACnetwork command data. Next, the Synthetic Normal Dataset and Synthetic Attack
Dataset, the outputs of the simulator designed in §4.6.5 were evaluated and compared using the
same unsupervised methods. The comparison of these sets revealed differences in the network pat-
terns of attack data, compared to normal data for known network attacks, supporting hypothesis
H2, and SQ2. Further, the defined unknown network attacks were not distinguishable with fre-
quency measures such as time series. Penultimately, the preprocessing for a set of Hidden Markov
Models for classification of BACnet/IP network attacks was defined. Finally, evaluation results for
the Hidden Markov Models were presented, highlighting the results of principal interest, namely
repeatable MCC and TPR values which identify the ability to detect both known and unknown
BACnet/IP attacks using a range of classification thresholds. These results provide evidence to
hypotheses H3, H4 and H5, which in turn support SQ3 and SQ4.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
This chapter identifies the relationships between results derived from experiments conducted in this
research to their corresponding hypotheses and research questions. The research questions defined
in Chapter 3 are re-stated, and then addressed through evaluating the results derived in Chapters
4 and 5 in the context of the existing literature. Next, the contribution to knowledge provided by
this thesis is stated with the implications outlined and elaborated. Finally, the chapter concludes
with a critical review of the research process identifying areas in which the study could have been
improved.
6.1 Research question outcomes
The principal research question posed was explored through four defined sub-questions:
RQ1 How can known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP based Building Automation Systems
be detected?
SQ1 Are BACnet devices exposed to known threats?
SQ2 Do known BACnet attacks have distinguishable network patterns compared to normal
BACnetwork traffic?
SQ3 Is machine learning applicable to identify known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP
networks?
SQ4 How accurate are machine learning approaches in detecting known and unknown attacks
against BACnet/IP networks and devices?
To answer these sub-questions, a number of hypotheses were defined, with the results presented
in Chapters 4 and 5 providing evidence for the hypotheses, and thus answering the sub-questions
of this research. The relationships between the research sub-questions, and the derived hypotheses
are detailed in Table 6.1
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Table 6.1: Research sub-questions explored during the research, and related
hypotheses
Sub-question Related Hypotheses
SQ1: Are BACnet devices exposed to known
threats?
H1:BACnet devices are exposed to known
threats
SQ2: Do known BACnet attacks have distin-
guishable network patterns compared to nor-
mal BACnetwork traffic?
H2: Known BACnet attacks have distinguish-
able network patterns
SQ3: Is machine learning applicable to
identify known and unknown attacks against
BACnet/IP networks?
H3: Machine learning is capable of identi-
fying one or more known attacks against
BACnet/IP networks
H4: Machine learning is capable of identi-
fying one or more unknown attacks against
BACnet/IP networks
SQ4: How accurate are machine learn-
ing approaches in detecting known and un-
known attacks against BACnet/IP networks
and devices?
H5: Hidden Markov Models are more accur-
ate at detecting unknown BACnet/IP based at-
tacks than known BACnet/IP based attacks
6.1.1 SQ1: Are BACnet devices exposed to known threats?
Hypothesis H1: BACnet devices are exposed to known threats posited that BACnet devices are
exposed to known threats. While researchers such as Praus et al. (2016) and Gasser et al. (2017)
have presented data relating to the number of directly accessible BACnet devices over the Internet,
the threats posed to specific device types have not previously been explored. Further, Holmberg
(2003) presented threat models for the BACnet protocol, but did not define what classes of BACnet
devices can be affected by the defined threats. This research sought to evaluate the potential effect
a range of known threats can have on defined device profiles. The capabilities of five prominent
device profiles were examined through identifying the objects and services implemented in 368 real
devices. In §4.3, it was identified that the five most common commands are normally used by
97.8% of the retrieved devices. All five of these commands have one or more known malicious uses,
identified in Table 4.6.
To explore the impact of known threats to a BACnet device, a model of a controller device
was defined in Figure 4.3, with the developed STRIDE matrix of known threats applied. In total,
652 threat counts were identified as existing in the controller model, with denial of service the
most common threat faced. Further, the network services in use by the surveyed devices were
evaluated using the defined known attacks. It was found that control devices, which issue a greater
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variety of network commands are exposed to more commands which can be used for malicious
means. This aligns with current literature, whereby protection of controllers and workstations is
promoted over protection of sensors and actuators. With current network topologies, it is more
plausible for external adversaries to interact with controller devices, as many sensors and actuators
are still connected using serial media. However, it is expected that future buildings incorporated
into the Internet of Things and Smart City environments will have fully-native IP connectivity.
This is acknowledged by the recent proposals by the BACnet working group to implement a native
IP layer in the protocol to supplement the existing virtual IP layer (ASHRAE, 2018). As such,
identifying known threats to the prominent device profiles was justified. Hypothesis H1 is accepted,
given the identification of known threats in models of BACnet devices, the correlation of real-world
defined BACnet devices to exploitable services, and the 76,489 unique Internet exposed BACnet
devices over the past three years which utilise these services.
6.1.2 SQ2: Do known BACnet attacks have distinguishable network patterns
compared to normal BACnetwork traffic?
To evaluate SQ2, hypothesis H2: Known BACnet attacks have distinguishable network patterns
was defined with the assumption that BACnet attacks would affect network patterns enough to
be identifiable. To test this hypothesis, two simulated network datasets were developed based on
a defined BAS scenario described in §4.6.5. The first dataset, denoted Synthetic Normal Dataset,
contained only normal network data. Comparatively, the second dataset, denoted Synthetic Attack
Dataset, contained Normal, known attack and unknown attack network data. The two datasets
are statistically different, with the Wilcoxon signed-rank on a comparison of command frequencies
over the same period reporting a W value of 249,151.5 (p<0.1). Consequently, the Null hypothesis,
SyntheticNormal == SyntheticAttack was rejected. A range of unsupervised methods were used
to evaluate the two datasets, including unsupervised clustering, graph analysis and time-series
analysis.
K-means and Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) clustering were undertaken to identify, and
compare patterns in network flows constructed from the two datasets. The k-means clustering ap-
proach identified different underlying structures for each dataset. The k-means result was validated
by the GMM clusters, which identified the same underlying structures. Clustering the Synthetic
Normal Dataset revealed a linear-based function for cluster placements, where flows moved from
low duration, low packet count clusters, to high duration, high packet count clusters, visible in
Figure 5.13. Similar behaviour was not replicated in the Synthetic Attack Dataset depicted in Fig-
ure 5.20, highlighting the inherrent differences between normal and malicious BACnet/IP traffic.
Further, a direct comparison between BACnet commands, and the packet size feature of these
commands was undertaken. Similar feature evaluation was performed in Kaur et al. (2015) and
Tonejc et al. (2016), where packet lengths were normalised as a feature for anomaly detection. The
packet lengths for each command in the Synthetic Normal Dataset and Synthetic Attack Dataset
packet were compared. Packet length was deemed appropriate for use as a feature for identifying
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a number of Write property class attacks in the Synthetic Attack Dataset. As noted in §5.4.1,
the variance in addressing scheme will increase the signal-to-noise ratio of using packet length as
a feature. However, the variations in packet lengths further supports that there are distinctions
between normal and malicious BACnet/IP network traffic.
Differences between the two datasets were evaluated with directed graph analysis and a time-
series analysis of network packets. The Louvain community detection algorithm revealed distinct
visual characteristics between the directed graphs of the two datasets. However, an expected in-
crease in modularity classes for the Synthetic Attack Dataset did not occur. Rather, the network
attacks diluted the certainty of the community detection classifiers due to the increase in commu-
nication between nodes, in addition to the normal communication actions. Time-series analysis of
the full network capture for each dataset clearly identifies frequency peaks when known network
attacks occur, as detailed in Figure 5.22. Graphical anomaly detection was previously conducted in
Tonejc et al. (2016), with encouraging results when identifying new malicious hosts. This research
extends graphical analysis of BACnet anomalies to identify previously normal hosts which also
send a range of malicious traffic. The cumulative result identified from each applied unsupervised
method proves that known BACnet/IP attacks have different network patterns to normal network
traffic, and thus H2 was accepted.
6.1.3 SQ3: Is machine learning applicable to identify known and unknown
attacks against BACnet/IP networks?
Unsupervised machine learning algorithms have previously been applied to BACnet anomaly de-
tection by Tonejc et al. (2016) for identifying known network attacks, such as new commands, new
hosts, and out of context values. Comparatively, this research explored the application of two fur-
ther machine learning algorithms, Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs), to both known and unknown attacks. To provide an answer to the proposed research
question, two hypotheses were derived, namely, H3: Machine learning is capable of identifying
one or more known attacks against BACnet/IP networks and H4: Machine learning is capable of
identifying one or more unknown attacks against BACnet/IP networks.
Hypothesis H3 was accepted, based on the ability to classify known network attacks by the
two explored algorithms. In §4.4.2, an ANN was proven capable of identifying one class of known
network attack, supporting H3. Further, the mean results from 10 sampled HMMs for six BACnet
hosts, presented in Tables 5.14 - 5.25 identified the capability of HMMs to classify known attacks
at varying levels of accuracy. These results align with those presented in Tonejc et al. (2016),
stating that known attacks can be identified with unsupervised machine learning methods. Unlike
other studies, this research also investigated the ability to detect unknown BACnet/IP attacks.
In this context, unknown attacks are defined as a legitimate command, which occurs normally
in the training dataset, but can also be used for a malicious action in the testing dataset. An
example of this is a Write property command, which normally occurs between two hosts in the
training dataset, but is also used as an attack in the testing dataset. Outlined by the True Positive
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Rate values in Tables 5.17 - 5.19 and Tables 5.23 - 5.25, the implemented HMMs are capable of
identifying unknown BACnet/IP attacks with a range of defined classifiers. Further, evaluating the
effect of the two schemata revealed that the models for hosts 192.168.10.100 and 192.168.10.101
for the CMD schema also identified unknown network attacks. Classification of unknown malicious
BACnet commands is novel. Unlike other BACnet/IP anomaly detection studies, such as Tonejc et
al. (2016) and Esquivel-Vargas et al. (2017), which focussed on identifying deviations from learned
rules, this research has classified a range of in-bounds unknown attacks correctly, with acceptable
true negative, and false positive rates.
6.1.4 SQ4: How accurate are machine learning approaches in detecting known
and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP networks and devices?
Hypothesis H5: Hidden Markov Models are more accurate at detecting unknown BACnet/IP based
attacks than known BACnet/IP based attacks was defined to evaluate the accuracy of detecting
known and unknown BACnet/IP attacks using HMMs. Given that anomaly detection is generally
used to identify yet unknown threats (Goldstein & Uchida, 2016), the ability to detect unknown
attacks was selected as the test criterion for this hypothesis. As described in §5.5.1, two labelling
schemata, three hidden state model types and twelve classifier thresholds were used as compar-
ative measures for the HMM approach. The models for hosts 192.168.10.100, 192.168.10.101,
192.168.10.161, 192.168.10.126 and 192.168.10.182 evaluated both known and unknown attacks
in their datasets. The dataset for host 192.168.10.160 only contained known network attacks, and
thus models for host 192.168.10.160 only evaluated known network attacks.
For both schemata, all models which evaluated the unknown attacks were capable of detection
given the TPR result of 1.0, outlined in Tables 5.20,5.15, 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19. The most accur-
ate classifications for the CMD schema were C11 for the 10-state and 20-state models for host
192.168.10.101, with a MCC of 1.0. Comparatively, the most accurate classification for the LEN
schema was C10 for the 10-state model for host 192.168.10.182, also with a MCC of 1.0. Host
192.168.10.160 obtained a MCC of 1.0 for C11 in the 10-state and 20-state models for the CMD
schema. Additionally, host 192.168.10.160 obtained a MCC of 1.0 for C9, C10 and C11 for the 10-
state and 20-state models for the LEN schema. Of the presented models, four classifiers obtained
a MCC of 1.0 for only the known attacks, while three classifiers obtained a MCC of 1.0 for both
the known and unknown attacks. Due to the spread of attacks in the network, no examined host
evaluated only unknown attack traffic. As such, the models examined with the selected evaluation
metrics reported were independently, equally accurate at detecting both known and unknown at-
tacks in the examined dataset. These results do not support the premise of hypothesis H5, and as
such hypothesis H5 was rejected.
Unlike the results presented in Ariu et al. (2007), increasing the quantity of hidden states in this
research did not consistently increase the accuracy measurements of the model. For the results in
this study, all evaluation metrics plateau between the 20-state and 30-state models, with no change
recorded. Further inspecting the results in Ariu et al. (2007), identical behaviour can be identified
226
where the 20-state and 30-state models for two examined classifiers output identical evaluation
metrics. This further validates the results of the applied HMM in this research, given the same
behaviour is represented in both studies.
The cumulative answers of the defined research sub-questions provide an answer to the primary
research question, RQ1: How can known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP based Building
Automation Systems be detected?. Each method explored was capable of detecting known network
attacks against BACnet/IP devices at various levels of specificity. For a high-level view of network
patterns, time-series analysis of the network flows was useful for visual analysis of known network
attacks when compared to a known normal baseline. Both the clustering and graph analysis ap-
proaches were useful for identifying differences in network traffic between the Synthetic Normal
Dataset and the Synthetic Attack Dataset. However, both methods operating in an unsupervised
mode are only suitable for exploratory analysis, given the lack of ground truth. Tonejc et al. (2016)
has explored an unsupervised clustering approach for known network attacks with favourable res-
ults. Further work is required to increase the robustness of using solely a clustering or graph analysis
approach for detecting unknown network attacks. Conversely, the ANN deployed was effective at
identifying a known Write property attack, and should be explored further. The HMM approach
explored in this research was successful in detecting both known and unknown network attacks
in the examined dataset with acceptable evaluation measures. Specifically, the ability to detect a
range of unknown attacks in all of the examined hosts containing unknown attacks is promising.
6.2 Implications of the research
6.2.1 Threat modelling of BACnet devices
The research contributed to the existing threat modelling literature regarding BACnet systems in
§4.3. Previous works including Granzer et al. (2010), Fisk (2012), and Caselli et al. (2016) have
relied on the threat models presented in Holmberg (2003), however this work is not capable of
capturing the identified known BACnet attacks presented in the literature over the past 15 years.
The research collected a range of known attacks from the literature, and classified them using a
STRIDE threat matrix. To evaluate the threat model, the functions of a controller device were
modelled, with the defined threat model applied to generate threat impacts. The described threat
modelling approach was published in Peacock et al. (2018), and can be applied to other device
profiles using a model of each device.
6.2.2 Identification and evaluation of unknown network attacks
In §4.1, two potential vulnerabilities in the protocol were identified. The first vulnerability involved
the Change of Value (CoV) reporting function of the BACnet protocol, which describes how devices
disseminate values to other devices based on defined value thresholds. The research theorised that
variables which are set by the subscribing device could be exploited to cause a denial of service
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attack in the network, due to the inherent trust between devices in the network. The vulnerability
was evaluated using the developed threat model, obtaining the equal highest threat impact from
all evaluated known attacks. Further, CoV reporting is used in all of the evaluated device profiles,
outlined in Table 4.9. The vulnerability was examined using a testbed implementation described in
§4.4.4, where the theorised denial of service behaviour was observed. To evaluate the vulnerability
in a larger testbed, the vulnerability was incorporated into the attack framework defined in §4.6.9.
The impact of the CoV attack on the larger network remains unclear, as the attack was limited
in scope to prevent data generation failures from occurring in the defined scenario. However, the
attack was detected using the evaluated HMMs. Although the commands used to instigate this
attack were also used normally in the training dataset, additional emission symbols in the sequence
window were not normal, and thus caused the malicious labelled sequence referencing the CoV
attack to be identified using the wildcard emission symbol as an anomaly. Further evaluation of
the impact of this attack is required given the potential for vendor-specific limits in the number of
subscriptions each device holds.
The second identified vulnerability was in the Priority Array process of the BACnet protocol
for commandable properties identified in §4.1. Commandable properties are defined as those whose
value change causes physical action. The Priority Array can hold up to 16 values to be written to a
device, at 16 different priority levels. The BACnet 2012 standard states that undefined behaviour
may occur if more than one value is written to a device using the same priority level at the same
time. As such, the behaviour was modelled using the data representation of the Priority Array
in §4.3.1. The model identified that two devices may write to a third device at the same Priority
Array level, with only the second device’s value held by the array. To explore the Priority Array
attack using the BACnet open stack a simulation was developed which followed the same logic as
the defined model. The results in Table 4.11 report that the Priority Array behaviour is replicated
in the BACnet open stack. Given that there are no restrictions or enforcement on devices writing
to priorities by default in the BACnet 2012 standard, this exists as a significant issue for BACnet
devices. Further, the Write property command is a core function of the protocol, and exists in
all of the retrieved sensor, actuator, controller and advanced controller device descriptions. The
identification of this issue further reinforces the requirement for segregation and filtering of BACnet
devices connected to other networks, such as the Internet.
Similar to the CoV attack, the Priority Array attack was implemented in the attack framework
defined in §4.6.9. Further, the attack was successfully identified due to the emission symbol being
classed as anomalous, due to the target which was automatically selected by the attack framework
being a non-normal destination for the malicious controller device. It is expected that if the attack
was undertaken using a host which was normally communicated with, the evaluated schema would
not be appropriate for detecting the attack. Future work should examine further features, such as
inter-packet timings and contextual values such as a sliding window of known normal values written
to each device for identifying this class of attack.
The initial identification of both the two described network attacks were discussed in Peacock
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et al. (2017), and further expanded upon in Peacock et al. (2018).
6.2.3 Application of anomaly detection approaches for BACnet/IP networks
This research evaluated a range of approaches which were appropriate for identifying anomalies
in BACnet/IP traffic. The literature has identified methods of detecting out-of-bounds (known)
network attacks, where packet features deviate from normal. This research contributed out-of-
bounds network attack detection through applying an ANN to a known network attack using
time-based features. A further contribution to known network attack detection in BACnet/IP was
presented through the evaluation of HMMs.
The application of HMMs for BACnet/IP anomaly detection is a novel approach for both known
and unknown network attacks. Further, two methods were developed to apply the HMM approach
to BACnet/IP traffic. These methods are protocol agnostic, and can be utilised for other protocols
to apply a HMM. First, a method was developed to generate feature based emission symbols, which
provides a unique label for each specific BACnet packet. Two feature sets were implemented using
the approach, with the method robust enough to allow selection of specific packet features and
generate unique labels for each provided dataset. The method provides a means for comparing
feature selection sets for sequence-based models. Second, a semi-supervised labelling method was
developed which could enumerate and label generated sequences of emission symbols using pre-
defined ground truth data. The labelling method provided the means to evaluate the classification
capability of the HMMs. The HMMs deployed in this research provided promising results for
the defined simulated scenario at a host based specificity for classification of known and unknown
anomalous network traffic.
Three other anomaly detection methods were explored, namely, graph-analysis, unsupervised
clustering and time-series analysis. All three methods show promise, with the ability to distinguish
between datasets which contain normal and malicious network commands. The existing literature
has explored unsupervised clustering and time-series analysis for anomalous network classification,
and graph-analysis for known-bad hosts. Further tuning mechanisms are required to distinguish
between normal and unknown network attacks, and should be the focus of future studies.
The evaluation of the ANN and Write Property attack was presented in Johnstone et al. (2015).
6.3 Critical review of the research
The original design of the research as described in §3.5 was to use real network traffic as a com-
parison metric for the generated simulation scenario. However, the variability in real networks,
due to vendor specific device implementation, and the flexibility of the BACnet protocol made a
comparison to a generic defined simulation scenario difficult. Specifically, it was unclear until in-
spection of the captured network traffic that a vendor-specific middleware BACnet implementation
was also running on the network. This protocol seemed to undertake many normal functions of the
BACnet protocol, but provided a level of abstraction to existing network dissectors. Given that
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the research focus was on BACnet/IP and the proprietary nature of the discovered protocol, the
proprietary traffic was not evaluated. This reduced the ability to draw comparisons between the
simulated BACnet/IP implementation and the real BACnetwork traffic. Additionally, the topology
of the available real network did not provide the ability to capture sensor network data. The sensor
devices also did not communicate using BACnet/IP. As such, it was deemed not feasible to compare
the simulation scenario with the real network capture. However, this did not invalidate the selec-
tion of simulation as a research method for generating data. In other studies, such as Tonejc et al.
(2016) and Esquivel-Vargas et al. (2017), rather than using real network data to validate the design
of an implemented simulator, the real and simulated datasets are used to complement each other.
Thus, the research adapted to take this approach, where the analysis of the real network traffic
was useful for identifying the commands used in real networks, the structure and flow between
controllers, and the diurnal network patterns of the traffic. Further, the real data was used to trial
and evaluate a range of unsupervised methods to compare normal and malicious network traffic.
In addition, the task of generating data was underestimated, and as such required extensive
additional time and resources. To build the underlying data to drive the simulated network com-
munications a range of algorithms were implemented based on the defined scenario. The software
packages commonly used for architectural and air-conditioning design did not have the required
variable resolution to generate per second data. Further, through evaluation of the existing BACnet
simulators the only valid selection was the BACnet open stack as it was not restrictive for devel-
opment and deployment. However, for the purposes of this research, the network stack required a
number of features to be implemented to create the defined network scenario. These issues however,
could not realistically have been identified prior to the research commencement. Regardless, the
effect they had on the research was extensive.
Finally, the variance in generation of the BACnet/IP specific network attacks could be improved.
The attack framework was designed to be flexible and automated, primarily to eliminate the threat
of bias in generating the research data. As such, there is a lack of human interaction with the
generation of network attacks. Rabadia, Valli, Ibrahim and Baig (2017) suggest that automated
scripts and human interaction can be distinguished by the properties of the network attack. Thus,
the network patterns generated by the attack framework captures only automated attacks without
a human element. If generating a dataset using the attack framework again, the introduction
of human-driven attacks would be of interest for comparison between attack behaviour, and the
classification ability of the explored methods.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Research overview
This research aimed to investigate methods for identifying known and unknown network attacks
against BACnet/IP managed Building Automation Systems (BASs). The research area was defined
in Chapter 1, where the exploration of further anomaly detection approaches was identified, with
respect to existing approaches presented in the literature. The literature presented a number of
methods for detecting known network attacks in BACnet/IP networks. Focus has been on detecting
known attacks, where malicious traffic have distinct features, such as increased frequencies, illegal
byte values, or are sent out of sequence, when compared to normal network behaviour. Evaluating
the detection of legitimate-yet-malicious commands, those which operate normally but through the
protocols design or implementation can have malicious effect, has previously not been explored.
Further, limited existing research has explored machine learning methods for anomaly detection in
BACnet/IP networks.
Similar to other anomaly detection research areas, datasets for evaluating anomaly detection
approaches in BACnetworks are limited in scope and quantity. Given the criticality of BAS net-
works, existing studies evaluated datasets generated using simulation test-beds, or real datasets
with synthetic attacks implemented. Often these test-beds were small in scale, implement few
known attacks, or did not follow existing real-network topologies. Further, open source simulation
implementations were lacking in features, and require significant development to generate mean-
ingful datasets.
The research followed five phases. The first phase investigated the BACnet/IP protocol to
build an understanding of the protocol, and identify potential network commands which could
be used to cause malicious action. Further, the known attacks against BACnet were retrieved
from the surrounding literature for analysis in later phases. A range of existing BACnet simulator
and network generation solutions were collected for generating the required network data for the
research. Further, a range of existing Internet-wide scans of BACnet/IP devices were retrieved, in
addition to vendor-defined device specifications for analysis.
Phase two analysed the retrieved network scans, and identified the common services and objects
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used in deployed device profiles. From the retrieved known attacks and the protocol investigation
undertaken in phase one, a threat model was constructed. The threat model was applied to a
model of a BACnet/IP controller device, in addition to the identified services operating in the
vendor-defined device profiles. Further, to evaluate the retrieved network simulators, and trial
implementing known and unknown network attacks, two exploratory datasets were generated fol-
lowing the iterative process defined in Chapter 3. Ultimately, the BACnet open stack was selected
due to its flexibility. A range of algorithms and methods were selected for evaluation. These were,
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), Hidden Markov Models (HMMs), graph analysis, k-means clus-
tering, Gaussian Mixture Model clustering and time series analysis. Both ANNs and time series
analysis were conducted on the trial dataset with a defined known attack, providing encouraging
results.
Phase three consisted of collecting real BACnetwork data from an Australasian university,
and designing the simulation environment. A simulation scenario, underlying data generation
algorithms, network topology, and attack framework were designed. The simulation was then
deployed to generate and capture both normal and anomalous network traffic for evaluation. Two
datasets were generated, the Synthetic Normal Dataset, which consisted of one month of normal
network traffic, and the Synthetic Attack Dataset, consisting of one week of normal traffic with
pseudo-randomly generated anomalous network traffic drawn from the defined attack framework.
In phase four, experiments were conducted to evaluate the graph analysis, clustering, time series
and HMM approaches for detecting anomalous network traffic. Preprocessing was undertaken for
each dataset to allow the application of the selected algorithms and methods.
During the final phase, the outputs generated by each algorithm-dataset pairing were evaluated.
The results of this evaluation, in addition to the results generated in phase two, tested the posed
hypotheses and provided answers which supported the research questions. Further, the results
identified directions for future work.
7.2 Summary of contributions
7.2.1 Are BACnet devices exposed to known threats?
Existing literature has presented a range of attacks which can be used against BACnet devices.
Additionally, Holmberg (2003) identified a range of threats to the BACnet protocol. Further, Praus
et al. (2016) and Gasser et al. (2017) identified that BACnet devices are openly accessible over the
Internet, and readily accessible through services such as Shodan. Existing research however, has
not explored the threats faced by specific BACnet device types. This research explored the impact
existing known threats from the literature could have on BACnet devices through the creation of a
STRIDE threat model. Further, two additional threats were identified and evaluated in the context
of the threat model. It was proven that BACnet devices are exposed to known threats. Further,
BACnet controller and workstation device types face more potential known threats than lower-
level sensor and actuator device types. This finding is in-line with current literature suggestions,
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where protection of controller and workstation devices is promoted over protection of sensor and
actuator devices. It is expected that future BASs, which will be connected to the Internet of Things
and Smart City environments will shift perceptions of importance in regards to device protection.
Therefore, future work should aim to protect all types of devices.
7.2.2 Do known BACnet attacks have distinguishable network patterns com-
pared to normal BACnetwork traffic?
This research identified distinguishable network patterns between generated normal and malicious
BACnet commands. Unsupervised clustering of network flows identified differences in packet quant-
ity and flow sizes between known BACnet attacks which involve changes in frequency, such as denial
of service and flooding attacks. These patterns were further identified using time series analysis,
where comparisons of command frequencies identified spikes when network attacks were undertaken.
Graph analysis using an unsupervised community detection algorithm detailed differences in net-
work structures between networks which have only normal commands, and those with a mixture
of normal and malicious commands. However, network hosts which conduct malicious commands
were not identifiable with only graph based analysis. The cumulative results from the explored
approaches support the existing research paradigm, where deviation from the normal properties of
BACnet packets are used to identify anomalies.
7.2.3 Is machine learning applicable to identify known and unknown attacks
against BACnet/IP networks?
Machine learning previously has had limited use in the domain of BACnet/IP anomaly detection.
Further, research conducted by Tonejc et al. (2016) focused solely on known network attacks. In
contrast, this research explored the application of ANNs for anomaly detection for known network
attacks, and HMMs for anomaly detection for both known and unknown network attacks. It was
concluded that both approaches are capable of detecting known network attacks with acceptable
certainty. In addition, HMMs were found to be capable of detecting unknown network attacks
in the evaluated dataset. The HMM results are promising and HMMs should be evaluated with
further datasets containing unknown network attacks to generalise the results of this research.
7.2.4 How accurate are machine learning approaches in detecting known and
unknown attacks against BACnet/IP networks and devices?
Previous applications of machine learning were found to be highly accurate in BACnet/IP anomaly
detection. The approaches explored in this research were selected due to their high accuracy rates
in other anomaly detection problems. Evaluation of the accuracy of the selected approaches was
undertaken using multiple metrics to further examine the suitability in classifying both normal and
anomalous traffic correctly. This research identified that both ANNs and HMMs are accurate at
detecting known network attacks with similar results to those presented in Tonejc et al. (2016),
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and can distinguish between known attacks and normal traffic. Further, the research discerns that
HMMs can be equally accurate at detecting unknown attacks, in addition to distinguishing between
unknown attack and normal network traffic. The HMM results presented follow the trend of those
presented Ariu et al. (2007).
The cumulative answers of the explored research sub-questions provided an answer to the
primary research question, RQ1: How can known and unknown attacks against BACnet/IP based
Building Automation Systems be detected?. As outlined in Table 7.1, four of the five hypotheses
were accepted. H5 was not supported, as the HMMs explored were equally accurate at detecting
both known and unknown network attacks. Rather, the HMMs explored were not more, or less,
accurate at detecting known and unknown attacks in the explored dataset. Ultimately, the results
of the study were positive, and contributed to the domain knowledge through the creation of a
generalisable threat model for BACnet, identification and evaluation of two unknown network at-
tacks, and the exploration of a range of anomaly detection techniques capable of detecting known
and unknown BACnet/IP network attacks.
234
Table 7.1: Summary results of research sub-questions and related hypotheses
explored during the research
Sub-question Related Hypotheses Result
SQ1: Are BACnet devices exposed to known
threats?
H1:BACnet devices are exposed to known
threats
Accepted
SQ2: Do known BACnet attacks have distin-
guishable network patterns compared to nor-
mal BACnetwork traffic?
H2: Known BACnet attacks have distinguish-
able network patterns
Accepted
SQ3: Is machine learning applicable to
identify known and unknown attacks against
BACnet/IP networ9ks?
H3: Machine learning is capable of identi-
fying one or more known attacks against
BACnet/IP networks
Accepted
H4: Machine learning is capable of identi-
fying one or more unknown attacks against
BACnet/IP networks
Accepted
SQ4: How accurate are machine learn-
ing approaches in detecting known and un-
known attacks against BACnet/IP networks
and devices?
H5: Hidden Markov Models are more accur-
ate at detecting unknown BACnet/IP based at-
tacks than known BACnet/IP based attacks
Rejected
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7.3 Recommendations and future research directions
From the explored research it is recommended that BACnet devices have additional measures de-
ployed to mitigate potential cyber-physical attack. From a technical point of view these measures
should include network segregation of BACnet devices, source authentication and network monit-
oring. Cyber security considerations should be evaluated when connecting BACnet devices, and
in general BASs, to the Internet for remote monitoring and cloud-based analytics. There should
be some level of communication restriction through existing IP-based measures such as firewalls,
or customised BACnet methods such as those presented in Kaur et al. (2015). Further, ensuring
mutual trust between devices using source authentication measures will reduce the threat posed
by many known BACnet attacks which rely on exploiting the high trust between BACnet devices
in the guise of increased availability. Information Technology departments, network security de-
partments and mechanical services departments should increase communications to improve their
understanding of building control system networks which they manage. Deploying measures such
as IP network monitoring would assist in identifying both potential malicious traffic, and network
misconfigurations.
In terms of the future direction of research in BACnet/IP anomaly detection, identification and
exploration of additional existing machine learning approaches to anomaly detection are of interest.
To date, there are limited studies in terms of machine learning application to BACnet/IP, and there
are various existing algorithms which could be explored, such as Support Vector Machines. This
research presented an investigation into the application of HMMs and ANNs to the problem domain.
There are many additional approaches within these two algorithms to explore, including feature
selection tuning. Further application of an ANN to a diverse set of attacks, and deploying a network
level HMM, which can handle a non-unary emission symbols are also of interest.
Dataset generation can be improved as currently there are limitations in regards to simulations,
and attack generation. Research should focus on constructing testbeds using real BACnet/IP
devices to generate network data. However, given the variation in device descriptions between
vendors, using real devices is expected to be a costly exercise, and results may only be valid for
specific vendor types. Implementing a shared cyber-range of BACnet/IP devices could be a means
to improve research in this area where researchers can pool their implemented testbeds to increase
the rigour and validity of methods in future studies.
The flexibility of the BACnet protocol has aided in the widespread adoption of the protocol as
each vendor may design within the loose constructs of the protocol. It has however, made identifying
anomalies in BACnet/IP a larger task. Specification-based anomaly detection approaches, such as
those presented in Caselli et al. (2016) and Esquivel-Vargas et al. (2017) could be combined with
methods which evaluate in-bounds network traffic, such as those presented in this research.
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7.4 Further remarks
BACnet development has now identified the inherent lack of security in the protocol as an inhib-
iter of future BACnet use. Specifically, in June 2018 the BACnet working committee proposed
Addenda 135-2016bj for public review (ASHRAE, 2018). The aim of this review of the Addenda
was increasing the native security of BACnet implementations to fit with previous iterations of
the Addenda for expanding the use of native IP into the BACnet stack. The purpose of native
IP is to enable all BACnet devices to operate using IP as a medium, with the aim of integration
into the Internet of Things and cloud-based infrastructures. The proposal introduces the use of
websockets to provide TLS to BACnet devices, specifically focusing on encryption and source au-
thentication, allowing dynamic host address assignments. Additionally, the proposal identifies that
vendors should provide the ability to update hardware firmware and software. These are positive
steps that are long overdue in a slow moving but widely used protocol.
However, the proposal does not reduce the requirement for network monitoring in BACnet/IP
networks. With BACnet devices set to be connected to further diverse networks and devices,
detection capabilities must continue to improve to address future needs.
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Appendix A
BACnet Device Profiles
Table A.1: Definitions of sensor devices derived from the retrieved product
listing statements
SensorProfile
BIBBS DS-RP-B, DS-WP-B, DM-DDB-B, DM-DOB-B, DS-RPM-B, DM-RD-B, DM-DCC-
B, DM-TS-B, DS-COV-B
SERVICES ConfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate, DeviceCommunicationControl-Execute, I-Am-
Initiate, I-Have-Initiate, ReadProperty-Execute, ReadPropertyMultiple-Execute,
ReinitializeDevice-Execute, SubscribeCOV-Execute, TimeSynchronization-Execute,
UnconfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate, Who-Has-Execute, Who-Is-Execute,
WriteProperty-Execute
OBJECTS device, analog-input, analog-value, binary-input
Table A.2: Definitions of controller devices derived from the retrieved product
listing statements
ControllerProfile
BIBBS DS-RP-B, DS-WP-B, DM-DDB-B, DM-DOB-B, DM-DCC-B, DS-RPM-B, DM-RD-
B, DS-WPM-B, DM-TS-B, DS-COV-B, DM-DDB-A
SERVICES ConfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate, DeviceCommunicationControl-Execute,
I-Am-Execute, I-Am-Initiate, I-Have-Initiate, ReadProperty-Execute,
ReadPropertyMultiple-Execute, ReinitializeDevice-Execute, SubscribeCOV-
Execute, TimeSynchronization-Execute, UnconfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate,
Who-Has-Execute, Who-Is-Execute, Who-Is-Initiate, WriteProperty-Execute,
WritePropertyMultiple-Execute
OBJECTS device, analog-value, analog-input, binary-input, binary-value, binary-output,
analog-output, multi-state-value
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Table A.3: Definitions of actuator devices derived from the retrieved product
listing statements
ActuatorProfile
BIBBS DS-RP-B, DS-WP-B, DM-DDB-B, DM-DOB-B, DS-RPM-B, DS-COV-B, DM-TS-
B, DM-UTC-B, DM-DCC-B, DM-RD-B, DS-WPM-B
SERVICES ConfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate, DeviceCommunicationControl-Execute, I-Am-
Initiate, I-Have-Initiate, ReadProperty-Execute, ReadPropertyMultiple-Execute,
ReinitializeDevice-Execute, SubscribeCOV-Execute, TimeSynchronization-Execute,
UTCTimeSynchronization-Execute, UnconfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate, Who-
Has-Execute, Who-Is-Execute, WriteProperty-Execute, WritePropertyMultiple-
Execute
OBJECTS device, analog-input, binary-input, analog-value, binary-value, binary-output,
analog-output, multi-state-value
Table A.4: Definitions of advanced controller devices derived from the retrieved
product listing statements
AdvancedControllerProfile
BIBBS DS-RP-B, DS-WP-B, DM-DDB-B, DS-RPM-B, DM-TS-B, DM-DCC-B, DS-WPM-
B, AE-N-I, AE-ACK-B, DM-DOB-B, DM-RD-B, DM-DDB-A, SCHED-I-B, DM-
UTC-B, DS-COV-B, DS-WP-A, T-VMT-I, DS-RP-A, T-ATR-B, DM-LM-B, DM-
BR-B, SCHED-E-B, DS-COV-A, DM-R-B, DS-RPM-A, DM-DOB-A
SERVICES AcknowledgeAlarm-Execute, AddListElement-Execute, AtomicReadFile-
Execute, AtomicWriteFile-Execute, ConfirmedCOVNotification-Execute,
ConfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate, ConfirmedEventNotification-Initiate,
DeviceCommunicationControl-Execute, I-Am-Execute, I-Am-Initiate, I-
Have-Execute, I-Have-Initiate, ReadProperty-Execute, ReadProperty-
Initiate, ReadPropertyMultiple-Execute, ReadPropertyMultiple-Initiate,
ReadRange-Execute, ReinitializeDevice-Execute, RemoveListElement-Execute,
SubscribeCOV-Execute, SubscribeCOV-Initiate, TimeSynchronization-Execute,
UTCTimeSynchronization-Execute, UnconfirmedCOVNotification-Execute,
UnconfirmedCOVNotification-Initiate, UnconfirmedEventNotification-Initiate,
Who-Has-Execute, Who-Has-Initiate, Who-Is-Execute, Who-Is-Initiate,
WriteProperty-Execute, WriteProperty-Initiate, WritePropertyMultiple-Execute
OBJECTS device, analog-value, schedule, notification-class, calendar, binary-value, analog-
input, binary-input, multi-state-value, binary-output, analog-output, file, trend-log,
multi-state-input, program, multi-state-output, loop, event-enrollment
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Table A.5: Definitions of workstation devices derived from the retrieved product
listing statements
Workstation Profile
BIBBS DS-RP-B, DM-DDB-B, DM-DOB-B, DM-DDB-A, DS-WP-A, DS-RP-A, DS-RPM-
A, DS-WPM-A, AE-ACK-A, AE-N-A, DM-MTS-A, AE-AS-A, AE-VM-A, AE-VN-
A, DS-M-A, DS-V-A, SCHED-VM-A, T-V-A, DM-ADM-A, DM-TS-A, DS-COV-
A, DM-UTC-A, DM-ANM-A, DS-WP-B, DS-RPM-B, DM-DCC-B, DS-WPM-B,
DM-LM-B, T-ATR-A, DM-UTC-B, DM-LM-A, DM-TS-B, DM-RD-B, DM-ATS-
A, AE-AVN-A, DM-DOB-A, DM-RD-A, SCHED-WS-A, DM-DCC-A, DM-BR-A,
T-VMT-A, DM-OCD-B
SERVICES AcknowledgeAlarm-Initiate, AddListElement-Execute, AddListElement-Initiate,
AtomicReadFile-Initiate, AtomicWriteFile-Initiate, ConfirmedCOVNotification-
Execute, ConfirmedEventNotification-Execute, CreateObject-Execute,
CreateObject-Initiate, DEPRECATED, DeleteObject-Execute,
DeviceCommunicationControl-Execute, DeviceCommunicationControl-
Initiate, GetAlarmSummary-Initiate, GetEnrollmentSummary-Initiate,
GetEventInformation-Initiate, I-Am-Execute, I-Am-Initiate, I-Have-
Execute, I-Have-Initiate, ReadProperty-Execute, ReadProperty-
Initiate, ReadPropertyMultiple-Execute, ReadPropertyMultiple-Initiate,
ReadRange-Initiate, ReinitializeDevice-Execute, ReinitializeDevice-Initiate,
RemoveListElement-Execute, RemoveListElement-Initiate, SubscribeCOV-
Initiate, TimeSynchronization-Execute, TimeSynchronization-Initiate,
UTCTimeSynchronization-Execute, UTCTimeSynchronization-Initiate,
UnconfirmedCOVNotification-Execute, UnconfirmedEventNotification-Execute,
Who-Has-Execute, Who-Has-Initiate, Who-Is-Execute, Who-Is-Initiate,
WriteProperty-Execute, WriteProperty-Initiate, WritePropertyMultiple-Execute,
WritePropertyMultiple-Initiate
OBJECTS device, file, analog-value, binary-value, schedule
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Appendix B
BIBB to Service Matching Tables
Table B.1: BIBB to services matching, adapted from SSPC-135 (2012)
BIBB Services
DataSharing
DS-RP-A ReadProperty (Initiate)
DS-RP-B ReadProperty (Execute)
DS-RPM-A ReadPropertyMultiple (Initiate)
DS-RPM-B ReadPropertyMultiple (Execute),
DS-WP-A WriteProperty (Initiate),
DS-WP-B WriteProperty (Execute),
DS-WPM-A WritePropertyMultiple (Initiate),
DS-WPM-B WritePropertyMultiple (Execute),
DS-COV-A SubscribeCOV (Initiate), ConfirmedCOVNotification (Execute), Unconfirmed-
COVNotification (Execute),
DS-COV-B SubscribeCOV (Execute), ConfirmedCOVNotification (Initiate), Unconfirmed-
COVNotification (Initiate),
DS-COVP-A SubscribeCOVproperty (Execute), ConfirmedCOVNotification (Execute), Un-
confirmedCOVNotification (Execute),
DS-COVP-B SubscribeCOVProperty (Initiate), ConfirmedCOVNotification (Initiate), Un-
confirmedCOVNotification (Initiate),
DS-COVU-
A
ConfirmedCOVNotification (Execute),
DS-COVU-B ConfirmedCOVNotification (Initiate),
DS-V-A ReadProperty (Initiate),
DS-AV-A ReadProperty (Initiate),
DS-M-A WriteProperty (Initiate),
DS-AM-A WriteProperty (Initiate),
DS-WG-A WriteGroup (Initiate),
DS-WG-I-B WriteGroup (Execute),
DS-WG-E-B WriteGroup (Execute), WriteProperty (Initiate)
AlarmSharing
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BIBB Services
AE-N-A ConfirmedEventNotification (Execute),UnconfirmedEventNotification (Ex-
ecute),
AE-N-I-B ConfirmedEventNotification (Initiate),UnconfirmedEventNotification (Initi-
ate),
AE-N-E-B ReadProperty (Initiate),ConfirmedEventNotification (Initi-
ate),UnconfirmedEventNotification (Initiate), AcknowledgeAlarm (Execute),
GetEventInformation (Initiate), GetEventInformation (Execute)
AE-ACK-A AcknowledgeAlarm (Initiate),
AE-ACK-B AcknowledgeAlarm (Execute),
AE-ASUM-
A
GetAlarmSummary (Initiate),
AE-ASUM-
B
GetAlarmSummary (Execute),
AE-ESUM-
A
GetEnrollmentSummary (Initiate),
AE-ESUM-
B
GetEnrollmentSummary (Execute),
AE-INFO-A GetEventInformation (Initiate),
AE-INFO-B GetEventInformation (Execute),
AE-LS-A LifeSafetyOperation (Initiate), ConfirmedEventNotification (Ex-
ecute),UnconfirmedEventNotification (Execute), AcknowledgeAlarm (Ini-
tiate),
AE-LS-B LifeSafetyOperation (Execute), ConfirmedEventNotification (Initiate), Uncon-
firmedEventNotification (Initiate), AcknowledgeAlarm (Execute), GetEventIn-
formation (Execute)
AE-VN-A ConfirmedEventNotification (Execute),UnconfirmedEventNotification (Ex-
ecute),
AE-AVN-A ConfirmedEventNotification (Execute),UnconfirmedEventNotification (Ex-
ecute),
AE-VM-A ReadProperty (Initiate), WriteProperty (Initiate)
AE-AVM-A ReadProperty (Initiate), WriteProperty (Initiate), CreateObject (Initiate), De-
leteObject (Initiate),
AE-AS-A GetAlarmSummary (Initiate), GetEnrollmentSummary (Initiate), GetEventIn-
formation (Initiate),
AE-ELV-A ReadRange (Initiate),
AE-ELVM-
A
ReadRange (Initiate),ReadProperty (Initiate), WriteProperty (Initiate),
AE-EL-I-B ReadRange (Execute),
AE-EL-E-B ConfirmedEventNotification (Execute), UnconfirmedEventNotification (Ex-
ecute), ReadRange (Execute),
AE-NF-B A AddListElement (Initiate), RemoveListElement (Initiate), ConfirmedCOVNo-
tification (Initiate), UnconfirmedCOVNotification (Initiate), ConfirmedCOV-
Notification (Execute), UnconfirmedCOVNotification (Execute)
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BIBB Services
AE-NF-I-B ConfirmedCOVNotification (Initiate) , UnconfirmedCOVNotification (Initi-
ate), AddListElement (Execute), RemoveListElement (Execute)
Schedule
SCHED-A ReadProperty (Initiate),WriteProperty (Initiate), DEPRECATED,
SCHED-I-B ReadProperty (Execute), WriteProperty (Execute), TimeSynchronization (Ex-
ecute), UTCTimeSynchronization (Execute),
SCHED-E-B ReadProperty (Execute), WriteProperty (Execute), TimeSynchronization (Ex-
ecute),UTCTimeSynchronization (Execute), WriteProperty (Initiate),
SCHED-R-B ReadProperty (Execute), TimeSynchronization (Ex-
ecute),UTCTimeSynchronization (Execute),
SCHED-
AVM-A
CreateObject (Initiate),DeleteObject (Initiate),ReadProperty (Initiate),
WriteProperty (Initiate),
SCHED-
VM-A
ReadProperty (Initiate), WriteProperty (Initiate),
SCHED-
WS-A
ReadProperty (Initiate), WriteProperty (Initiate),
SCHED-
WS-I-B
ReadProperty (Execute), WriteProperty (Execute), TimeSynchronization (Ex-
ecute) ,UTCTimeSynchronization (Execute)
Trending
T-VMT-A ReadRange (Initiate), DEPRECATED,
T-VMT-I-B ReadRange (Execute),
T-VMT-E-B ReadRange (Execute), ReadProperty (Initiate),
T-ATR-A ConfirmedEventNotification (Execute), UnconfirmedEventNotification (Ex-
ecute), ReadRange (Initiate),
T-ATR-B ConfirmedEventNotification (Initiate) , UnconfirmedEventNotification (Initi-
ate), ReadRange (Execute),
T-VMMV-A ReadRange (Initiate), DEPRECATED,
T-VMMV-I-
B
ReadRange (Execute),
T-VMMV-
E-B
ReadRange (Execute), ReadPropertyMultiple (Initiate),
T-AMVR-A ConfirmedEventNotification (Initiate) , UnconfirmedEventNotification (Initi-
ate), ReadRange (Execute),
T-AMVR-B ConfirmedEventNotification (Initiate) , UnconfirmedEventNotification (Initi-
ate), ReadRange (Execute),
T-V-A ReadRange (Initiate),
T-AVM-A CreateObject (Initiate), DeleteObject (Initiate), ReadProperty (Initiate),
ReadRange (Initiate), WriteProperty (Initiate),
T-A-A ConfirmedEventNotification (Execute), UnconfirmedEventNotification (Ex-
ecute), ReadRange (Initiate), ReadRange (Execute)
DeviceManagement
DM-DDB-A Who-Is (Initiate), I-Am (Execute),
DM-DDB-B Who-Is (Execute), I-Am (Initiate),
255
BIBB Services
DM-DOB-A Who-Has (Initiate), I-Have (Execute),
DM-DOB-B Who-Has (Execute), I-Have (Initiate),
DM-DCC-A DeviceCommunicationControl (Initiate),
DM-DCC-B DeviceCommunicationControl (Execute),
DM-TM-A ConfirmedTextMessage (Initiate),UnconfirmedTextMessage (Initiate),
DM-TM-B ConfirmedTextMessage (Execute), UnconfirmedTextMessage (Execute),
DM-TS-A TimeSynchronization (Initiate),
DM-TS-B TimeSynchronization (Execute),
DM-UTC-A UTCTimeSynchronization (Initiate),
DM-UTC-B UTCTimeSynchronization (Execute),
DM-RD-A ReinitializeDevice (Initiate),
DM-RD-B ReinitializeDevice (Execute),
DM-BR-A ReinitializeDevice (Initiate), CreateObject (Initiate), AtomicReadFile (Initi-
ate), AtomicWriteFile (Initiate),
DM-BR-B ReinitializeDevice (Execute), AtomicReadFile (Execute), AtomicWriteFile
(Execute),
DM-R-A UnconfirmedCOVNotification (Execute),
DM-R-B UnconfirmedCOVNotification (Initiate),
DM-LM-A AddListElement (Initiate), RemoveListElement (Initiate),
DM-LM-B AddListElement (Execute), RemoveListElement (Execute),
DM-OCD-A CreateObject (Initiate), DeleteObject (Initiate),
DM-OCD-B CreateObject (Execute),DeleteObject (Execute),
DM-VT-A VT-Open (Initiate), VT-Close (Initiate), VT-Data (Initiate), VT-Close (Ex-
ecute), VT-Data (Execute)
DM-VT-B VT-Close (Initiate), VT-Data (Initiate), VT-Open (Execute), VT-Close (Ex-
ecute), VT-Data (Execute),
DM-ANM-A Who-Is (Initiate), I-Am (Execute),
DM-ADM-A ReadProperty (Initiate),
DM-ATS-A TimeSynchronization (Initiate), UTCTimeSynchronization (Initiate),
DM-MTS-A TimeSynchronization (Initiate), UTCTimeSynchronization (Initiate),
NetworkManagement
NM-CE-A Establish-Connection-To-Network (Initiate), Disconnect-Connection-To-
Network (Initiate),
NM-CE-B Establish-Connection-To-Network (Execute), Disconnect-Connection-To-
Network (Execute),
NM-RC-A Who-Is-Router-To-Network (Initiate), Initialize-Routing-Table (Initiate), I-
Am-Router-To-Network (Execute), I-Could-Be-Router-To-Network (Execute),
Initialize-Routing-Table-Ack (Execute),
NM-RC-B Who-Is-Router-To-Network (Initiate), I-Am-Router-To-Network (Initiate),
Initialize-Routing-Table-Ack (Initiate), Who-Is-Router-To-Network (Execute),
I-Am-Router-To-Network (Execute), Initialize-Routing-Table (Execute)
NetworkSecurity
256
BIBB Services
NS-SD Security-Payload (Initiate), Security-Response (Initiate), Request-Key-Update
(Initiate), What-Is-Network-Number (Initiate), Network-Number-Is (Initiate),
Challenge-Request (Execute), Security-Payload (Execute), Security-Response
(Execute), Update-Key-Set (Execute), Update-Distribution-Key (Execute),
What-Is-Network-Number (Execute), Network-Number-Is (Execute),
NS-ED Security-Payload (Initiate), Security-Response (Initiate), Request-Key-Update
(Initiate), What-Is-Network-Number (Initiate), Network-Number-Is (Initiate),
Challenge-Request (Execute), Security-Payload (Execute), Security-Response
(Execute), Update-Key-Set (Execute), Update-Distribution-Key (Execute),
What-Is-Network-Number (Execute), Network-Number-Is (Execute),
NS-MAD Security-Payload (Initiate), Security-Response (Initiate), Request-Key-Update
(Initiate), What-Is-Network-Number (Initiate), Network-Number-Is (Initiate),
Challenge-Request (Execute), Security-Payload (Execute), Security-Response
(Execute), Update-Key-Set (Execute), Update-Distribution-Key (Execute),
What-Is-Network-Number (Execute), Network-Number-Is (Execute),
NS-DMK-A Request-Master-Key (Execute), Set-Master-Key (Initiate),
NS-DMK-B Request-Master-Key (Initiate), Set-Master-Key (Execute),
NS-KS Request-Key-Update (Execute), Request-Master-Key (Execute), Update-Key-
Set (Initiate), Update-Distribution-Key (Initiate), Set-Master-Key (Initiate),
Security-Payload (Initiate), Security-Response (Initiate), Request-Key-Update
(Initiate), What-Is-Network-Number (Initiate),Network-Number-Is (Initiate),
Challenge-Request (Execute), Security-Payload (Execute),Security-Response
(Execute), Update-Key-Set (Execute), Update-Distribution-Key (Execute),
What-Is-Network-Number (Execute), Network-Number-Is (Execute),
NS-TKS Request-Key-Update (Execute), Request-Master-Key (Execute), Update-Key-
Set (Initiate), Update-Distribution-Key (Initiate), Set-Master-Key (Initiate),
Security-Payload (Initiate), Security-Response (Initiate), Request-Key-Update
(Initiate), What-Is-Network-Number (Initiate),Network-Number-Is (Initiate),
Challenge-Request (Execute), Security-Payload (Execute),Security-Response
(Execute), Update-Key-Set (Execute), Update-Distribution-Key (Execute),
What-Is-Network-Number (Execute), Network-Number-Is (Execute),
NS-SR Security-Payload (Initiate), Security-Response (Initiate), Request-Key-Update
(Initiate), What-Is-Network-Number (Initiate), Network-Number-Is (Initiate),
Challenge-Request (Execute), Security-Payload (Execute), Security-Response
(Execute), Update-Key-Set (Execute), Update-Distribution-Key (Execute),
What-Is-Network-Number (Execute), Network-Number-Is (Execute),
NS-SP Security-Payload (Initiate), Security-Response (Initiate), Request-Key-Update
(Initiate), What-Is-Network-Number (Initiate), Network-Number-Is (Initiate),
Challenge-Request (Execute), Security-Payload (Execute), Security-Response
(Execute), Update-Key-Set (Execute), Update-Distribution-Key (Execute),
What-Is-Network-Number (Execute), Network-Number-Is (Execute),
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